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ABSTRACT  
 
Objectives of the Study 
The objective of this mixed methods case study is two-fold.  First, it explores corporate learning 
using the theory of organizational knowledge creation and one US based corporation to determine 
the theory’s relevance to American firms.  Second, it seeks to understand how social practices 
and leadership behaviors affect employee knowledge or “true beliefs” and thus the implications to 
the firm’s knowledge creation and ultimately, its competitive advantage.  Ikujiro Nonaka’s theory 
of organizational knowledge creation is used as the framework to examine the extent to which 
internal factors affect knowledge creation at the organizational and employee levels.  The 
research addresses two questions regarding Nonaka’s theory:  1) it assesses the theory in a US 
corporation with a relatively homogenous population to determine the validity of the theory that 
was developed outside the US and 2) it examines to what extent internal factors such as social 
practices and leadership behaviors affect the organizational knowledge creation process.  In 
addition, consequences from events external to the firm are assessed to determine their impact on 
knowledge creation and corporate learning.   
 
 
Summary 
The study used knowledge creation theory to understand how internal behaviors and external 
events affected corporate learning and competitive advantage.  Given that knowledge is only 
useful in its context, the introduction described the origins of the firm and impact of the Internet.  
The literature review provided the historical context for organizational culture in US firms, the 
growth of learning organizations and it summarized organizational knowledge creation theory.  
Social practices and leadership behaviors were explored in relation to a variety of topics.  The 
research used quantitative and qualitative data that included survey data and qualitative data 
collected from semi-structured interviews, direct observation, internal documents, and secondary 
sources.  The variety of sources aided the attempt to identify robust answers to the broad research 
questions raised in the study. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The interviews and direct observations at the firm reveal that organizational knowledge creation 
is not evident in this US corporation, primarily due to the narrow way in which knowledge is 
perceived and leadership behaviors that fail to consistently empower subordinates in the 
hierarchical management model.  The cultural beliefs that preclude knowledge creation were also 
observed to thwart corporate learning.  Several social practices and leadership behaviors appear to 
influence employee beliefs and thus corporate learning including communication transparency, 
decision-making and accountability, and strategic responses to external “random” events in 
digital communication.  Shortcomings in these areas appear to have related and unintended 
consequences of diminished trust, lack of confidence, and risk aversion that can jeopardize the 
firm’s competitive advantage.  
 
 
Key Words  
Corporate learning, organizational knowledge creation, organizational development, 
organizational learning, knowledge management, strategic learning, social practices, leadership  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Background to the research problem 
Over twenty years ago, Ikujiro Nonaka wrote “in an economy where the only certainty is 
uncertainty, the one sure source of lasting competitive advantage is knowledge” (1991, p. 96).  While 
individuals develop new knowledge, organizations play a key role in how knowledge is articulated and 
amplified (Nonaka, 1994) and how new knowledge is created.  In 1998, Larry Prusak of IBM stated: 
There is an emerging new theory of the firm, one that recognizes the growing complexity of work, 
products, and organizations, and concludes that the only sustainable competitive advantage 
comes from what you know and how fast you can put it to use. (Cohen, 1998, p. 23) 
 
Knowledge is the foundation of invention and innovation (Bell, 1999).  Today, US business spends over 
$60 billion annually to develop employees and it is argued that when managed well, corporate learning 
can not only reduce errors and improve productivity it can be an essential source of competitive 
advantage (Bersin, 2013).  How is knowledge created in an organization and how does it enhance a firm’s 
competitive advantage?  The point of this case study is to explore corporate learning and the relevance of 
knowledge creation theory in the US, how social practices and leadership behaviors influence employee 
beliefs and subsequently, the firm’s ability to innovate and expand competitive advantage. 
Organizations are defined as a group of people that collectively act for a common goal (Scharmer, 
2009).  For business organizations, also referred to as firms, companies or corporations, the groups of 
people share the common goal of maximizing profits.  These organizations are not static or passive 
entities that merely process information.  They must dynamically respond to changing marketplace 
conditions creating information and knowledge (Nonaka, 1994) if they are to achieve their goals over 
time.  The paradigm of the organization as a system that processes information or solves problems in a 
hierarchical “input-process-output” sequence (Nonaka, 1994) that Frederick Winslow Taylor helped to 
create a century ago is one broadly agreed to as outdated in what has been characterized as our 
postindustrial, knowledge or information society (Drucker 1968; Lyotard 1984; Bell 1999).  Often, in 
addition to maximizing profits, there is an overarching reason the business exists which Nonaka & 
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Toyama (2005, p. 424) use the French phrase raison d'être that in English translates as “reason for 
existence.”  This suggests there are subjective elements in an organization and how they define success.  
Consequently, there is not one right answer or success formula that can be imitated across organizations.   
Organizations, like the people within them, contain subjective qualities that must be considered 
and are a source of differentiation.  An example of differentiation across organizations are their strategies 
for acquiring knowledge when competition is a “war of movement” whereby success depends on 
anticipating market trends and the speed in meeting customer needs (Slocum, 1994).  Research in 
corporate learning, organizational learning, and development or “strategic learning” is built upon the 
premise that the conversion of information into knowledge and learning can be a source for competitive 
advantage and a key asset to the firm (Nonaka 1994, Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, Kuwada 1998, Thomas et 
al. 2001).  Peter Drucker wrote that the “main producers of wealth have become information and 
knowledge” (p. 183, 1993) as there is increasingly less return on conventional resources such as land, 
labor, and capital.  He acknowledged that while knowledge has power, the ways in which knowledge 
behaves as an economic resource are not clearly understood.  At the individual and organizational level, 
power and those who control it affect knowledge.  People often share knowledge with those they relate to 
most that can result in informal yet powerful sub-groups within an organization that inhibit broad 
knowledge sharing across groups (Makela et al 2007).  Few companies in the US embody the true nature 
of the knowledge-creating company and have little understanding of what knowledge is and what must be 
done to exploit it (Nonaka 1991, 2007) despite decades of research and commercialized concepts such as 
“intellectual capital”, “knowledge management”, and “learning organizations.”    
Knowledge and the learning context have been defined in various ways by researchers and 
business scholars.  For this research, knowledge and the means by which it is created is defined according 
to the prominent work of Ikujiro Nonaka and his associates (Nonaka et al. 2000).  First, knowledge is not 
information that comes from what can be measured; rather it is a true belief1 that is justified based on an 
                                                
1 Nonaka & Toyama 2005 argues knowledge is not absolute and context-free. Instead it exists with human 
subjectivities and the contexts that surround whom we are (values) and from where we look at it (context). 
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individual’s experiences in the world.  Information remains the same regardless of context and knowledge 
is only useful in its context.  Knowledge is constructed based on one’s reality that involves feelings and 
belief systems that may or may not be conscious.  Second, knowledge has explicit and tacit meaning that 
some can be captured, formulated into sentences, or specifications and some may be very difficult to 
describe since it exists in habits and culture.  The analogy frequently used to explain the differences 
between tacit and explicit knowledge is that of riding a bike.  Writing a book about a bike and how to ride 
it is very different than the act of riding when often the rider cannot explain how he or she does it.  
Effective knowledge creation also depends on other factors such as the enabling context and distinct steps 
involved in organizational knowledge creation that connects knowledge of individuals to the broader 
organization.  Communicating knowledge is equally as important as creating it (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995).  These concepts are explored at length in Chapter 2.3 Organizational Knowledge Creation Theory.   
Only a small number of large corporations live half as long as a person2 (Senge, 1990), and even 
fewer still actually outlive one.  Jim Collins in his book Good to Great (2001) says that the chances are 
fifty-fifty that employees will see their present company disappear during their working career.  With 
these failure rates, one can appreciate how an industry has formed around Industry with a myriad of 
business writers and researchers claiming they have found the universal characteristics of success.  
Business leaders perpetually seek to understand and embody the latest methods to “transform” so they can 
confidently achieve and avoid the seemingly obvious mistakes of their predecessors realized in hindsight.  
Daniel Kahneman (2011) agrees that stories of the rise and fall of businesses are very compelling to the 
minds of readers for the clear cause-and-effect portrayed in their simple narratives of victory and defeat.  
He argues, however, that these stories ignore “the determinative power of luck and the inevitability of 
regression” (2011, p. 207) that induce and maintain “an illusion of understanding, imparting lessons of 
little enduring value to readers who are all too eager to believe them” (2011, p. 208).  Linchpin social 
practices and the roles of luck and randomness are discussed in Chapters 2.4 Truth, Trust, Blame, Shame, 
and Power and 2.5 Organizational Paradox, Unpredictability, and Decision-Making.       
                                                
2 1983 Royal Dutch/Shell study found the average lifetime of the largest industrial enterprises was less than 40 years   
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1.2 Purpose and research questions 
The purpose of this mixed methods case study is two-fold.  First, it explores corporate learning 
using the theory of organizational knowledge creation and one US based corporation to determine the 
theory’s relevance to American firms.  Second, it seeks to understand how social practices and leadership 
behaviors affect employee knowledge or “true beliefs” and thus the implications to the firm’s knowledge 
creation and ultimately, its competitive advantage.  The research was completed at a large corporation in 
the United States that is referred to throughout the study as “The Company.”  Ikujiro Nonaka’s3 theory of 
organizational knowledge creation is used as the framework to examine to what extent internal factors 
such as social practices and leadership behaviors affect knowledge creation at the organizational and 
employee levels.  Consequences from external events will also be assessed to determine their impact on 
social practices, leadership behaviors, and knowledge creation.  Excluded from this study are formal 
benchmarks with other companies, trade secrets, or any proprietary business interactions with The 
Company’s customers or business partners.  This research focuses on relevant actions and events in the 
decade surrounding The Company’s centennial anniversary to understand not only the practices and 
outcomes associated with organizational knowledge creation, but to investigate the roles that uncertainty 
and improbable events play in beliefs and decision-making.  
The research addresses two voids in Nonaka’s theory of organizational knowledge creation.  
First, it assesses the theory in a US corporation with a relatively homogenous population to determine the 
validity of the theory that has been developed outside the US through work with Japanese organizations 
and multinational corporations (MNC).  Second, it examines to what extent internal factors such as social 
practices and leadership behaviors affect the organizational knowledge creation process; a process that 
connects the knowledge created by individuals to the knowledge system of the organization (Nonaka & 
von Krogh, 2009).  In the years since the theory’s introduction, academic work by Nonaka, his associates, 
and others have advanced this theory; however, there remains debate regarding these key concepts. 
                                                
3 Nonaka first presented this theory in 1994 and refined it with his associates: Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995; Nonaka & 
Konno 1998; Nonaka et al. 2000; Nonaka & Toyama 2003; Nonaka & Toyama 2005 
11 
 
 
Specifically, Nonaka and von Krogh (2009) believe there are significant research opportunities in 
exploring the intersection between organizational knowledge creation and social practices.  They raise 
three broad research questions that are in scope for this study.      
1. What is the relationship between organizational knowledge creation and social practices 
in organizations?   
2. When and why do social practices contribute to the conservation of existing tacit 
knowledge and existing routine rather than organizational knowledge creation and 
innovation?   
3. How can leadership motivate and enable individuals to contribute to organizational 
knowledge creation by transcending social practices? 
(Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009, p. 647-648) 
 
The authors state, and I concur, that these questions are significant ones to the theory given organizational 
leaders establish the social context for knowledge creation referred to in Japanese as ba.  The word has no 
exact English counterpart but roughly translates to a shared “place” or “space” (Nonaka & Konno, 1998; 
Cohen, 1998) described in section 2.3.  Leaders can impact both the diversity of individuals in their 
organization and how interactions occur by the organizational climate or culture they create.     
The role of leadership is approached from a broad perspective.  It includes how The Company’s 
leaders influenced employees to change social practices within the corporate culture to contribute to the 
organization’s knowledge creation as well as how The Company’s leadership commonly approached 
decision-making during the period of study.  This study will also observe whether organizational 
knowledge creation enhances the corporation’s competitive advantage.  Do knowledge creation practices 
enable superior innovation and/or can they promote illusions of certainty that bias views and decisions?  
Decision-making practices are critical components that shape the entire organization and they offer 
insight into the psychology of the leaders themselves, for example, the leaders’ confidence in what they 
believe they understand and their ability to acknowledge the extent of their ignorance and uncertainty.  
Daniel Kahneman argues that our human minds have a perplexing limitation: we overestimate how much 
we understand and underestimate how chance influences events (2011).  This concept is critically 
important to knowledge creation and to organizations when the believed improbable events have 
significant consequences and occur with increasing frequency.  
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1.3 Case study overview 
This mixed methods case study utilizes the theory of organizational knowledge creation to 
examine how internal factors and external events affect The Company’s knowledge creation during a 
period of concerted change or “business transformation” initiatives.  Several techniques have been used to 
capture information about organizational and human behaviors associated with knowledge creation 
including analysis of employee engagement surveys, interviews, direct observation of formal group 
discussions, relevant internal documents and secondary data. Former ethnography research is 
incorporated to provide historical and cultural context of The Company.  Lastly, the research includes 
descriptions of external events to determine if knowledge creation as described in theory existed and if so, 
enhanced The Company’s ability to innovate and competitive advantage.   
There are five chapters that comprise this study.  The first introduces the research with the 
background to the research problem, definition of the research questions and provides an overview of the 
case study.  The introduction to the study also provides a historical overview of the institution in the study 
and offers a contextual background for the new socio-technical paradigm that is disrupting their industry.  
The second chapter reviews the literature by describing the legacy of organizational culture in US 
companies, and defining the elements and iterations of learning organizations, organizational knowledge 
creation theory and the multitude of considerations associated with social practices and leadership.  
Methodology, including the data analysis, is described in chapter three followed by the presentation of 
results in chapter four.  Chapter five concludes that study by summarizing the research, answering the 
research questions, and discussing implications, the study’s limitations and areas for future research.      
 
1.4 A traditional US corporation 
The Company that is featured in this study began in 1910 when its eighteen-year-old founder 
raised on an impoverished farm in Nebraska started selling products that would change the way many 
Americans communicated and emotionally connected with one another through much of the 20th century.  
The founder and his brothers grew his company with the hands-on management style of an entrepreneur 
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to ultimately solidify The Company’s position as both the industry leader and one of the most recognized 
brands in the US.  I argue that this seemingly incredible accomplishment is an example of what Nassim 
Nicholas Taleb (2010) refers to as a Black Swan4:  an improbable positive or negative event that has 
massive consequences.  There are many examples around us that qualify as such events that range from 
fads, epidemics, fashion, and the Internet, to the rise and fall of world leaders and sovereign states.  All of 
these so-called Black Swans follow the same dynamics that will be discussed in Chapter 2.5 and have the 
following three characteristics.  They exist outside the realm of the expected – they are outliers; they have 
an extreme impact on the world around them; and they are predictable only in retrospect as people create 
explanations for its occurrence only after the fact (Taleb, 2010).  In the case of The Company, a poor 
teenage boy creating a company that birthed a new industry and changed how many Americans express 
their feelings to those they care most about is an improbable and impactful positive event – a Black Swan.     
The founder was a gifted pioneer.  At Christmas time in 1917, he and his brothers sold out of 
tissue paper that was used to wrap presents in the day so, as an alternative, they offered a hard-wearing 
French paper used for lining envelops.  The colorful wrapping paper, later to be known as giftwrap, was a 
success and became a permanent alternative to its wispy and plain predecessors.  The founder went on to 
develop new retail fixtures, used artwork from acclaimed artists such as Walt Disney, Grandma Moses, 
and Norman Rockwell to create new products, and ventured into the new medium of his day with a 
television series debuting in 1951 (Raymond, 2005).  Through the mass media of television, The 
Company was able to effectively reach audiences across all age groups and strata of American society and 
created one of the most recognized slogans in advertising.  The brand found its way into hearts of 
American audiences with commercials that still give way to happy tears (Hill, 2013).  The Company 
found that their advertising slogan also created a business commitment that constantly put pressure on 
The Company to be the very best.  The Company’s tradition of creativity, caring, and product excellence 
                                                
4 The metaphorical use of a black swan refers to the fact that people in the Old World believed all swans to be white 
prior to the discovery of the first black swan in Australia.  This story “illustrates a severe limitation to our learning 
from observations or experience and the fragility of our knowledge” (Taleb, 2010, p. xxi).   
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is deeply ingrained in its corporate culture.  By the mid-1990s, the organizational culture was one 
described by employees as “polite, caring, and full of bright and creative people” (Lampe, 1996, p.3).   
On the other hand, employees have described The Company as a “hierarchical bureaucracy that 
specializes in reinventing the wheel and hiring the kind of people that can be programmed to walk [The 
Company] walk”5 (Lampe, 1998, p. 181).  As The Company scaled it business throughout the twentieth 
century growing in size and revenue, so did its smaller internal divisions and subcultures as they found a 
home in the hierarchical structure (Lampe, 1998).  “Like the overwhelming majority of corporations and 
similar organizations, [The Company] was firmly grounded in – and securely hobbled by – a deeply 
embedded belief in the elusive validity of the pyramid hierarchy model” (MacKenzie, 1996, p.164).  
Traditional organizations were constructed around Adam Smith’s fundamental premise first published in 
1776 that the division or “specialization” of labor created a more productive cost efficient and predictable 
system of work where management is in control (1904).  Advancing this idea was Frederick Winslow 
Taylor and his management theory whose objective was to improve the efficiency of labor and maximize 
prosperity.  “Programming people to conform to established procedures remains the essence of 
bureaucracy even now” (Hammer and Champy, 2003, p. 16).  The literature review, Chapter 2.1, 
discusses at length the legacy of organizational culture in US companies and the implications to work 
today.  At The Company, employees developed with narrow skill sets and with a limited holistic 
understanding of how their company operated outside of what they were told by their superiors. 
The more efficient the systems, the more management could control employees, as well as 
production, and the more ‘predictable’ everything became.  Efficiency provided as sense of 
security for employees, making them feel comfortable and safe.  Decision-making was kept 
relatively private and employees could not readily see what was going on behind the scenes.  
Employees trusted their supervisors, and things went well as long as they did.  But when reality 
did not match ideology, the culture experienced trouble.  (Lampe, 1998, p. 153) 
 
By the mid and late century, an outcome of The Company’s functionally driven organization was often a 
culture of damaging internal competition where conflicting executive visions, defensiveness, or 
complacency occurred.  Sub optimizing social behaviors were also prevalent.  Examples include efforts to 
                                                
5 Research findings from 1996 internal focus group study by Lampe. 
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identify blame with "who is wrong?" rather than "what is wrong?" and the hoarding of information.  
“Employees believed management hid information people needed to do their jobs” (Lampe, 1998, p. 176).   
At the age of 91, the beloved founder died in 1982 just as The Company was entering a new age 
of connecting through new mediums made possible through the internet and personal technology.  He is 
quoted as saying, “If a man goes into business with only the idea of making money, the chances are he 
won’t” (Raymond, 2005, p, 325).  A statement that proved prophetic as The Company would later look 
for paths to monetize new business models in digital and social media rather than entering these emerging 
spaces with a spirit of experiment and innovate first, monetize second.  Unfortunately, the entrepreneurial 
mindset that was part of The Company’s roots was lost as it grew on its success formula developing a 
perfectionist culture where risk taking was not rewarded.  According to one of The Company’s 
subsidiaries, the culture was one that did not value people who take risks and get results, but rather valued 
people who drive for perfection.  “People who gravitate to environments where risk is rewarded probably 
don’t apply to a company like [The Company].” (Lampe, 1998, p. 225).  Risk-taking was not celebrated 
or welcome in the culture.  “Historically, any failures, no matter how small or insignificant, had been 
ignored or looked upon as something to be ashamed of – an embarrassment to the family and the 
company” (Lampe, 1998, p. 228).   
Today, The Company faces the challenge of maintaining revenues and brand relevance in the age 
where many American’s can still recite their renowned advertising slogan “when you care enough to send 
the very best” but when they connect with others, they increasingly do so through digital mediums now 
capable of transmitting not just data and information, but also emotion.  In 2006, The Company began an 
initiative to “transform” its business by enabling new thinking and technology within the organization.  It 
looked to external inspiration, new talent, resources, and organizational restructures to turn around 
sagging business results.  By the centennial celebration in 2010, The Company put in place a dramatically 
new organizational structure to support its North American business by reducing the number of senior 
leaders, moved from business units that create goods by product formats to platforms that make goods 
based on consumer needs, and began to reduce their overall workforce for the first time in their history.   
16 
 
 
The Company’s leaders declared a new vision to achieve and enable long-term prosperity and 
identified the strategies intended to deliver sustained profitable revenue growth.  The leaders commenced 
efforts to expand brand relevance through consumer-inspired innovation to engage more consumers more 
effectively by acting on shopper insights to develop compelling, differentiated products while continuing 
to reduce cost structures and encouraging “end-to-end” thinking to reduce organization dysfunction from 
decades of working in “silos”6 (The Company, March 2010).  Competitive advantage could no longer be 
sustained by relying solely on tangible assets such as The Company’s established means of manufacturing 
or their brand.  Growth had to come from new performance advantages in “intangible assets”:  long-term 
resources with no physical existence such as research and development (R&D) related activities.  
Examples include work dedicated to the realization of new knowledge, incorporation of new technology 
and enhanced organizational capabilities that enable the development of new or significantly improved 
products or processes that create new pathways for profitable growth.   
 
1.5 The networked society  
The Information Age began at the turn of the 1970s “in what amounts to as an historical instant” 
(Castells, 2000, p. 33) with the revolution of information technology brought by innovations in Silicon 
Valley, California.  These innovators were the first to decentralize corporate structure and prosper from 
the benefits of the networking principle.  Manuel Castells (2000) contends, “that only in the 1970s did 
new information technologies diffuse widely, accelerating their synergistic development and converging 
into a new paradigm” (p. 39).  Innovation was driven in three main technological fields: micro-
electronics, computers, and telecommunications.  For micro-electronics, the giant leap forward came with 
the Intel invention of the microprocessor that spawned a “revolution within the revolution” that lead to the 
design of the Apple microcomputer.  For telecommunications, the revolution was a combination of 
“node” technologies and transmission technologies that created new linkages followed by major 
                                                
6 Silo is a commonly used term that refers to a department or division that is funded separately and acts 
independently often not cooperatively with the other areas within the company.   
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technological advances in opto-electronics and digital packet transmission that expanded the capacity of 
transmission lines.  Collectively, these innovations made way for the Internet and the creation of the 
World Wide Web that likewise was facilitated by launches of browsers and communication protocols.  
Each leap and bound in a specific technological field amplifies the effects of related information 
technologies.  The convergence of all these electronic technologies in to the field of interactive 
communication led to the creation of the Internet, perhaps the most revolutionary technological 
medium of the Information Age (Castells, 2000, p. 45). 
 
The Internet gave birth to a new industry when it was privatized in the 1990s.  Castells declares 
that technology does not undermine society rather it represents it; technology is society, a new paradigm.  
The new socio-technical paradigm joined with a new economy that emerged during the close of the last 
century.  This new economy is “informational, global, and networked.”  Long-term productivity is the 
basis of the national prosperity and technology is the main productivity-inducing factor.  The agents of 
economic growth are firms and nations that behave within the rules of an economic system, 
“informational capitalism”, are either rewarded or penalized by the system in their pursuit of profitability 
for firms and in the case of nations, competitive economies.    
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature review is collated into five sections.  The first sets the historical context for the 
organizational culture in traditional US companies by contrasting the forces that originally formed the 
cultural norms that still exist today with the contemporary forces that compel them to change.  Learning, 
knowledge, and learning organizations comprise the second section.  The third section explores the theory 
of organizational knowledge creation and its evolution over the course of almost twenty years of research 
in organizations outside the US.  The fourth section sets additional foundation for the research by 
elaborating on the social practices relating to truth, trust, blame, shame, and power.  The fifth and final 
section reviews the literature on the paradoxes within organizations, the decision-making practice and the 
role that luck and randomness play in success.  
 
2.1 Legacy of organizational culture in US companies 
 “In a knowledge-based economy, the new coin of the realm is learning” is the quote from Robert 
Reich, former US secretary of labor that introduces the book Enabling Knowledge Creation (von Krogh et 
al, 2010, p.2).  Patricia Cross (1981) wrote of the learning society that is growing because it must; adults 
must make learning a lifelong activity to live with escalating change happening globally and locally - at 
home and at work.  Peter Senge’s (1990) breakthrough book, The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of 
the Learning Organization offered a common language for workplace change and a vision for companies 
to become places for collective and perpetual learning.  His five disciplines of personal mastery, mental 
models, shared vision, team learning, and system thinking along with related ideologies from other 
authors gave birth to a world-wide movement to create companies that can excel in the future by 
discovering how to tap people’s commitment and capacity to learn at all levels in the organization.  
Today, as the US struggles to find new sources for economic growth and global leadership, organizational 
capabilities for learning in ways that create knowledge and competitive advantages in the marketplace are 
highly valued, however, often elusive for many organizations whether they be small, local companies or 
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large, multinational corporations.  The pressure on organizational capabilities to create knowledge will 
only intensify as technology continues to evolve and leap forward while education attainment in the US 
slows.  “College completion and high school graduation rates have been sluggish and overall years of 
schooling have risen more slowly than in the past” (Goldin & Katz, 2008, p.325). 
To understand why change is difficult and indeed necessary for large US organizations, it must be 
acknowledged that these traditional organizations may still be operating in ways they were originally 
designed.  This begins with the theory of the subdivision of labor where every man does what he is most 
capable of doing or “does that thing which is natural to him.”  This concept dates back to Plato who 
claimed in his Republic that the growth of society itself was due to the benefits realized through 
specialization (Economic Theories, 2008).  Adam Smith believed that labor, all types of labor, produced 
value and was the source of wealth (1904).  The subdivision of labor and the system of automatic 
exchange, which enables specialization to take place, is the true source of the rise in the wealth of nations 
(Economic Theories, 2008).  Smith argued the increase in total production using an example from the pin 
industry.  Through specialization and subdivision of labor, each man could make the equivalent one 
pound of straight pins or more per day while one man working alone could only produce from one to 
twenty pins a day. Smith clearly stated the reasons for such gains: learning one job well saved the time 
usually spent in movements across varied jobs and familiarity with a single job encouraged invention of 
new techniques. Specialization of labor is not without criticism for its dehumanizing effect with Smith 
himself acknowledging that concentration upon a few simple job functions for extended time periods 
might cause the workers to lose the capacity for exercising intelligent thought. 
In the early 20th century, Frederick Winslow Taylor expanded upon Adam Smith’s fundamental 
premise that the division or specialization of labor created a more productive cost efficient and 
predictable work system.  Taylor and his scientific management theory known as Taylor-ism brought 
revolutionary changes to Industry.  The objective was to improve the efficiency of labor and maximize 
prosperity.  In his book, The Principles of Scientific Management (1911), Taylor developed the system of 
precise work methods based on scientific study.  He proposed a top-down organization that described how 
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to select and train workers for specialized tasks, how to closely supervise them, and how to divide work 
equally between managers in order to apply scientific management principles.  Taylor’s purpose was to 
introduce into industry particular "natural laws" which would maximize prosperity for both the employer 
and workers if followed. He introduced three new principles of industrial administration. First, obtain co-
operation from labor and hire the best workmen at wages high enough to guarantee their loyalty to the 
company. Second, standardize work and reduce it to a routine to gain efficiency. Third, introduce a 
system of functional planning that organizes business by the engineer not the profit maker to ensure suc-
cess of large ventures and efficiency in small ones (Economic Theories, 2008).  Taylor believed that by 
managers studying work, they could find the “one best way” for the work to be completed by their 
workers who were incapable of broadly understanding what they were doing.  Enforced standardization of 
methods, enforced adoption, and enforced cooperation from workers was the duty of management.  
Decades of organizational practice and embedded structures create a cultural legacy of social practices 
and leadership behaviors that include a pursuit of task excellence, internal competition for limited 
resources, and conflicting visions across departments.  Entrenched beliefs and behaviors must be 
addressed if new ways of working and effective means of knowledge creation are to be widely adopted.  
As referenced in Chapter 1.1 Background to the Research Problem, the paradigm that Frederick 
Taylor helped create of the organization as a system that processes information or solves problems in a 
hierarchical “input-process-output” sequence (Nonaka 1994) is one generally agreed to as outdated by 
authors characterizing what they term as our postindustrial, knowledge or information society (Drucker 
1968; Lyotard 1984; Bell 1999).  The standard, pyramidal organizational structure is designed for high-
growth environments because it is scalable and ideal for control and planning (Hammer & Champy, 
1993).  When work is broken down into pieces, supervisors can ensure the accuracy and consistency of 
the work down the chain of command.  Budgets and planning are monitored the same way, department by 
department, typically in departments organized by functional areas of expertise.  Champy and the late 
Michael Hammer (1993) contend that it is time to retire the set of principles that shaped the alignment, 
management, and performance of US businesses more than two centuries ago and assume a new set.  
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“The alternative is for corporate America to close its doors and go out of business.  The choice is that 
simple and that stark” (Hammer & Champy, 1993. p.1).  These authors argue that instead of work being 
broken down into specialized tasks it should instead be unified into coherent business processes.  This 
new model and set of techniques ignited a wave in the US of business process reengineering (BPR): a 
radical redesign of existing processes to gain significant performance improvements such as cost, quality, 
and service.  After two decades of implementation across a variety of US corporations, there is evidence 
that BPR projects did improve performance in large firms as measured by labor productivity, returns on 
assets, and equity (Ozcelik, 2009).  An important finding is that performance increases only after the BPR 
projects are finalized and is unaffected during execution. Equally as important is the finding that 
“functionally focused BPR projects on average contribute more to performance than those with a broader 
cross-functional scope. This may be an indication that potential failure risk of BPR projects may increase 
beyond a certain level of scope” (Ozcelik, 2009, p. 7).  Large investments are required for BPR projects 
that include both physical and human capital.  The hiring of new personnel and training impacted 
employees on new roles may increase training budgets by 30–50% (Al-Mashari & Zairi, 1999).  There are 
non-pecuniary costs due to changes in social practices and leadership behaviors including resistance to 
change, communication barriers between functional areas, communication issues between BPR project 
teams and other employees, lack of communication between top-level managers, management’s 
reluctance to commit necessary resources while expecting rapid results, and failure to hold employees 
accountable to new work methods during implementation (Ozcelik, 2009).   
Firms and their leadership are desperately searching for the new “scientific” management rules 
and organizational structures that so firmly guided their success as US businesses scaled throughout the 
20th century.  The search for answers is exemplified by repeated redefinition of strategies, changes in 
organizational structures, and reconfiguration of operations in response to amplified competition, 
accelerated product life cycles and rising complexity in their relationships with customers, suppliers, 
governments, and employees.  Christopher Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal (1990) maintain that senior-
level managers in top corporations are losing control of their companies.  Corporate strategies have 
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become more sophisticated and agile, however, organizational capabilities and employee attitudes have 
not followed.  Companies can fall into traps that are either strategic or structural in nature.  The strategic 
trap appeals to the leaders desire for success through simplification.  It proposes simple, or even 
simplistic, fixed solutions to complex problems and promises rewards if the company remains steadfast.  
As leaders realized oversimplification as a strategic trap, they recognize the need to learn how to manage 
complexity leading to the second trap – structural.  The structural trap deludes leaders into the belief that 
the best response to complex strategic requirements is to create complex organizational structures or 
“matrixed” organizations with parallel reporting structures to build flexibility and share knowledge more 
freely throughout the organization.  When companies fall into the structural or organizational trap they 
mistakenly believe that the changes to their formal structure will also change interpersonal relationships, 
decision-making, and employee attitudes (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1990).  While strategies and structure are 
elements of success, continuous learning and beneficial knowledge creation capabilities remain vital. 
Today the most successful companies are those where top executives recognize the need to 
manage the new environmental and competitive demands by focusing less on the quest for an 
ideal structure and more on developing the abilities, behavior, and performance of individual 
managers. (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1990, p. 145).   
 
Companies face a learning dilemma: success depends on learning yet many do not know how to learn 
(Argyris, 1999).  Learning, the definitions of knowledge, and learning organizations are concepts integral 
to knowledge creating and are explored in the next section that follows. 
 
2.2 Learning, knowledge, and learning organizations 
US companies create visions of themselves as places for perpetual learning (Senge 1990) often 
describing themselves as a “learning organization”, yet truly achieving this ideal proves an arduous task.  
The challenges begin with how they define learning, often too narrowly, as “problem solving” where the 
focus is placed on expeditiously identifying and systematically correcting errors (Argyris, 1999).  
Problem solving skills are indeed necessary for learning in the external environment; however, members 
of the organization also need the abilities, behaviors, and business setting conducive to looking inward for 
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learning.  They need to reflect on how their own behavior can be the source of problems and how they 
can improve themselves, as well as other things, or other people.  Chris Argyris (1999) coined the terms 
“single-loop” and “double-loop” learning finding that highly skilled professionals are generally very good 
at single-loop learning – they know how to apply their intellectual discipline to effectively solve 
problems.   Ironically, many of these accomplished professionals are not proficient at double-loop 
learning because they have rarely, if ever, experienced failure.  As a consequence, they can lack 
propensity for introspection and screen out criticism frequently blaming others for failures.  When these 
blaming behaviors occur, they can be compounded in traditional organizations still suffering from a 
legacy of sub optimizing social behaviors that look for "who is wrong?" rather than "what is wrong?"  
Sustaining momentum in a learning organization requires businesspeople to change the way they think 
about organizations – less like traditional managers where knowledge is managed from the top-down and 
more like biologists where knowledge is cultivated and further studied (Senge 1990).     
There are fundamental differences between knowledge and information despite the frequent 
interchangeable use of the terms and mainstream epistemology theories largely in management and 
organization theory that likened the two until the mid-1980s (Nonaka et al, 2006).  Information refers to 
the flow of meanings or messages that may add to, change, or restructure knowledge (Machlup 1983).  
Information is an essential vehicle to initiate and formalize knowledge, and can be regarded from 
“syntactic” or “sematic” standpoints (Nonaka, 1994).  The syntactic aspect of information focuses on 
form, as opposed to meaning and value, which represents the sematic aspect of information most relevant 
to knowledge creation.  Knowledge is formed by the flow of information that serves a purpose in its 
context and is “anchored in the beliefs and commitment of the holder” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 58).  
The authors affirm that unlike information, knowledge is a function of “beliefs and commitment” and is 
about action and meaning.  The question of “what is knowledge” has been debated since Ancient Greece 
with definitions today varying greatly between disciplines and cultures.  For this research study, 
knowledge and the means by which it is created will be defined according to the work of Nonaka and his 
associates that include von Krogh and Ichijo (2010).  First, knowledge is a true belief that is justified 
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based on an individual’s experiences in the world, and is a construct based on one’s reality that involves 
their feelings and belief systems that may or may not be conscious.  Second, knowledge has explicit and 
tacit meaning - some can be captured, formulated into sentences, or specifications and some may be very 
difficult to describe.  For example, transferring explicit knowledge of how parts of the human body 
function from a medical textbook may be transferred fairly easily to a medical student.  In contrast, the 
tacit knowledge required for the medical student to know how to effectively diagnose and explain what is 
wrong to comfort a sick patient is more difficult to teach and comes through experience.  Tacit knowledge 
can be a rich source for new insights and innovation for business.  Therefore, creating the environment 
that breaks down knowledge barriers is a first step in creating the enabling context (von Krogh et al, 
2010) described as part of the theory of organizational knowledge creation in section three.   
Diverse conceptions and assumptions of what constitutes knowledge exist between Western and 
Eastern world cultures.  The “western view” of knowledge refers to the general view within the US as 
well as potentially larger culturally homogenous English-speaking populations in North America and 
parts of Europe.  The “eastern view” denotes beliefs in Japan and likely other populations in Southeast 
Asia (Jelavic & Ogilvie, 2010).  For this discussion, the attention is on conceptions of knowledge or 
“definitions” in the US and Japan.  The knowledge definition rooted in traditional Western philosophy 
believes knowledge is “unchanging and true regardless of the social circumstances” (von Krogh et al, 
2000, p. 48).  This translates to a “western view” in US based companies that tend to highly value explicit 
knowledge such as what facts are known and tangible individualistic motivational factors (Nonaka et al, 
2006; Jelavic & Ogilvie, 2010).  By contrast Japanese firms tend to share an “eastern view” that is more 
concerned with tacit knowledge such as the know-how that embodies employees' skills, hunches, and 
ideals that are deep-seated and hard to share (von Krogh et al, 2000; Nonaka et al, 2006; Jelavic & 
Ogilvie, 2010).  These fundamentally different conceptions of knowledge often manifest in contrasting 
business practices in US and Japanese organizations.  In the US, the focus on facts that translate to 
knowledge practices that emphasize: 
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…collecting, distributing, re-using, and measuring existing codified knowledge and information.  
Practitioners often look to information technology to capture and distribute this explicit 
knowledge; firms measure success by near-term economic returns on knowledge investment. 
(Cohen, 1998, 23) (Cohen, 1998, p. 23). 
 
The term “knowledge” itself implies a thing; a noun that can be captured and manipulated for measurable 
gain.  In Japan, where the knowledge creation discipline as a whole receives more attention, the use of the 
term “knowing” connotes action of the knowers, a process that is inseparable from them (Cohen, 1998).   
Japanese knowledge beliefs focus on abstract workplace principles that translate to practices emphasizing: 
…developing conditions that favor the exchange of tacit knowledge between individual knowers, 
a social process through which new knowledge develops.  Success is measured by a long-term 
capability to succeed through innovation.  (Cohen, 1998, 23) 
 
The differences between West and East are real and have significant consequences in corporations that 
are implementing Japanese production practices such as Lean or in a global marketplace of multinational 
companies where knowledge creation and management practices across different cultural perspectives is 
becoming increasingly complex (Jelavic & Ogilvie, 2010).  Cohen provides a schematic to summarize the 
differences between US and Japanese views and the larger contrasts between West and East7 (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. US-Japan Contrast View of Knowledge (Cohen, 1998, p. 24) 
West (US) East (Japan) 
Focus on Explicit Knowledge  Focus on Tacit Knowledge 
Re-Use Creation 
Knowledge Projects Knowledge Cultures 
Knowledge Markets Knowledge Communities 
Management and Measurement Nurturing and Love 
Near-Term Gains Long-Term Advantage 
 
The polar perspectives of knowledge between West and East are important basis to reflect on and 
understand the impact that social practices and leadership behaviors have on creating and transferring 
knowledge.  Quite simply, actions that may not have bearing based on one definition or conception of 
                                                
7 Cohen’s study (1998) distinguished perceptions of knowledge in American versus Japanese firms that he later 
extended, with some reservations, to characterize larger contrasts between West and East (Jelavic & Ogilvie, 2010).   
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knowledge may have significant consequences on another.  Knowledge perspectives also influence if and 
how “learning organizations” are created.  
Learning Organizations (LO) describe business organizations that implement innovations in their 
work practices, incorporate market-generated information, and make organizational changes to improve 
application of knowledge (Crites, 2009).  The LO concept often encompasses three additional 
organizational principles that are subsequently defined: organizational learning, organizational 
knowledge, and knowledge management (Easterby-Smith by Crites, 2009).  First, organizational learning 
is the process of informing organizational practices when external market information is converted to 
practical, contextual knowledge (Easterby-Smith by Crites, 2009). Second, organizational knowledge is 
the product of the learning process and includes internal (tacit knowledge held only in minds of 
organizational members) and external (explicit knowledge) forms (Easterby-Smith by Crites, 2009).  
Lastly, knowledge management is the term that describes the control of organizational processes and 
structures to facilitate knowledge sharing through information systems, communication networks 
(Easterby-Smith by Crites, 2009) increasingly between individuals with different backgrounds (Mäkelä, 
Kalla & Piekkari 2007).  Therefore, one could conclude that a successful LO is one that utilizes the 
principles of organizational learning and knowledge management while using human systems or 
individuals to facilitate the capture and application of new knowledge.  Arguably, this is an optimistic 
view of how people accept new experiences and a simplistic overall view of the means for organizational 
renewal.  It assumes a predominately Western view of knowledge and that organizations are proactive.  
von Krogh, Ichijo and Nonaka (2010) share a representative example of a manager speaking of a new 
program intended to transform his company into a learning organization:  
[Our program] is about taking the whole organization through a process of renewal from the old 
ways of doing things to the new.  Its success lies in the ability to galvanize an entire workforce to 
create a new future, not just for themselves, but for the organization as a whole.  It is releasing 
the unexplored capabilities of people to sustain major growth without added costs.  
(Matthews, 1997, p. 130 by von Krogh et al, 2010, p. 19) 
 
Organizational leaders that are deploying knowledge platforms, as a means for renewal, must appreciate 
that there are barriers for individuals to accept new knowledge – new, justified true beliefs.    
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A learning organization has also been described as one where its members, regardless of their 
status or level, work together to raise their effectiveness and achieve outcomes from a set of shared values 
(Wallace 2009).  Shared values, or said differently low “value” diversity and high “informational” 
diversity, may enhance group performance (Jehn et al. 1999).  Central to organization learning research 
and literature over the last thirty years is the theme of learning for performance improvement; that 
performance differences across organizations can be attributed to what has been termed as “knowledge 
asymmetries” (Thomas et al. 2001).   For example, how these asymmetries are expressed is foundational 
to the resource-based view of the organization (e.g., Wernerfelt 1984, Connor and Prahalad 1996), 
wherein the organization’s ability to bundle critical resources in such a way that differentiates its 
knowledge base in particular areas (i.e., competencies) is seen as the key to sustainable competitive 
advantage.  Likewise, creating an environment that maximizes the organization's ability to effectively 
learn over time defines the view that such learning organizations will realize performance advantages in 
competitive markets (cf. Senge 1990, McGill and Slocum 1994).  Learning behaviors and processes that 
enable long-term adaptive expertise are referred to as "strategic learning" (Kuwada 1998).  While the 
organizational view provides a good overview of knowledge flows, in-depth studies of what knowledge is 
and how it is conveyed at the individual level makes organizational knowledge more subjective (Nonaka 
& Peltokorpi 2006) and helps organizations become more aware of what constitutes knowledge in their 
context.  To understand how individuals and organizations create and share knowledge, the theory of 
organizational knowledge creation is discussed in section three.  
 
2.3 Organizational Knowledge Creation theory 
The aim of this section is to summarize the theory of organizational knowledge creation and 
discuss its evolution over the course of twenty years of research.  When Nonaka first published (1994) a 
theory of organizational knowledge creation, he argued that knowledge is created through a continuous 
dialogue between tacit and explicit knowledge in specific patterns of interaction – patterns, which 
represent ways, that existing knowledge of individuals can be converted into new knowledge of others in 
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the organization.  Said differently, organizational knowledge creation is the process by which the 
knowledge created by individuals is made available, amplified, and connected to the organization’s 
knowledge system (Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009).  Since Nonaka’s first article in Organization Science 
(1994), there has been in-depth analysis and reflection that led to continued theory building and debate 
around the several premises such as the distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge and knowledge 
conversion that explains the interactions between them (Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009).  The research for 
this case study does not concentrate on the idiosyncrasies of tacit and explicit knowledge rather focuses 
on the process of knowledge creation.  Specifically, is new knowledge creation theory relevant in an US 
organization and how do social practices and leadership behaviors affect knowledge creation?  To answer 
this question, the review of the literature summarizes Organization Knowledge Creation and the three 
conceptual components of the theory’s model:  knowledge conversion known as the SECI process, shared 
context for knowledge creation known as ba, and knowledge assets.  
In 1995, Nonaka and Takeuchi used the Japanese context to formulate their famous theory and 
wrote The Knowledge-Creating Company.  This collaboration originated from participation in a 1984 
Harvard Business School colloquium on productivity and technology where the authors agreed that the 
existing theory of information processing originating from Taylor to Herbert Simon (Nonaka et al, 2006) 
was not adequate to explain the process of innovation: “a process to capture, create, leverage, and retain 
knowledge” (Scharmer, 2000, p. 24).  This departure was not only from organization theory that had 
historically emphasized the processing of pre-given information and organizations as information 
processors (Nonaka et al, 2006; Nonaka 1991, 1994), but also from the “western view” of knowledge as 
fixed irrespective of context and fails to recognize experience and perception as described previously in 
section 2.2.  Nonaka and Takeuchi in their book attempted to develop a universal model of how a 
company should be managed and presented the theory of organizational knowledge creation that has been 
subsequently reformulated by Nonaka and his associates.  In this theory previously described in section 
2.2, individuals justify the truthfulness of their observations based on their experiences in the world and 
personal sensibility: knowledge is a justified true belief (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995).  Fundamental to 
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organizational knowledge creation theory is the ability to characterize a situation and act accordingly – 
the use of knowledge to define a situation and subsequent actions rather than to solve predefined 
problems (von Krogh et al., 2000; Nonaka el al, 2006).  Lastly, knowledge has explicit and tacit meaning 
- some can be captured with words and writing and some may be enmeshed in the senses and experiences.  
This definition transcends the epistemology of the West and “underscores that knowledge is never free 
from human values and ideas” (Nonaka et al, 2006, p. 1182).  This definition of knowledge raised new 
questions on both the interrelationships between the explicit and tacit components and the relationships 
between social values, ideas and individual knowledge (Nonaka et al, 2006).  Nonaka and his associates 
answered with what would become the second foundational element of their theory – knowledge 
conversion.  
 Knowledge conversion is how an organization creates knowledge through interactions and 
reciprocal relationships between explicit and tacit knowledge.  Knowledge is created as individuals share 
different types and contents of knowledge as opposed 
to existing knowledge just being combined (Nonaka et 
al, 2000).  Both types of knowledge expand through a 
process referred to as “social conversion” (Nonaka 
1991, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).  Knowledge 
creation “is a journey ‘from being to becoming’” 
(Nonaka et al., 2000, p. 8); it is a “continuous process 
through which one overcomes the individual 
boundaries and constraints imposed by information 
and past learning by acquiring a new context, a new 
view of the world and new knowledge” (Nonaka et al, 2006, p. 1182).  Knowledge ‘expands’ in an 
organization through a four-stage conversion process known as SECI (Figure 1).  Socialization shares 
tacit knowledge among individuals.  Externalization articulates tacit knowledge into explicit forms of 
expression.  Combination joins different entities of explicit knowledge followed by Internalization that 
498 Nonaka, Toyama, and Byosiere
Internalization
Explicit
Combination
Explicit
Fig. 22.2. The four modes of knowledge conversion and
the evolving spiral movement
Adapted from The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese
Companies Create the Dynamics of In ovatio by Ikujiro Nonaka
and Hirotaka Takeuchi, copyright x: 1995 by Oxford University
Press, Inc. Used by permission of Oxford University Press, Inc.
divisional, and even organizational bound-
aries.
The process of organizational knowledge
creation is n t confined to the or anization; it
includes many interfaces with the environ-
ment as well. Not only does the environment
receive the explicit knowledge created by the
organization (e.g. technologies, products or
services, values, and so on), it also supplies
knowledge to be brought into a new cycle of
organizational knowledge creation. Firms ac-
quire knowledge from outside sources such as
customers, suppliers, and competitors and uti-
lize such knowledge to create their own know-
ledge (see Child, Ch. 29; and Hedberg and
Holmqvist, Ch. 33 in this volume). For ex-
ample, many dimensions of customer needs
take the form of tacit knowledge that custo-
mers cannot articulate by themselves. A pro-
duct works as a trigger to articulate such tacit
knowledge. Customers give meaning to the
product by purchasing, adapting, using, or not
purchasing it. This mobilization of the tacit
knowledge of customers will be reflected back
to the organization, and a new process of organ-
izational knowledge creation will be initiated.
Organizational knowledge creation is a
n ver-ending process that upgrades itself con-
tinuously. A spiral emerges when the interac-
tion between tacit and explicit knowledge is
elevated dynamically from a lower ontological
level to higher ontological levels. This interac-
tive and spiral process, which we call the cross-
leveling of knowledge, takes place both intra-
and interorganizationally. Through the cross-
leveling of knowledge, new spirals of know-
ledge creation are triggered. For example,
when created knowledge is presented to other
departments, it can lead to the internalization
of this knowledge by individuals, who thus
gain tacit knowledge. Thus, an entire new
SECI process can begin. In short, the continued
dynamism of turning ideas into words, words
into forms is a main characteristic of organiza-
tional knowledge creation.
Ba: The Foundation for Knowledge
Creation
The foundation of the SECI process described
above is ba (roughly meaning 'place'). Based on
Figure 1. The SECI Process (Nonaka et al, 2001, p. 498) 
Adapted from Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995 
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embodies explicit knowledge into tacit knowledge (Nonaka et al, 2000; Nonaka et al, 2006).  Journey 
through the four modes of knowledge conversion forms a spiral of knowledge creation as opposed to a 
circle. In this spiral, knowledge is amplified creating an ever-increasing spiral as it moves up through the 
“ontological levels.”  Knowledge created in this dynamic process can activate new spirals of knowledge 
creation that expand across the organization: from the individual expanding through communities that 
transcend departmental, divisional, and organizational boundaries. (Nonaka et al, 2000) 
The Socialization-Externalization-Combination-Internalization (SECI) model of knowledge 
conversion is widely accepted by the knowledge management community as generally applicable across 
contexts and cultures; however, some scholars argue that it is not applicable to non-Japanese 
organizations since it was developed in a Japanese context (Glisby and Holden, 2003).  
Given its Japan-specific nature, therefore, Nonaka’s model cannot uncritically be transferred to a 
non-Japanese context and have the equivalent explanatory power. A more effective way of 
utilizing the model would be to critically compare the implicit assumptions and tacit foundation 
of the model with those associated with the context to which the model is attempted to be 
transferred to. If, however, the implicit foundation of the model is decisively different from one’s 
own, the applicability of the model seems theoretically questionable.  
(Glisby and Holden, 2003, p. 35) 
 
This point of context dependency is consistent with the definition of knowledge itself.  Knowledge is 
context-specific, therefore, requires a shared context to be meaningful (Nonaka et al., 2000).  The context 
for knowledge creation is ba (Nonaka and Konno 1998). 
Nonaka & Konno (1998) introduce the 
concept of ba to answer the question of how 
individuals can be motivated to share and create 
knowledge (Cohen, 1998).  “Knowledge needs a 
context to be created” (Nonaka et al, 2000, p. 13).  
Ba is this shared context for knowledge to be 
shared, created, and utilized with participants 
committed to ba through action and collaboration 
Figure 2. Ba as shared context in motion (Nonaka et al, 2000, p. 14) 
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(see Figure 2).  It is as an ideal space - mental, physical or virtual - for converting tacit into explicit 
knowledge.  The concept of ba has no exact English counterpart but roughly translates to a shared 
“place”, “field”, or “space” (Nonaka & Konno, 1998; Cohen, 1998).  It is the shared space for developing 
relationships and whether ba is mental, physical, or virtual – each has knowledge embedded (Nonaka et 
al, 2006).  Nonaka et al illustrate this concept with the following example.   
Members of a product development project share ideas and viewpoints on their product design in 
a ba that allows a common interpretation of the technical data, evolving rules of thumb, an 
emerging sense of product quality, effective communication of hunches or concerns, and so on. 
To participate in ba means to become engaged in knowledge creation, dialogue, adapt to and 
shape practices, and simultaneously transcend one’s own limited perspective or boundaries. 
(Nonaka et al, 2006, p. 1185) 
 
“…like culture, ba is a visualization of processes occurring between individuals or groups of individuals” 
(Lehtonen, 2009, p. 24).  Ba corresponds to the four stages of the SECI process that result in four types of 
ba (Figure 3).  The first is originating ba where knowledge creation begins in the socialization phase 
where individuals meet in person to 
share emotions, experiences, and mental 
models.  This phase is characterized by 
love, trust, and commitment and “a 
place where barriers between self and 
others are removed” (Cohen, 1998, p. 
25).   Second is dialoging ba (originally 
referred to as “interacting ba”) in the 
externalization phase that encourages individuals to dialogue with one another sharing their mental 
models and skills to establish mutual terms and concepts.  Third is systemizing ba (originally referred to 
as “cyber ba”) in the combination phase where explicit new knowledge virtually joins existing 
information and knowledge to generate and systematize explicit knowledge through the organization.  
Lastly, exercising ba in the internalization phase motivates individuals to internalize explicit information.  
This is encouraged through training and repetitive teaching methods that reinforce desired new behaviors 
Figure 3. Four types of ba (Nonaka et al, 2000, p. 16) 
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(Nonaka et al, 1998; Nonaka et al, 2000).  The natures of the various bas are suited for the knowledge 
conversion and accelerating knowledge creation (Nonaka and Konno 1998).  Knowledge can be separated 
from ba and when it is  “it takes the form of information that can be communicated beyond the ba” 
(Nonaka et al, 2006, p. 1185) consistent with the earlier discussion on information vs. knowledge. 
 Third, and final, component of the knowledge creation model is knowledge assets - foundational 
for effectively managing knowledge and “the outcomes of knowledge creating processes through the 
dialogues and practices in ba” (Nonaka et al, 2006, 1194).  The knowledge asset concept was fused into 
theory for strategic purposes to give a more comprehensive and detailed investigation of the knowledge 
system supplementing the knowledge 
creation process (Nonaka et al, 2006, 
2000; Nonaka & Toyama, 2005).  
Knowledge assets are the inputs, 
outputs, and moderating factors in the 
process of knowledge creation and 
consist of four categories that also 
correspond to the SECI model (Nonaka et al, 2000). These assets are “firm-specific resources that are 
indispensable to create values for the firm” (Nonaka et al, 2000, p. 20).  The authors acknowledge that 
while knowledge is thought to be one of the most vital assets for an organization to create and sustain 
their competitive advantage, there is not an effective means, such as a system and tools, to evaluate and 
manage these assets.  Nonaka et al (2000) propose the categorization (see Figure 4) to appreciate how 
knowledge assets are “created, acquired, and exploited” (p. 21): experiential knowledge assets, conceptual 
knowledge assets, systemic knowledge assets and routine knowledge assets.  First, the experiential 
knowledge assets are skills, expertise, and emotional knowledge, such as care and love, developed and 
amassed by individuals through their work experiences.  These assets are tacit in nature, difficult to grasp, 
trade and evaluate.  They are company specific and difficult to emulate, therefore, making them a source 
for sustainable competitive advantage.  Second and easier to grasp are conceptual knowledge assets that 
Figure 4. Four categories of knowledge assets (Nonaka et al, 2000, p. 20) 
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have a tangible form as language, images, and symbols.  These are assets based on value they represent to 
customers or employees, that granted can be difficult to quantify, such as brand equity, concepts, and 
designs.  Third, systemic knowledge assets is explicit information that is packaged and relatively easily 
transferred and is commonly the assets stored in knowledge management systems such as legally 
protected intellectual properties such as patents and licenses, product specifications, explicitly stated 
technologies, and documented information on customers and suppliers.  The fourth and final knowledge 
asset is routine: embedded practices and culture within the organization that perform the day-to-day 
business.  Patterns in thinking are established, “stories” about the organization are shared, and behaviors 
are reinforced over time.  The four types of knowledge assets are foundation for the knowledge-creating 
process to occur and are dynamic with new knowledge assets forming from existing.  To effectively 
manage and exploit the creation of knowledge, the organization must “map its stocks” of knowledge 
assets which requires more than cataloguing existing knowledge (Nonaka et al, 2000, p. 22). 
 In summary, the main goal of organizational knowledge creation theory is to recognize conditions 
enabling knowledge creation so that innovation and learning can improve (Nonaka 1994; Nonaka and 
Takeuchi 1995; von Krogh et al. 2000).  Figure 6 illustrates the model of a knowledge-creating firm 
(Nonaka  & Toyama, 2007, 2005).  An 
organization creates new knowledge through 
the synthesis of objectivity and subjectivity 
from existing knowledge assets in the SECI 
process (Dialogues and Practice) that occurs 
in ba, the enabling or shared context.  Ba is 
where new knowledge once it is created 
becomes the source for a new spiral of 
knowledge creation (Nonaka et al, 2000).  Ba 
does not apply necessarily to one static project or circumstance but extends across multi-layers within the 
organization crossing functional boundaries (Nonaka & Toyama 2005); “more than anything, it is a 
Honda created and accumulated the resources and interacted with the environment
to realize this goal. It was a dynamic process that could not be predicted by
rationalist th ories of trategy based on static analyses of the e vironment and the
firm’s resources.
To realize their vision, firms create and utilize resources and interact with the
environment through the knowledge-creating process. To understand the dynamic
process in which strategy is built and practiced, we need a theory of the knowledge-
based firm that is up to the challenge of explaining how firms perceive and interpret
realities, manage interactions, both inside and outside the organization, and
synthesize various subjective interpretations into a collective knowledge that is then
objectified and validated as universal.
3. Strategy as distributed phronesis
3.1 The dynamic mod l of a knowl dge-creating company and
the role of leadership
Figure 1 shows the model of a knowledge-creating firm (Nonaka and Toyama,
2005a). A firm creates knowledge through the synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity
in the SECI process of Dialogues and Practice. The process is based on the Knowledge
Vision and Driving Objective, which gives direction and energy to the SECI process.
Ba, defined as a shared context in motion, provides an existential place for the
 
 
 
  
Figure 1 The model of a knowledge-creating firm.
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Figure 5. The mo el of a knowledge-creating firm                  
(Nonaka & Toyama, 2007, p. 376) 
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network of interactions, determined by the care and trust of participants” (von Krogh et al, 2000, p.49).  
The Knowledge Vision and Driving Objective give the SECI process direction and energy, and “a firm 
creates knowledge through interactions with the Environment as an ecosystem of knowledge and multi-
layered ba” (Nonaka  & Toyama, 2007, p. 377).  Further reflection and discussion on the theoretical 
concepts of knowledge creation are explored and contrasted with existing literature on social practices.  
Nonaka and von Krogh (2009, p. 646-647) believe there is a “limited understanding about how social 
practices emerge from knowledge conversion…knowledge conversion may have both a knowledge and a 
social practice outcome.” 
  
2.4 Truth, trust, blame, shame, and power   
“The organizational knowledge creation theory has not adequately accounted for the role of social 
practices” (Nonaka & von Krogh 2009, 644).  As established by Nonaka and his associates in the 
previous section, knowledge is a “justified true belief” and is context-specific, thereby, requiring a shared 
context to be meaningful (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Nonaka et al. 2000).  Inherent to the definition of 
“truth” is the individual’s justification of their beliefs - a process embedded in a social context where past 
investments in learning and knowledge shape their current and future interests (Nonaka & von Krogh 
2009).  “‘Truth’ becomes a truth through social interactions, instead of existing somewhere to be 
discovered” (Nonaka & Toyama, 2005, p. 422).  Research has located knowledge in two places and has 
adopted different approaches accordingly, depending if knowledge is believed to be in the mind of the 
individual or in the social interaction (Lehtonen, 2009, p. 22-23).  While knowledge may be located in 
two places, it should not be perceived as separate.  Lehtonen explains using a social and technical 
knowledge example.  Social knowledge evolves from social participation located in the social interaction.  
Conversely technical knowledge, such as knowing how to build a bike, is controlled and evolved by the 
individual, therefore, resides in the mind.  The knowledge to build a bike is acquired from reading how to 
do it or it is passed down through a social interaction.  Therefore, the nature of knowledge defines its 
location and should be understood as complimentary, not separate.   
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Tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge are not totally separate but are mutually complementary 
entities. Without experience, we cannot truly understand. But unless we try to convert tacit 
knowledge to explicit knowledge, we cannot reflect upon and share it….                              
(Interview with Ikujiro Nonaka in February 1996 by C. Otto Scharmer, 2000, p. 25)  
Knowledge creation originates at a subjective level, the individual, and is made objective, explicit, 
through social interaction (Nonaka & Toyama, 2005).  Understanding the social practices within an 
organization that foster or create barriers for knowledge creation is essential to improving innovation and 
continuous learning to capitalize on external forces - changing market conditions.  Knowledge creation 
theory focuses on organizational creativity, change, and innovation complementing both the knowledge-
based view of the firm and the dynamic capabilities theory that focuses importance on dynamic processes 
that form competitive advantages when assets are coordinated and combined to shape the organization’s 
knowledge asset (Teece et al. 1997).  Social practices reflect the collective beliefs of those within the 
organization, what knowledge the organization values and how skillfully it is applied. 
Collective beliefs are illustrated in an example from the automobile industry and the application 
of Toyota’s Production System (TPS).  “TPS has long been hailed as the source of Toyota’s outstanding 
performance as a manufacturer”, however, “what's curious is that few manufacturers have managed to 
imitate Toyota successfully even though the company has been extraordinarily open about its practices 
(Spear & Bowen, 1999, p. 97).  Manufacturers that include Chrysler, General Motors, Ford, and others 
extending across diverse fields from aerospace to consumer products are not able to easily “see” the 
information and knowledge that makes the difference and underlies the system’s success.   
Hundreds of thousands of executives from thousands of businesses have toured Toyota's plants in 
Japan and the United States. Frustrated by their inability to replicate Toyota's performance, 
many visitors assume that the secret of Toyota's success must lie in its cultural roots. But that's 
just not the case. Other Japanese companies, such as Nissan and Honda, have fallen short of 
Toyota's standards, and Toyota has successfully introduced its production system all around the 
world, including in North America… (Spear & Bowen, 1999, p. 97).   
In 1981, an engineering team from Ford Motor Company visited Toyota plants operating on the 
“lean” Toyota production system. Although the Ford engineers had firsthand access to the 
revolutionary new production system, they were unable to “see” or recognize what was in front 
of them and claimed that they had been taken on a staged tour; because they had seen no 
inventory, they assumed they had not seen a “real” plant. The reaction of the engineers reminds 
us how difficult it is to let go of existing ideas and beliefs (Scharmer, 2008, p. 56-59).   
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 Spear & Bowen (1999) believe that the answer regarding why TPS is so challenging to successfully 
implement elsewhere is that visitors confuse the practices and tools they observe with the system itself; a 
system grounded in tactic knowledge from disciplined and universal application of the scientific method.  
This system grew organically out of five decades cultivating workers as a community of “scientists” each 
approaching their work by forming testable hypotheses and making changes through a rigorous problem-
solving process that details a current state assessment and a plan for an improved future state through 
experimentation with proposed changes.  Belief in the scientific method is so deep-seated that workers are 
often unable to articulate it and “explains why the 
high degree of specification and structure at the 
company does not promote the command and 
control environment one might expect” (Spear & 
Bowen, 1999, p. 98).  All employees are taught the 
scientific method, make improvements to their own 
jobs with assistance from supervisors as teachers, 
and learn through experience “the four rules” 
(Figure 5) that Spear & Bowen believe is the DNA 
of TPS.  This process is consistent for all 
organizational levels guaranteeing that problem 
solving and continuous learning take place even at 
the highest ranks and pursue “common goodness” to 
form distributed practical wisdom.  
Nonaka & Toyama (2007) refer to distributed, practical wisdom as “phronesis” originally from 
Aristotle roughly meaning “practical wisdom”, “prudence” and “practical rationality.”  The authors 
demonstrate this behavior using company examples one of which also includes Toyota and the tension 
between cost and quality.  This conflict is a common one in most companies that is typically solved by 
Figure 6. The Four Rules (Spear & Bowen, 1999, p. 98) 
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either lowering quality or increasing price to levels that customers still find acceptable.  At Toyota, 
employees took an alternative approach.  
…instead of accepting the constraints as given and simply seeking an optimum solution under 
those conditions, they began by questioning the constraining conditions. They questioned what 
they needed to be done right now to achieve their ideal level of quality and cost, and then 
synthesized the knowledge of all frontline workers through kaizen activities to make operational 
improvements.  In the end, Toyota created new knowledge in the form of a unique manufacturing 
system that overcame the paradox and enabled them to achieve both lower costs and higher 
quality (Monden, 1998). (Nonaka & Toyama, 2007, p. 387). 
 
 
Toyota’s problem-solving method includes asking the question “why?” five times; with each ask the 
answer becomes more focused.  Through “a kinetic chain of minor premises and conclusions based on 
specific contexts” (p. 387) the group collectively applies vertical and horizontal reasoning to overcome 
instead of accept initial constraints to optimize production under a new set of circumstances.  This 
practical wisdom to determine the best action given the circumstances and pursue it to serve the common 
good is phronesis; an intellectual virtue (Nonaka & Toyama, 2007).  To do this requires superior tactical 
knowledge acquired from practical experience and flexible, distributed leadership where the context, not 
an elite job title, determines the leader.  “As actions originate from particular situations, phronesis is the 
ability to synthesize a general, universal knowledge with the particular knowledge of a concrete situation” 
(Nonaka & Toyama, 2007, p. 379).  This concept synthesizes the scientific theory of “knowing why” with 
the practical skills of “knowing how” to the goals that are to be realized, “knowing what.”  Phronesis can 
be more than a possession of one individual (Halverson, 2004) manifesting in leadership behaviors that 
use contextual knowledge gained through experience synthesized with general knowledge to make 
decisions, solve problems, and set new goals.  Nonaka and Takeuchi (2011) also describe practical 
wisdom as “experiential knowledge that enables people to make ethically sound judgments” (p. 60).  
Phronetic leadership requires social capital – the talent that fosters sharing, connections, and engagement 
among members of ba where care, love, and trust are cultivated (von Krogh et al, 2000).  Social capital 
enables a ba to form motivating individuals to “transcend the self” and is also necessary to link ba in 
multiple layers (Nonaka & Toyama, 2007).  
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“If you think about it, your trust in some ways compensates for the knowledge you lack” (von 
Krogh et al, 2000, p.49).  Decades of research has emphasized the critical role trust plays in organizations 
at the micro and macro levels ranging from employee satisfaction, teamwork and collaboration, effort and 
performance, leadership effectiveness, strategic alliances, mergers and acquisitions, and more (Fulmer & 
Gelfand, 2012).  However, trust as a critical concept in the fields of epistemology and knowledge 
management has not received the prominent attention it warrants, especially in Western cultures 
(Lehtonen, 2009).  As section 2.2 and 2.3 describe, there are cultural distinctions between US and 
Japanese views of knowledge that influence their social practices and how “knowledge” as they define it 
is created.  Specifically, there is remarkable difference in the value placed on love and trust.  For Japanese 
organizations according to Nonaka’s theory, love, trust, and commitment initiates the knowledge creation 
process when individuals meet in person to share emotions and experiences: originating ba where barriers 
between self and others are removed.  “…Originating ba diverges from the Western tendency to 
understand the world through distinctions and dichotomies.  In its emphasis on emotion and even spiritual 
qualities, it runs counter to the more ‘objective’ and external Western style of business discourse” 
(Cohen, 1998, p. 25).  The Western philosophy view of knowledge “fails to address the relative, dynamic, 
and human dimensions of knowledge” (Von Krogh et al, 2000, p. 48).  The differences between Western 
and Eastern conceptions of knowledge and human existences at large can be observed in the contrasting 
philosophies of Descartes and Nishida.  Ikujiro Nonaka makes this point.  
To the Western-Cartesian, “I think, therefore, I am,” Nishida counters, “I love, therefore, I am.”  
Descartes conceives of the individual as outside the environment, an observer standing apart 
from and evaluating his surroundings.  Nishida views the individual as inside the environment, an 
inseparable part of it. (Cohen, 1998, p. 24) 
 
Research findings from von Krogh on high-care and low-care situations support Nonaka’s conclusions 
that emotional attachment and trust contributes to knowledge creation (von Krogh, 1998; Cohen, 1998).  
Individuals in high-care groups were found to impart knowledge, openly exchanging with others in a 
manner von Krogh describes as “indwelling” – looking with others at their tasks instead of at others 
(Cohen, 1998, p.26).  Georg von Krogh (1998) defines “care” as accessibility, attentive inquiry, 
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propensity to help, lenience to accept error, and reciprocity.  Instances where these qualities are lacking 
characterize low-care situations with individuals in the group seizing the knowledge they need, hoarding 
what they have, and otherwise exerting a “maximum grip” on knowledge to exchange it only when the 
benefits outweigh the risks.  In profit-driven organizations, trust can have instrumental value rather than 
value alone (Lehtonen, 2009).  In other words, trust alone does not exceed expectations, but outstanding 
performance is achieved when a high level of trust is present and people are able to depend on one 
another.   
Relationships between colleagues in a firm that are based on norms of trust and cooperation for 
mutual advantage can improve knowledge sharing and the development of both individual tacit 
knowledge and valuable firm-specific routines (Chisholm & Nielson, 2009, p. 11) 
 
Nurturing trust, care, love, and commitment among organizational members forms the foundation of 
knowledge creation (Nonaka et al, 2000).  The process begins in an organization when the self-organizing 
team triggers the forming of mutual trust by sharing experiences and continuous, increasingly creative 
dialogue that enables implicit perspectives to be conceptualized among team members once information 
is redundant (Nonaka, 1994).  Redundancy, discussed in the next section of this chapter, has a negative 
connotation of unnecessary duplication to Western managers; however, the concept is central to Japanese 
firms because of its ability to establish “common cognitive ground” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p.14).   
Trust can be taken for granted or not widely valued until it is noticeably absent.  “People more 
often than not notice mistrust than trust...individuals cannot always tell how other people express trust.  
Thus, it was more common to describe what trust is not” (Lehtonen, 2009, p. 68).  If an organization 
wants to achieve optimum levels of knowledge creation, group members must learn to identify and 
remove obstacles to knowledge conversion such as lack of resources, time to engage in the knowledge 
creation, and lack of mutual trust (Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009, p. 646-647).  Mistrust can occur when 
team members create false projections of their teammate’s behavior; consequently, managers need to be 
aware of trust and how misunderstandings can negatively impact it (Lehtonen, 2009).  Trust is a 
component of care, empathy, to achieve common ground between individuals (von Krogh, 1998) – a 
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connection.  Mistrust occurs when individuals perceive acts as unconstructive or minimizing rather than 
enhancing personal relationships.  An example of an unconstructive, sub optimizing social behavior 
mentioned in the introduction is blame to identify "who is wrong?" rather than "what is wrong?”  Blame 
can lead to feelings of shame that hurt and disengage individuals leaving them defensive and reluctant to 
transcend themselves to make authentic connections with others.  
Here’s the best way to think about the relationship between shame and blame: If blame is driving, 
shame is riding shotgun.  In organizations, schools, and families, blaming and finger-pointing are 
often symptoms of shame.  Shame researchers June Tangney and Ronda Dearing explain that in 
shame-bound relationships, people ‘measure carefully, weigh, and assign blame.’  They write, ‘In 
the face of any negative outcome, large or small, someone or something must be found 
responsible (and held accountable).  There’s no notion of ‘water under the bridge’.  They go on 
to say, ‘After all, if someone must be to blame and it’s not me, it must be you!  From blame comes 
shame.  And then hurt, denial, anger and retaliation.’  
 
Blame is simply the discharging of pain and discomfort.  We blame when we’re uncomfortable 
and experience pain – when we’re vulnerable, angry, hurt, in shame, grieving.  There’s nothing 
productive about blame, and it often involves shaming someone or just being mean.   
(Brown, 2012, p. 195)    
 
Brené Brown (2012) argues that if blame is a cultural pattern in any organization, then shame needs to be 
addressed rather than used as a “cover-up” that intentionally, or unintentionally, keeps members quiet.  
“When the culture of an organization mandates that it is more important to protect the reputation of a 
system and those in power than it is to protect the basic human dignity of individuals or communities, you 
can be certain that shame is systemic, money drives ethics, and accountability is dead” (Brown, p. 196).  
Shame can be used to change behavior at least in the short term.  Shame can create swift behavior change 
that can be excruciatingly hurtful and has the potential to scar the person being shamed and the one doing 
the shaming (Brown, 2007).  Shame breeds fear, destroying the tolerance for individuals to be vulnerable.  
People need to be vulnerable in order to trust and need to feel trust to be vulnerable.  Brown’s research 
describes trust as “a slow-building, layered process that happens over time” (Brown, 2012, p. 47).  In her 
book The Gifts of Imperfection (2010), she provides a definition of love developed from her research.  
We cultivate love when we allow our most vulnerable and powerful selves to be deeply seen and 
known, and when we honor the spiritual connection that grows from that offering with trust, 
respect, kindness, and affection. 
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Love is not something we give or get; it is something that we nurture and grow, a connection that 
can only be cultivated between two people when it exists within each one of them – we can only 
love others as much as we love ourselves. 
 
Shame, blame, disrespect, betrayal, and the withholding of affection damage the roots from which 
love grows.  Love can only survive these injuries if they are acknowledged, healed, and rare. 
(Brown, 2012, p. 105-106) 
 
Brown’s conclusions echo those of von Krogh’s high-care situations (1998) and Nonaka and associates’ 
concept of originating ba (Nonaka & Konno, 1998; Nonaka et al, 2000, 2001, 2006) by acknowledging 
that empathy is a valued asset and love is a connection to be cultivated fulfilling the primal human need 
for belonging.  
Empathy is required for self-transcendence and is essential to sharing individual tacit knowledge. 
“Tacit knowledge can only be shared if the self is freed to become a larger self that includes the tacit 
knowledge of the other. For example, the larger self means that we empathize with our colleagues and 
customers, rather than sympathizing with them” (Nonaka & Konno, 1998, p. 42).  Socialization creates 
empathy between individuals and initiates the knowledge creation process through shared experiences.  
Examples include apprenticeships, informal meetings, conversations over drinks and meals, and other 
joint activities that occur inside or outside organizational boundaries.  As individuals engage in high-
quality physical experiences, their tacit knowledge accrues to become a motivating influence for 
transcending individual boundaries to share tacit knowledge and generating high-quality knowledge 
(Nonaka et al, 2001).  As individuals trust, they allow themselves to be vulnerable and authentic dialogue 
is possible.  “The research has made this clear: vulnerability is at the heart of the feedback process.  This 
is true whether we give, receive, or solicit feedback” (Brown, 2012, p. 201).  Social practices in the US 
can display the contrary as characterized by the well-known saying, “its just business.”  When the phrase 
is used, it is generally a rationalization by the offender to inflict harm on others for their individual gain as 
opposed to acting for the common good.  Nonaka recognizes the individualistic nature in the US and 
unlike the previous example, sees advantages to it as expressed in his 1996 interview with Otto Scharmer. 
I have to admit that socialization is difficult to achieve in the US because of its individualism and 
incentive systems. The Japanese incentive system is more team-oriented, and, in principle, we 
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don’t lay off people. Consequently, it is relatively easy to share experiences at Japanese 
companies. I admit there are infrastructural differences, but nonetheless, socialization is possible 
in the US. With socialization, American teams are stronger than Japanese ones, because 
Americans are strong individuals. Strong individuals and a strong team are complementary. 
Japanese teams may not necessarily be so.  To institutionalize team-oriented spirit, however, US 
organizations may need strong corporate cultures….” (Scharmer, 2000, p. 28) 
 
Strength in individuals, teams and corporate cultures begs the question of power – how is power created, 
how is it lost and what are the implications to learning and knowledge creation.  
“If you want to be liked by everyone, don’t do anything”, Jeffrey Pfeffer commented during a 
lecture at Stanford University School of Business (2012).  Likeability is overrated and power is an 
intrinsic part of leadership.  Pfeffer (2010) writes that although nice people are perceived as warm, they 
can also be perceived as weak or even less intelligent.  He argues that while its desirable to be both loved 
and feared, if you have to choose one – choose fear if you want power.  Pfeffer describes three major 
obstacles that exist on the path to power.  First, is the belief that the world is a fair and just place where 
everyone gets what s/he deserves.  The negative effect of this belief is that it hinders one’s ability to learn 
from all people and situations especially from those they do not agree with, like or even respect.  Instead 
of learning in these instances, people instead choose to disengage believing that those they do not like will 
fail in the end and get what they deserve.  The belief in a “just-world” also anesthetizes individuals to the 
need to build a power base.  The second obstacle on the path to power is to avoid the leadership literature 
that focuses on success stories and often dismisses discussions of the power plays.  Pfeffer believes the 
leadership literature, that is often written by business leaders themselves, prescribes how it wishes the 
powerful behaved - truthful, self-effacing, modest, trustworthy, and so on.  The third obstacle to 
overcome is you.  Do not be overly concerned with your self-image or experiencing setbacks.  Using 
Toyota again as an example, there are no guarantees that the systems that enabled success will be 
sustained over time as exemplified by the quality problems Toyota has experienced the last few years.  
“In any organization, there will be internal and external factors that threaten to weaken the foundation, be 
they opportunities for growth, temptations to skimp on training or pressures to lower costs” (Cole, 2011, 
34-35).  Powerful leaders need to be attentive to maintaining the desired practices and values within their 
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organizations as they learn to adapt to predictable and unpredictable challenges that inevitably emerge.  
Leaders must direct learning in new, strategic areas because failures can come from focusing on what is 
known rather than focusing on what is not.  The Black Swan, an improbable event that causes massive 
consequences, comes from misunderstanding the likelihood of surprises “because we take what we know 
a little too seriously” (Taleb, 2010, p. 2).   
The final section of the literature review explores how leadership behaviors influence corporate 
cultures, and how internal environments and external events influence leadership and decision-making. 
 
2.5 Organizational paradox, decision-making, and randomness   
These are times of intense change - a tipping point where old paradigms are shifting: a “crisis” 
where old social structures, ways of thinking and institutionalizing fail to be effective (Scharmer, 2009).  
Peter Senge talks about three distinct positions that can be heard in the debate on the crisis: retro 
movement activists that want to return to the order of the past; defenders of the status quo who just want 
to muddle through; and advocates of individual and transformational change who look for ways to break 
patterns of the past to experience a future of the highest possibilities (Scharmer, 2009).  Leaders search 
for new approaches to develop heightened abilities for their organizations so they can recognize new 
situations and adapt quickly to dynamic environments.  Research demonstrates that how top managers 
interpret and categorize their accumulated information and knowledge has a systematic linkage with 
differential organizational performance (Thomas et al., 1993).  The ability to interpret events as they 
occur, acquire new knowledge, and disseminate improved expertise across multiple levels of an 
organization to fuel future performance is extremely valuable (Thomas et al. 2001).  “The importance of 
knowledge for gaining competitive advantage is widely accepted” (Osterloh & Frey, 2000, p. 538).  The 
inherent challenge with top down leadership is the boundaries it creates.  The less people know about one 
another, the more difficult it is to establish and augment trust (Lehtonen, 2009).   
Western and Japanese firms are profoundly different in how they create knowledge through their 
organizational forms (Hedlund & Nonaka, 1993).  As discussed in section 2.1, US firms are traditionally 
44 
 
 
organized by the pyramidal structure designed for high-growth environments because it is scalable and 
ideal for control and planning (Hammer & Champy, 1993).  However, “at worst, the hierarchy may be 
fatal for knowledge creation” (Nonaka et al, 2006, p. 1189).  Hedlund and Nonaka (1993) argue the 
negative implications of the hierarchical organizational structure on knowledge creation and the firm’s 
ability to innovate. 
Concerning implications for the management of knowledge, we want to suggest that the 
difficulties of the large Western firms to create novelty have to do with overemphasizing the 
instrumental, articulating, exploiting nature of the corporation.  The firm loses much of its 
potential for knowledge creation through the elaboration of complex managerial hierarchies and 
technical formalism with attendant systems, standardization and, ultimately, loss of overriding 
purpose.  Hedlund (1986, 1991) has suggested heterarchy as a fundamental organizing principle 
for strategies of creation and experimentation, whereas hierarchy fits the demands of strategies 
of exploitation (p. 139).  
 
Osterloh and Frey (2000) find that sharing tacit knowledge across organizational boundaries is 
exceptionally problematic due to the hierarchies themselves, individual and group interests, and 
inadequate incentives.  “Intrinsic motivation is crucial when tacit knowledge in and between teams must 
be transferred” (Osterloh & Frey, 2000, p. 538).  Extrinsically motivated employees are indirectly 
satisfied through monetary compensation that is commonly tied to the measurable goals of the firm.  
Intrinsic motivation comes from work that provides direct and immediate need satisfaction; work is self-
sustaining because it is valued for its own sake and can be strongly tied to a firm’s strategic goals and 
shared purposes (Osterloh & Frey, 2000).  There are advantages and disadvantages to both types of 
motivation.   
Daniel Pink (2009) in his best-selling book Drive highlights research from Edward Deci that 
found extrinsic monetary rewards, “carrots and stick”, focus interest and enhance performance in the 
short-term but over time fail to be effective and can reduce long-term motivation.  He argues that research 
points to three factors for better performance and personal satisfaction: autonomy, mastery, and purpose.  
He defines autonomy as the ability to be self-directed and a critical component for engagement.  Mastery 
is the innate human urge to improve and make a contribution that closely ties to purpose.  Intrinsic 
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rewards do, however, have potential disadvantages in that they are more difficult to change, have 
uncertain outcomes, and may have undesirable content as provided by Osterloh and Frey in this example.   
Envy, vengeance, and the desire to dominate are not less intrinsically motivated than altruism, 
conscientiousness, and love.  All of these motives contribute to immediate satisfaction rather than 
to achieving externally set goals” (Osterloh & Frey, 2000, p. 540). 
 
Managers must compare the benefits and costs of each types of motivation plus the blend of reward and 
command required based on the specific conditions they want to create.  For example, intrinsic motivation 
is needed for activities that require creativity and is more beneficial for job functions with multiple tasks 
(Osterloh & Frey, 2000).  In sharp contrast, research finds that employees who are extrinsically motivated 
tend to repeat what has already been successful (Amabile 1996, 1998; Schwartz, 1990 by Osterloh & 
Frey, 2000), and are pressured to achieve the rewards that lead to superficial performance and reduced 
levels of learning.  
Japanese firms in general seem more flexible and dynamic than those in the West because they 
create both tacit and explicit knowledge in formal (project) or informal groups embracing bas that may 
span across multiple organizational units (Nonaka et al, 2006). When these groups necessitate a new 
division of labor and specialization, reorganization is not constrained by group members’ inability to 
express knowledge, requirements related to information processing or decision-making.  Reorganization 
happens when new knowledge creation demands for specialization and coordination are discovered.  This 
is possible due to their heterarchy structure that Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) describe as the "hypertext 
organization” (Figure 7) where like an actual hypertext document, the organization has interconnected 
layers or different contexts that are available: the project team, the business system, and the knowledge-
base layers.  The top “project team” layer is where multiple project teams engage in knowledge-creating 
work such as new-product development.  The "business-system" is the central layer where normal, routine 
operations are completed.  The bottom layer is the "knowledge-base" that is embedded in the corporate 
vision, organizational culture and/or technology.  This is where organizational knowledge generated in 
the above two layers is recategorized and recontextualized (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 167).   Nonaka 
& Toyama (2005) also describe an “ecosystem of knowledge” that requires a dynamic environment where 
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strategic and managerial decisions are made iteratively in response to the environment as opposed to 
isolated from it in a vacuum.  “The ecosystem of knowledge consists of multi-layered ba, which exists 
across organizational boundaries and is continuously evolving” (Nonaka & Toyama, 2005, p. 430).  
There are advantages and disadvantages to both organizational views in the hierarchy vs. 
heterarchy dichotomy between Western and Japanese firms.  Hedlund (1994) proposes that heterarchy is 
the preferred organizational form for knowledge creation because it is network-based where 
communication moves horizontally instead of vertically and assets, talent and leadership are distributed.   
However as described by Nonaka et al (2006), Hedlund does caution that despite the virtues of the 
heterarchy form, it can be substandard in achieving the economic efficiency of a hierarchy. 
…less costly knowledge creation through the sheer combination of explicit knowledge, faster 
diffusion and infusion of dramatically new practices and perspectives through people, 
reorganization, spin-offs and acquisitions, and a superior ability to design and implement large-
scale system changes. Finally, he argued that the hierarchy is more strategically robust due to 
quasi-independent organizational units that can be managed as a portfolio of businesses. 
(Nonaka et al, 2006, p. 1189) 
 
 
IKUJIRO NONAKA Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation 
Figure 4 Hypertext Organization -An Interactive Model of Hierarchy and Nonhierarchy 
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Source: Nonaka, Konno, Tokuoka, and Kawamura (1992). 
firms. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the prin- 
ciples described have a more general application to any 
organization, either eco omic or social, private or pub- 
lic, manufacturing or service, in the coming age despite 
their field of activities as well as geographical and 
cultural location. The theory explains how knowledge 
held by individuals, organizations, and societies can be 
simultaneously enlarged and enriched through the spi- 
ral, interactive amplification of tacit and explicit knowl- 
edge held by individuals, orga izations, and s cieties. 
The key for this synergetic expansion of knowledge is 
joint creation of knowledge by individuals and organi- 
zations. In this sense, the theory of organizational 
knowledge creation is at the same time a basic theory 
for building a truly "humanistic" knowledge society 
beyond the limitations of mere "economic rationality." 
Organizations play a critical role in mobilizing tacit 
knowledge held by individuals and provide the forum 
for a "spiral of knowledge" creation through socializa- 
tion, combination, externalization, and internalization. 
All of these conversion modes interact in a dynamic 
and continuous "entanglement" to drive the knowl- 
edge creation process. These modes operate in the 
context of an organization and, while acknowledging 
the role of individuals as essential actors in creating 
new knowledge, the central theme of this paper has 
been to address the processes involved at an organiza- 
tional level. 
By concentrating on the concept of organizational 
knowledge creation, it has been possible to develop a 
perspective which goes beyond straightforward notions 
of "organizational le rning." In the language of he 
present discussion, learning can be related to "inter- 
nalization" which is but one of the four modes of 
conversion required to create new organizational 
knowledge. Taken by itself, learning has rather limited, 
static connotations whereas organizational knowledge 
creation is a more wide-ranging and dynamic concept. 
Finally, hypertext and middle-up-down management 
have been offered as practical proposals for imple- 
menting more effective knowledge creation. As knowl- 
edge emerges as an ever more important feature of 
advanced industrial development, it is necessary to pay 
incr ased tt ntion to the processes by which it is 
34 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE/VO1. 5, No. 1, February 1994 
Figure 7. Hypertext Organization - An Interactive Model of An Interactive Model of Hierarchy and Nonhierarchy 
(Nonaka, 1994, p. 34) 
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Argyris  (1999) abandons the belief in the hierarchical structure of the traditional pyramidal maintaining 
that development and deployment of project teams in a matrix organization offers promising strategies to 
encourage the integrated effort and collaboration required for success.  In this structure, several project 
teams may exist within an organization that are deployed to solve critical business problems.  Project 
team members are given equal responsibility to solve assigned problems by sharing skills and 
representing the interests of their functional area such as marketing, engineering, finance and so on.  
Argyris’ preliminary findings across nine large organizations suggest mixed results.   
In preliminary interviews the executives reported that the matrix organization and team approach 
made sense, but that they found them very difficult to put into actual practice.  People still seemed 
to polar issues, resisted exploring ideas thoroughly, mistrusted each other’s behavior, focused on 
trying to project one’s own function, overemphasized simplified critical for success (e.g. figures 
on sales), worked too much on day-to-day operations and short-term planning, engaged in 
routine decisions rather than focus more on the long-range risky decisions, and emphasized 
survival more than the integration of effort into a truly accepted decision. 
 
Others found fault with the team approach for not providing individuals enough opportunity to 
get recognition in their own functional departments for their performance on the team.  Still 
others insisted that individuals sought to be personally identified with a particular 
accomplishment; that is wasn’t satisfying for them to know that their group (and not they) 
obtained the reward.  Finally, some said that during their meetings the teams got bogged down in 
focusing on the negative, i.e., what had not been accomplished (Argyris, 1999, p. 109) 
  
 
Despite the ineffectual results, Argyris believes that the matrix organization is a fundamentally valid 
means to respond to increasing external complexity.  The challenges stem from executive leadership 
styles and employee’s social behavior developed in the traditional pyramidal structure.  This assertion 
echoes Barlett and Ghoshal (1990) who argue the concerns with matrix management are not from the goal 
of a multidimensional organization but from the “organizational trap” that firms fall into when they focus 
on implementing a new structure instead of changing employees’ attitudes and behaviors.   
Companies must also concern themselves with the organizational physiology – the systems and 
relationships that allow the lifeblood of information to flow through the organization.  And they 
need to develop a healthy organizational psychology – the shared norms, values, and beliefs that 
shape the way individual managers think and act (Barlett & Ghoshal, 1990, p. 140).   
 
Responding successfully to the demands of a complex and competitive environment occurs from a focus 
on developing abilities and desired behaviors rather than on achieving the ideal structure (Barlett & 
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Ghoshal, 1990).  “Organizations work the way human beings create them” (Scharmer, 2009, p. 54).  The 
concept of the organization as a collection of attitudes, social behaviors, and a place to create knowledge 
departs from the static theories of a firm that portray companies as information-processing machines.  De 
Geus (1997) writes the firm as a machine implies the builder bestows its identity, its actions are in fact 
reactions to management decisions and goals, and when the machine fails management will rebuild it.  
Viewing the firm as a living being means it naturally evolves having its own sense of identity capable of 
self-renewal and regeneration - a learning entity and community of human work rather than employees as 
“human resources” awaiting deployment and instruction.  The firm as a living entity corresponds to 
Nonaka and associates that argue an organization is a dialectic being that uses the SECI process and ba to 
synthesize contradictions (Nonaka & Toyama, 2003).  They believe a firm is “an organic configuration of 
ba to create knowledge” rather than an assortment of subdivided tasks that require completion (Nonaka & 
Toyama, 2003, p. 9).  Their view of the firm is that of a “dialectical being” meaning the process of its 
knowledge-creating activities should be known, not just the outcomes. “In the knowledge creation 
process, dialectics is a method of thinking and acting. It is a way/process to approach a reality to find a 
truth in it” (Nonaka & Toyama, 2003, p. 9).  The firm as a dialectic being synthesizes contradictions 
through ba and the SECI process to present the organization and knowledge creation itself not as static 
theory but as a dialectic process where competitiveness depends on internal resources and market 
positioning.  Some would argue that success in competition also depends on luck. 
 In his best-selling book (2011), Daniel Kahneman describes an instance when an editor of an 
online magazine asked him for his “favorite equation.”  In response, he offered the following two: 
   success = talent + luck  
   great success = a little more talent + a lot of luck  
 
Luck is an elusive theoretical concept that, whether admitted or not, can have a non-trivial influence on 
outcomes.  Along with the determinant power that organizations and individuals have in creating 
competitive advantage, the stochastic nature of firm performance must also be acknowledged (Ma, 2002).  
Perplexing to the human mind is the phenomenon of regression to the mean originally discovered by Sir 
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Francis Galton late in the nineteenth century who aptly termed it regression towards mediocrity (Koenker, 
2006).  The general definition for this statistical phenomenon is that “the larger the deviation from the 
norm, the larger the probability of it coming from luck rather than skills (Taleb, 2005, p. 155), or said 
differently, “whenever the correlation between two scores is imperfect, there will be regression to the 
mean (Kahneman, 2011, p. 181).  “All deviations do not come from this effect, but a disproportionately 
large proportion of them do” (Taleb, 2005, p. 156).  From Kahneman’s years of research with colleague 
Amos Tversky, he describes that the human mind does not easily accept statistics because it evokes casual 
explanations when no actual cause exists for outcomes occurring by regression to the mean.  The struggle 
with the regression concept as one example originates from two very different dimensions of the mind 
Kahneman (2011) metaphorically refers to as “System 1” and “System 2.”  System 1 operates fast and 
automatically, effortlessly and unquestionably providing impressions and emotion that form the basis for 
beliefs and deliberate choices of System 2.  System 2 is slow thinking, highly diverse operations that 
construct orderly thoughts that can overrule the impulses of System 1 if so exercised, engaged and not 
otherwise distracted.  The importance of these distinctions is not to satisfy academic curiosity rather a 
matter of pragmatic leadership to reduce the cognitive bias inherent in the decision-making process: “we 
are prone to overestimate how much we understand about the world and to underestimate the role of 
chance in events.  Overconfidence is fed by the illusory certainty of hindsight” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 14). 
The cognitive biases that generate overoptimism are magnified by the limits of human imagination.  For 
example, the business scenarios developed in the planning process, while detailed, are generally 
inadequate because any multifaceted initiative has the potential to experience countless problems that 
cannot be foreseen (Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003).  Consequently, scenario planning can dramatically 
understate the probability of failures.  When the overall probability of unfavorable outcomes is 
underestimated, the numerous outcomes that may have only a small chance of occurring in combination 
actually may be much more likely to happen than the deemed “most likely” scenario. 
 There are many types of biases that distort reasoning to affect the decision-making process.  It 
can be argued that organizations that learn to better understand and take steps to counteract them will 
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reduce negative effects and improve outcomes8.  Biases originate from System 1 or “fast thinking” that 
constructs contextual narratives from multiple inputs such as visual cues, anxieties, associations, and 
memories (Kahneman, 
Lovallo, & Sibony, 2011).  
For the most part, these 
narratives are accurate but 
when they are not, the 
exception can be a cognitive 
bias that conceals alternative 
truths from the individual 
without their awareness.  To 
avoid this, Kahneman et al. 
(2011) developed twelve 
questions (Table 2) decision- 
makers should ask 
themselves, and the teams 
making the proposals, in 
order to discover biases that 
may be present and other 
action steps intended to aid 
the decision making process.  
Because individuals cannot 
recognize their own biases, 
                                                
8 “The Case for Behavioral Strategy,” McKinsey Quarterly, March 2010: a McKinsey study of more than 1,000 
major business investments that found when the effects of bias are reduced in the organizations’ decision-making 
processes, up to seven percentage points higher returns were achieved (Kahneman, Lovallo, Sibony, 2011). 
 
Table 2. Decision Quality Control: A Checklist  
(adapted from Kahneman, Lovallo & Sibony, 2011, p. 54-58). 
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those practicing the quality screens such as those shown in Table 2 should be absolutely independent 
from the teams creating and pitching the recommendations (Kahneman et al, 2011).  Understanding that 
individuals accept their own intuitive, “fast thinking” explains why biases are so difficult to detect in 
oneself and why effective self-reflection or “double-loop learning” (Argyris, 1999) can be so elusive.  
Hope comes from the collective and an inclusive decision-making process when System 2 “slow 
thinking” is used to recognize System 1 errors in the recommendations of others. 
…when we move from the individual to the collective, from the decision maker to the decision-
making process, and from the executive to the organization. As researchers have documented in 
the realm of operational management, the fact that individuals are not aware of their own biases 
does not mean that biases can’t be neutralized—or at least reduced—at the organizational level. 
This is true because most decisions are influenced by many people, and because decision makers 
can turn their ability to spot biases in others’ thinking to their own advantage. We may not be 
able to control our own intuition, but we can apply rational thought to detect others’ faulty 
intuition and improve their judgment (Kahneman et al, 2011, p. 52-53).   
 
 
To be successful, the organizational culture must support and reinforce the systematic use of such quality 
controls to avoid partial screening or selective implementation.  Since the introduction of cognitive biases 
in the 1970s by 2002 Nobel Laureates Kahneman and Tversky, biases have been well documented and 
researched across a variety of disciplines from psychology and economics to medical, engineering and 
business.  The purpose of this brief review of the literature on decision-making is not to delve into the 
nature and scope of cognitive biases themselves, rather it is intended to reiterate the importance of bias 
awareness, and the need for disciplined work methods and distributed leadership to offset judgment errors 
to enhance the decision-making process specifically and organizational knowledge creation in general. 
Typically executives and other leaders significantly rely on the judgment of their teams when 
they make critical decisions (Kahneman et al, 2011).  Fostering judgment, practical wisdom or as defined 
in the previous section, “phronesis”, is fundamental to growing organizational and individual capabilities. 
Nonaka & Takeuchi (2011) contend that cultivating distributed leadership is one of the greatest 
responsibilities of a wise leader.  “Practical wisdom should never be treated as if it were the preserve of 
the company’s chief executive or top management team.  It must be distributed as much as possible 
through the organization, and employees at all levels can be trained in its use (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 2011, 
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p. 66).  An example that illustrates this principle in practice and the cultural differences between Japanese 
and Western companies is the theory of redundancy.  For many Westerners, the word redundancy has a 
negative connotation because it describes inadvertent, unnecessary repetition, duplication of effort or 
waste.  This concept to the Japanese, however, is central to knowledge creation because it enables 
“common cognitive ground” to be established (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p.14) across the organization.  
In Japanese firms, redundancy is intentional and denotes the “overlapping of information about business 
activities, management responsibilities and the company as a whole” (Nonaka et al, 2000, p. 27).  Instead 
of slowing down knowledge creating processes it speeds them up by facilitating the sharing of tacit 
knowledge and acts as a “self-control mechanism” for realizing consistent and a common direction 
(Nonaka et al, 2000).  Individuals are able to sense what others are attempting to articulate and to 
transcend their functional boundaries and offer alternative perspectives to advance the common good.  
Middle managers in Japanese firms occupy key positions forming the nuclei of self-organizing teams.  
Middle management occupies a key position, equipped with its ability to combine (Nonaka, 1988) 
strategic macro (context-free) information and hands-on micro (context-specific) information. 
Middle management is able to most effectively eliminate the fluctuation and chaos within the 
organization's information creation structure by serving as the starting point for action to be 
taken by upper and lower levels. Middle management is also able, therefore, to serve as the agent 
for change in the organization's self-renewing process (Nonaka, 1988, p. 67). 
 
These practices are a philosophical departure from traditional Western beliefs that cautions leaders to 
selectively share information with employees and for information that is shared, it is done so explicitly.  
The paradigm of the information processing  (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1969) disregards beliefs and 
“images of reality” because it separates facts from subjective values in the name of “science” (Scharmer, 
2000).  To continue with the middle manager example, Guth and MacMillan (1986) argue that top 
managers must communicate self-explanatory messages regarding the rationale and goals for various 
strategies in order for managers to understand and willingly implement rather than delay, sub-optimize, or 
“totally sabotage” these strategies.  Organizations “must learn to exercise severe, intelligent selectivity in 
mining our data mountains, and to communicate information in ways that will inform and not bury the 
recipients” (Simon, 2000, p. 611).  The mission statement “must become part of the mind-set of every 
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member of the organization….  Only if this conception of mission and guidelines is evoked whenever the 
occasion for decision arises, will decisions be shaped by it”  (Simon, 1993, p. 138).  Agents of knowledge 
creation in the top-down structures common in the US are senior-level managers, typically very 
charismatic individuals, who give voice to the company’s future (Nonaka, 1994).  Table 3 recaps the 
comparison of the US and Japanese models, top-down and middle-up-down management respectively, in 
terms of who creates the knowledge, resource allocation, structural and process characteristics, how 
knowledge is accumulated, and limitations inherent to the design (Nonaka, 1994, p. 30-31).   It also offers 
a view of “bottom-up” entrepreneurial organization that is discussed in Chapter Five in context with The 
Company featured in the case study.  
 In a 1996 interview, Ikujiro Nonaka was asked how was it that he arrived at the idea of 
knowledge creation rather than remain with the established paradigm of information processing.  It was 
the process of innovation that led to his new insight as he describes below (Scharmer, 2000).   
 
The turning point in my transition from information to knowledge came when I participated with 
my colleagues Hirotaka Takeuchi and Kenichi Imai in a Harvard Business School colloquium on 
productivity and technology in March 1984. I found that the existing theory of information 
IKUJIRO NONAKA Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation 
Table 1 A Comparison of Three Management Models 
Top-Down Middle-Up-Down Bottom-Up 
Agent of top management self-organizing team (with entrepreneurial individual 
Knowledge Creation middle managers (intrapreneur) 
as team leaders) 
Resource Allocation hierarchically from diverse viewpoints self-organizing principle 
Pursued Synergy "synergy of money" "synergy of knowledge" "synergy of people" 
Organization big and powerful hq. team-oriented small hq. 
staff use manuals affiliated firms self-organizing 
by intrapreneurs suborganizations 
Management leaders as commanders leaders as catalysts leaders as sponsors 
Processes emphasis on create organizational create personal 
information processing knowledge information 
chaos not allowed create/amplify chaos/noise premised 
chaos / noise 
Accumulated explicit explicit and tacit tacit incarnated in 
Knowledge computerized / shared in diverse individuals 
documented forms 
Weakness high dependency human exhaustion time consuming 
on top lack of overall difficult to 
management control of the coordinate 
organization individuals 
Source: from Nonaka (1 988b). 
The main job of top and middle managers in the model 
of middle-up-down management is to orient this chaotic 
situation toward purposeful knowledge creation. These 
managers do this by providing their subordinates with a 
onceptual framework that elps them make sense of 
their own experience. 
In both top-down management and bottom-up man- 
agement, a high degree of emphasis is given to charis- 
matic leadership. By contrast, middle-up-down man- 
agement views managers as catalysts. In this role as a 
"catalyst," top management sets the direction, provides 
the field of interaction, selects the participants in the 
field, establishes the guidelines and deadlines for proj- 
ects, and supports the innovation process. 
Top management gives voice to a company's future 
by articulating metaphors, symbols, and concepts that 
orient the knowledge-creating activities of employees. 
In other words, they give form to "organizational in- 
tention" that is beyond the personal intention of top 
management as an individual. This is achieved by ask- 
ing the qu stions  behalf of the entire organization: 
What are we trying to learn? What do we need to 
know? Where should we be going? Who are we? If the 
job of frontline employees and lower managers is to 
know "what is,"' then the job of top management is to 
know "what ought to be." In other words, the respon- 
sibility of top m n gement in middle-up-down manage- 
ment is to articulate the company's "conceptual 
umbrella": the grand concepts expressed in highly uni- 
versal and abstract terms identify the common features 
linking seemingly disparate activities or businesses into 
a coherent whole. Quinn (1992) called this conceptual 
umbrella a "future vision" that gives intellectual mem- 
bers of organizations some challenges for intellectual 
growth and develops their capacity for continuous 
change. 
Another way in which top management provides 
employees with a sense of direction is by setting the 
standards for justifying the value of knowledge that is 
constantly being developed by the organization's mem- 
bers. As earlier comments on the "justification" of 
knowledge indicated, deciding which efforts to support 
an  develop is a highly strategic ta k. In order to 
facilitate organizational knowledge creation, qualitative 
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Table 3. A Comparison of Three Management Models (Nonaka, 1994, p. 31 from Nonaka, 1988b) 
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processing was not adequate. The process of innovation is not simply information processing; it’s 
a process to capture, create, leverage, and retain knowledge. I was beginning to theorize how an 
organization creates knowledge. 
When we talked with individuals in innovative organizations, they always started with their 
beliefs. A belief about images of the world, which you may call a mental model, is subjective. 
They tried to convert this subjective belief into objective language. They also tried to justify it 
within their organizations and finally realize it in a concrete form. The whole process originated 
in their subjective beliefs…innovation comes from a subjective belief or an image of the world 
(Scharmer, 2000, p. 24). 
If an organization acts as an open system allowing new information to continuously enter from the 
marketplace, then with it comes a character of self-renewal, which itself generates fluctuations, challenges 
and new decision alternatives (Nonaka, 1988). “An organization placed in a context of rapid 
environmental changes can raise the rate at which innovations occur, if the influx of problems and 
solutions is activated and participants who can lead problems into solutions exist” (Nonaka, 1988, p. 62).  
Dorothy Leonard of Harvard Business School observed, “…innovation comes from the right combination 
of cohesiveness (shared context, ideas, and language) and diversity.  Diversity without cohesiveness leads 
to disorder.  Cohesiveness without diversity results in groupthink” (Cohen, 1998, p. 30).  Leonard 
believes the right balance between cohesiveness and diversity creates “creative abrasion” where minds 
meet on shared ground to negotiate differences that generate new ideas in the process (Cohen, 1998).  
New ideas, creative activities, or even an organization’s total rejuvenation can be stimulated by a crisis.   
A company begins to decline as soon as one thinks it has become a premier company.  There are 
two things that the top management must keep in mind in order to guarantee the continuing 
existence of the company.  The first task of   top management is to create a vision that gives 
meaning to the employees' jobs.  The second task is to constantly convey a sense of crisis to their 
employees (Canon’s President Kaku from Nonaka, 1988, p. 66).  
A crisis can either lead to an organization’s demise or spawn entirely new innovations such as fresh 
product concepts that replace existing company patterns and processes with a new order (Nonaka, 1988).  
In 1998 Gordon Petrash of Dow remarked, "This is an era of experimentation.  There is a lot we 
don’t know” (Cohen, 1998, p. 23).  In modern social life that is increasingly connected and global, almost 
everything generates from consequential jumps and shocks; however, most of our existing knowledge 
bases focus on the “normal” through inference methods such as the “bell-curve” that predict very little 
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about what will happen in the future (Taleb, 2010).  In his best-selling book The Black Swan (2010), 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb describes positive or negative events that were once deemed as improbable, 
however, now happen with increasing frequency delivering massive consequences.  Examples include 
fads, epidemics, fashion, the Internet, and the rise and fall of world leaders and sovereign states.  All of 
these so-called Black Swans share three characteristics.  First, they exist outside the realm of the expected 
– they are outliers.  Second, they have an extreme impact on the world around them.  And lastly, they are 
predictable only in retrospect as people create explanations for their occurrence only after the fact.  As 
Taleb points out this is a problem of knowledge.  A knowledge problem that organizations must learn to 
deal with if they are to survive.  When firms focus only on what they know and what has already 
happened, then they are blind to the reality of events that may happen but did not…yet.  Taleb argues 
there are ways to get even with the Black Swan.  When errors are costly and randomness is wild then be 
skeptical about confirmation.  Lots of data cannot provide confirmation, but a single data point can 
disconfirm hence the example that all swans are not white.  Be very aggressive when there is a possibility 
to profit from exposure to positive Black Swans when downsides are small and very conservative when 
threatened with a negative Black Swan.   
I am very aggressive when an error in a model can benefit me, and paranoid when the 
error can hurt. This may not be too interesting except that it is exactly what other people 
do not do. In finance, for instance, people use flimsy theories to manage their risks and 
put wild ideas under “rational scrutiny. (Taleb, 2010, p. 296)   
 
He uses a framework to describe, not formulate theory, the environments that can produce Black Swans.  
The world of “Extremistan” is where most of the Black Swans occur and “Mediocristan” where 
individual events do not have significant impact on the collective and variation is within a range.  An 
example in Mediocristan is human weight – over eating one day cannot affect one’s yearly caloric 
consumption and its not likely to encounter a human that weighs several tons.  In other words, scalability 
is limited and the bell curve can accurately represent event distribution.  This is not the case in 
Extremistan where “inequalities are such that one single observation can disproportionately impact the 
aggregate, or the total” (p. 33).  Taleb notes that almost all social matters are examples because they are 
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information not physical.  Knowledge in this context grows slowly and erratically with new data where 
history makes jumps and events are not predictable.  Mediocristan is where the tyranny of the collective, 
the obvious, predicted and the routinized must be endured in contrast to Extremistan where the singular 
unseen, unpredicted and accidental reign supreme.   
The literature review and the contextual background from The Company and the network society 
described in the introduction provide the theoretical foundation for the research framework proposed in 
chapter three.  
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CHAPTER 3:  METHODOLOGY 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research methodology and justify the methods 
employed that are intended to yield research data from The Company to understand how social practices 
and leadership behaviors affect employee beliefs and thus determine the implications to the firm and 
knowledge creation.  The chapter includes four sections.  The first provides a conceptual framework to 
illustrate the contexts included in this study and section two details the research design.  The third section 
details the data analysis strategies and measures and the fourth concludes with validity and reliability. 
 
3.1 Conceptual Framework 
This mixed methods case study uses quantitative and qualitative research methodologies to 
investigate events in the decade surrounding The Company’s centennial anniversary, 2002 to 2013 in 
order to explore corporate learning and the relevance of organizational knowledge creation theory in the 
US, and how social practices and leadership behaviors affect employee knowledge or “true beliefs” and 
ultimately to the firm’s competitive advantage.  The conceptual framework for the research (Figure 8) 
Figure 8. Conceptual Framework for the Research 
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was developed to provide a visual representation of Nonaka’s theory of knowledge creation within the 
contextual elements of both The Company and the new socio-technical paradigm as described in chapter 
one’s introduction.  In order to fully explore corporate learning using knowledge creation theory, the 
study must include external influences from the US market where The Company operates and the shifting 
socio-technical paradigms of their US consumers.  Quantitative data from employee engagement as 
measured by The Company in 2011 is used to investigate employees’ beliefs at a point in time and 
determine whether significant patterns exist in the data.  Qualitative data from 2011 survey comments, 
direct observation of information and individuals, and semi-structured interviews in 2013 are used to 
further understand both context and the underlying reasons for the significant patterns of employee 
beliefs.  The ability to directly observe provides a basis for understanding shared contexts or ba, which is 
of great value when exploring social practices and leadership behaviors.  This study centers on answers to 
“how” and “why” questions and the relevant contextual conditions where boundaries are frequently not 
clear between behaviors, practices and context.   
 
3.2 Research design 
This section describes the rationale and techniques utilized in collecting and assimilating the 
various sources of data.  
Data Collection.  Quantitative and qualitative data from 2011 employee engagement Pulse 
survey was collected from The Company that created and administered the survey questionnaire as part of 
the routine business practice of Public Affairs and Communication and Human Resources departments.  
The Pulse survey was selected as starting point for the data collection to assess what employee beliefs are 
present at The Company to further investigate why these beliefs are held and the implications to 
knowledge creation.  At The Company, the Pulse surveys are routinely used to measure employee 
engagement and beliefs regarding various practices within the corporate culture.  In addition, every 
couple years The Company hires a third party to administer large company-wide employee engagement 
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surveys that follow similar lines of questioning and methodology.  Below is the explanation from The 
Company about the purpose and value the Pulse surveys. 
Pulse surveys are part of an ongoing program managed by public affairs and communications 
and human resources to measure employee engagement, progress against company culture and 
behavior change efforts, and communication effectiveness and preferences.  Pulse surveys, which 
are shortened versions of a broader employee survey conducted every other year, are 
administered each quarter to gather an accurate "pulse" about how employees are feeling 
compared to previous surveys.  Results of each survey are shared with senior leaders, and are 
used to guide areas of focus and communication for the company (The Company intranet, 
September, 22 2011). 
 
In February and October 2011, the Pulse survey was administered to all US employees in all US locations 
as opposed to other instances of up to 1,000 randomly selected employees who were administered in 
various periods across 2009 to 2012 (Appendix 1).  The average Pulse survey response rate from 2009-
2012 was 67%.  For the two periods of study in 2011, the survey response rate was similar to the four-
year average at 66% with a 72% response rate in February and 60% in October.  These two periods in 
2011 were selected for analysis due to the sample size (N=7630 total: N=4134 in February and N=3496 in 
October).   Permission was granted by The Company to use and disclose questionnaire data and results 
from 2011 Pulse surveys for the purposes of this study (Appendix 15).   
Formal semi-structured interviews were conducted in 2013 to further investigate the opinions that 
appear in the 2011 quantitative Pulse survey data regarding The Company’s future such as its capabilities, 
competitive advantages, and beliefs of engagement.  Interviews were conducted exclusively with middle 
managers from two groups; the first was men only that are currently employed by The Company and the 
second was open to male or female middle managers no longer employed at The Company.  For the first 
group, candidates for the “Pulse Follow-Up” interviews were selected using a quota sampling method to 
achieve 10 or more interviews through an email request to fifteen male middle managers now employed 
by The Company for more than five years.  All candidate names were listed under bcc on the email 
message in order maintain confidentiality of the distribution list.  The email request for interview also 
included a copy of the questionnaire of eleven questions (Appendix 3) and the consent statement 
(Appendix 16) to be signed and returned.  Twelve males responded and shared their beliefs regarding how 
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social practices and leadership behaviors affect knowledge or knowing within the company.  The “Pulse 
Follow-Up” interviews were conducted in-person or over the phone based on what was most convenient 
for those interviewed with the interviews lasting on average almost 19 minutes.  The twelve men 
interviewed were middle managers with 6 to 30 years of service at The Company in various roles within 
the organization.  For the second group of interviews, former employees that held middle manager 
positions at The Company prior to ending their employment within the last 12 months were contacted and 
interviewed in 2013.  Candidates for these interviews were selected using a quota sampling method to 
achieve a minimum of two “Post Employment” interviews.  Females were neither excluded nor targeted 
from the small sampling of former employees.  Six male and female middle managers that are no longer 
employed by The Company were emailed five questions (Appendix 4) and consent statement (Appendix 
16) with a request for interview.  All interview candidate names were listed under bcc on the email 
message in order to maintain confidentiality of the distribution list.  Two former employees responded, 
one male and one female, and engaged in phone interviews that lasted an average of 15 minutes each.   
These “Post Employment” interviews captured beliefs about The Company following a period of 
reflection given the individual is no longer in The Company’s day-to-day work environment.  All Pulse 
Follow-Up and Post Employment interviews were audio recorded for transcription purposes with 
recordings deleted at the conclusion of the study.  Specific references to either the name of The Company, 
employees, or product offerings were omitted from the interview transcriptions.  All interviewees 
provided their signed consent for the interview (Appendix 16).  Other qualitative data from relevant 
internal documents such as company news articles and training materials, and direct observation of formal 
group discussions was collected during the eleven-year period from 2002 to 2013 and is discussed in 
chapter four, Presentation of Results.  Data collection was completed solely for the purpose of this study 
and is limited to the questions raised regarding organizational knowledge creation.  The case study shall 
not disclose financial results, trade secrets or other proprietary information that could impede 
competition.  Data collected from The Company was destroyed at the conclusion of the study.    
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Instruments.  Pulse survey responses in 2011 were collected electronically using 
SurveyMonkey.com with an option for participants to identify themselves.  For purposes of this research, 
all names were removed from the survey data and questions were consolidated to the 25 that were 
common across questionnaires and most relevant to the broad questions posed in this study (Appendix 2).  
Survey participants provided responses to the majority of questions using a typical five-level Likert scale 
of strongly disagree, disagree, neutral (neither agree or disagree), agree or strongly agree where responses 
were coded categorically as strongly disagree=1; disagree=2; neutral (neither agree or disagree)=3; agree-
4; strongly agree=5.  For questions regarding gender, job level, length of employment, and year born, 
responses were also collected categorically and coded as shown in Appendix 2 (questions 22-25).  In 
addition to providing categorical responses, survey participants had the option to provide comments in 
open text fields on the surveys.  While the questions and response options were common across survey 
periods, the sequence of the questions varied.  Data from the survey questionnaires was downloaded from 
SurveyMonkey.com in separate SSPS Statistics files that were consolidated into one SSPS file for 
statistical analysis.  A new variable of “Survey Period” was created and coded for data analysis.  
The Pulse survey questionnaire designed by The Company is modeled after the questionnaire 
created by the third party, Kenexa an IBM Company, which is hired to measure employee engagement as 
mentioned previously every two to three years.  Employee engagement defined by Kenexa as: “The extent 
to which employees are motivated to contribute to organizational success, and are willing to apply 
discretionary effort to accomplishing tasks important to the achievement of organizational goals” (KHPI, 
2012, p. 4).  Kenexa, and likewise The Company, measures overall employee engagement by creating an 
“Employee Engagement Index” using the following four questions (Appendix 2, questions 18-21): 
• I would gladly refer good friends or family members to this company for employment (Advocacy) 
• I rarely think about looking for a new job with another company (Commitment) 
• I am proud to work for “The Company” (Pride) 
• Overall, I am extremely satisfied with this company as a place to work (Satisfaction) 
 
Kenexa asserts that, “attitudinal engagement is considered a state (as opposed to a trait) and is 
appropriately measured through questions that ask about pride, advocacy, overall satisfaction and 
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commitment to the organization” (2008, p.1) as shown by the questions and states in parentheses above.  
For each of these questions, a score is reported that corresponds to the percent of respondents that agree 
with the question; more specifically questions that receive a rating of “agree” or “strongly agree.”  The 
Employee Engagement Index or EEI is calculated by averaging the scores from the four questions.  This 
method of engagement calculation does not provide a reflection of the percent of employees who agree 
with all four questions, or in other words, the percent of employees who have pride, advocacy, overall 
satisfaction and commitment to the organization.  This researcher argues a more accurate reflection of a 
state of “attitudinal engagement” as described by Kenexa is the percent of individuals that agree with all 
four questions.  For this reason, the EEI scores will not be used in the data analysis and employee 
engagement is calculated as the percent of employees who “agree” or “strongly agree” with all four 
questions.  While the four questions above measure the percent of employees who are engaged at a given 
point in time, other questions in the survey can influence the state of being engaged and reflect important 
information about employee beliefs.  The point of incorporating The Company’s employee engagement 
data is to gain insight into a couple of things.  First, what do Pulse engagement surveys reveal about 
employees’ true beliefs and do changes in beliefs imply learning – knowledge creation?  Second, what 
does the way in which The Company interprets and amplifies survey insights say about leadership 
beliefs?  Answers to these questions will help to identify answers to the broader research questions raised 
in the study: is the theory of knowledge creation relevant at The Company and how do social practices 
and leadership behaviors impact the knowledge creation process as evidenced by employee beliefs. 
 Questions for the formal interviews were created following the analysis of the 2011 Pulse survey 
data and were designed to investigate the beliefs behind the quantitative data and the limited qualitative 
data that was available in the comments section of the 2011 surveys.  Given the relative stability of the 
data that is discussed in the next chapter, it is believed that the beliefs expressed in 2013 by individuals 
present at The Company for more than five years is relevant and indicative of employee beliefs in 2011.  
The semi-structured nature of the formal interviews and number of open-ended questions allowed 
interviewees the freedom to reflect and express their views in their own way.  Clarifying questions were 
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asked during the Pulse Follow-Up and Post Employment interview discussions to gain clarity and fully 
understand the beliefs shared.  For the Pulse Follow-Up interviews, a standard list of eleven questions 
was used for the formal interviews and included three structured, close-ended questions and eight 
unstructured, open-ended questions for current male middle manager employees asked to elaborate on 
their beliefs.  The interviews began with the three close-ended questions that included face-sheet 
information of job level, years of service, and year born.  The remaining eight open-ended questions that 
followed allowed interviewees to elaborate on their beliefs on the company’s capabilities, resources, 
social practices, and leadership behaviors.  Specific questions were asked about behaviors they experience 
that build or erode trust and whether they trust the skills and talents of senior leaders, and if/how they 
believed the company was building competitive advantages.  The complete questionnaire is listed in 
Appendix 3.  As mentioned under data collection, the interviews lasted on average almost 19 minutes; the 
shortest interview was just over eight minutes and the longest interview was almost 34 minutes.  
Lastly, for the Post Employment interviews a standard list of five open-ended questions was used 
for the semi-structured interviews with the former middle manager employees asked to elaborate on their 
beliefs regarding their experience at The Company.  This second group of interviews was completed 
following the first group of interviews to determine if there were differences in beliefs upon leaving The 
Company.  The former employees were asked if there were factors that inhibited their performance and/or 
ability to learn, if they thought social practices and leadership behaviors affect knowledge within The 
Company, and if there were implications to building competitive advantages.  These questions were 
similar to the first group of interviews, however, also included a new question: if they believed there is a 
cultural belief that job level equates to knowledge at The Company and if so, what are the implications.  
Appendix 4 provides the full questionnaire.  The two phone interviews lasted on average 15 minutes; one 
interview was just over 16 minutes and the other was just over 14 minutes.  
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3.3 Data analysis strategies and measures 
The dependent or outcome variable used for the analysis is “engaged employees” as defined as 
employees who either  “agree” or “strongly agree” with the four questions noted previously (Appendix 2 
questions 18-21) that reflect attitudes of advocacy, commitment, pride, and satisfaction with the 
organization.  These variables were transformed from their original categorical ordinal variable on the 
five-level Likert scale to a new, single dichotomous variable that has only two levels reflecting employees 
who are “engaged” (“agree” or “strongly agree” with questions 18-21) or those employees who do not 
meet this criteria across the four questions.  Appendix 5 lists other ordinal variables corresponding to 
eight survey questions that were transformed to dichotomous variables (1=“agree” or “strongly agree” 
with question or 0=“neutral”, “disagree” or “strongly disagree” with the question) to investigate patterns 
in the data such as factor analysis and binary logistic regression using the independent variables of 
gender, job status, length of employment, and age group (questions 22-25).   
Gender, length of employment, age group, job status, middle managers and October survey 
period are used as the independent or predictor variables in the analysis.  The job status variable (question 
23) was transformed slightly from its original form by removing all responses of “Don’t Know”=5.  A 
new dichotomous variable of “Middle Manager” was created from job status (1=responses of 3 indicating 
middle manager (grades 11-14) or 0=all other responses) so that middle managers as a group could be 
used as an independent in the regression analysis.  Likewise, a new dichotomous variable of 
“Oct_Survey” was created from the Survey Period variable (1=October 2011 survey or 0=all other 
surveys) so that changes from February to October 2011 could be analyzed. 
The qualitative data obtained was categorized by the relevant theme or main topic to facilitate 
triangulation - validation of the data by cross verifying from 2011 survey comments, semi-structured 
interviews in 2013, direct observation and internal documentation over an eleven-year period.  While the 
categorization process was often not mutually exclusive, such as interview responses that were relevant to 
multiple categories, the process did allow for consistent patterns in the data to appear.     
 
65 
 
 
3.4 Validity and reliability  
Validity and reliability can be affected in case study analysis by challenges inherent with data 
overload such as reliance on first impressions, unique incidents, or by assuming correlation between 
events that are unrelated.  During the design phase of this research, a variety of basic threats to reliability 
were addressed and include consistency in data collection by utilizing only one researcher, documentation 
captured over an eleven-year period to capture a holistic story, the use of quantitative survey data (Kohn, 
1997), and qualitative data collected from survey comments, interviews, direct observation, internal 
documents and secondary data.  For the interviews, a nonprobability quota sampling strategy was utilized 
that ensures some degree of representativeness, however, is less precise than a proportional stratified 
sampling.  The external validity for this mixed methods case study is low as it pertains to a statistical 
representativeness or generalizability of findings to other organizations; however, it does attempt to 
generalize results to the broader theory of organizational knowledge creation.  It is appropriate to 
summarize findings from the research methodology when analyzing beliefs and social interactions given 
that both are complex and pure causalities are rare. 
This researcher made her best attempts to guard against bias during analysis. Attempts were made 
to avoid the holistic fallacy by attempting to include outliers in the data collection process while at the 
same time balancing any tendency to generalize from exceptional events or nonrepresentative informants 
that could give way to elite bias.  The greatest risk of bias is the potential to "go native" and lose 
objectivity and distance during data analysis and presentation of results due to my familiarity with the 
industry.  To avoid this and other biases, the primary method for validation throughout the analysis is 
triangulation between the various data sources.  Multiple methods for collecting and analyzing data were 
used in order that sources converge on the facts and truth of a case.  Multiple data sources and multiple 
respondents were part of the mixed methods research design including quantitative survey data and 
qualitative data from interviews, direct observation of formal group discussions, relevant internal 
documents, secondary data, and biographical analysis of the organization.  Finally, coaching from my 
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chairperson who has no internal experience with The Company or with its larger industry provided 
objective counsel to examine this case study design, its assumptions and conclusions.  
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CHAPTER 4:  PRESENTATION OF RESULTS  
 
 This chapter’s objective is to elucidate the findings and illuminate patterns that emerged from the 
quantitative survey data and qualitative data collected from survey comments, semi-structured interviews, 
direct observation, internal documents and secondary data sources.  The results are presented in seven 
sections that begin with the 2011 Pulse survey findings discussed in sections one through three.  The 
fourth section illustrates the middle manager beliefs from the men interviewed in 2013 that are 
summarized in the section five along with the unintended consequences and unpredicted outcomes.  The 
sixth section describes the beliefs shared by middle managers no longer with The Company that are 
followed by the summary of results in the seventh and final section.       
 
4.1 Engagement measure for employee beliefs  
Employee engagement is a popular and perennial topic for business firms that endeavor to 
maximize their investment in human capital.  Employee engagement as defined by The Company is 
attitudinal engagement or a state as opposed to trait-based and behavioral engagement.  Engagement is 
not solely about encouraging the behaviors that maximize productivity; it is also about “creating a 
psychological affiliation with the organization so employees know what they do is more than ‘just a job’.  
The manager’s behavior plays a critical role in the process of engaging an employee. Those managers 
who listen to their employees’ concerns and demonstrate commitment to improvement through follow-up 
actions are more likely to engage their workers.” (Kenexa Corporation, 2008, p. 1).  Leaders at The 
Company philosophically agree with the need for attitudinal engagement of their employees, and 
consequently routinely measure and communicate employee engagement levels.  Attitudinal engagement 
is also part of the embedded corporate culture as documented by Lampe (1998); “The nearly-a-century-
old company prides itself on family values, tradition, and stability” (p. ii).  “The culture of niceness and 
sharing and caring was created and reinforced by the founder who went to great lengths to take care of his 
corporate family” (p. 223).          
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At the end of 2011, The Company reported and reflected on the Pulse survey results that showed 
lower engagement in October.  This article is reflective of other reporting and leadership commentary 
following a survey period where results are shared at a high-level, suppositions for the changes are 
provided and action steps for continued improvement are communicated.  Shown below are two excerpts 
from the same intranet article on the topic:  
The survey also showed little progress — and even some significant declines, especially among 
middle and senior managers — in changing employee perceptions of several specific priorities 
identified for improving engagement and business performance.  [Senior manager title] – human 
resources, says continued business challenges likely are the main factor in the declines.  
 (The Company intranet, December 15, 2011) 
 
The comparison between the two largest survey periods of all employees in February and October 2011 
shows that fewer people overall were in a state of being engaged (Table 4)9 that is referred to throughout 
as “engaged employees” as defined in section 3.2 Research Design.  In February, 58% of employees were 
engaged versus 55% in October. While The Company routinely focused on the change in scores between 
Engaged Employees * Survey Period Crosstabulation 
 Survey Period Total 
Feb 2011 Oct 2011 
Engaged  
Employees 
Not 
Count 1724 1567 3291 
% within Survey Period 41.7% 44.8% 43.1% 
% of Total 22.6% 20.5% 43.1% 
Yes 
Count 2410 1929 4339 
% within Survey Period 58.3% 55.2% 56.9% 
% of Total 31.6% 25.3% 56.9% 
Total 
Count 4134 3496 7630 
% within Survey Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 54.2% 45.8% 100.0% 
Yes = agree or strongly agree with all 4 engagement questions.  Not = neutral, disagree, strongly disagree. 
 
Table 4. Engaged Employees in 2011 
survey periods, the critical point is not the fairly small change, rather the stability over time of the two 
largest surveys.  This stability suggests that the sentiments are truly representative of beliefs in the 
                                                
9 The Company measures and reports overall employee engagement using the Employee Engagement Index (EEI).  
This study instead uses the percent of employees who are in agreement with all four questions used to measure 
engagement.  This varies but corresponds to the average percent across these questions or Employee Engagement 
Index (EEI) of 78% and 75% respectively.  EEI is not used in this analysis. 
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workforce in 2011.  What is more, this pattern of stability continues across the nine smaller Pulse surveys 
that occurred from 2009 to 2012 where employee engagement percentages fluctuate up or down ranging 
from a high of 61.8% to a low of 45.8% with a mean of 53.2%.  The 95% confidence interval has a lower 
endpoint, 45.6% and an upper endpoint 63.8%, which means that in 95% of the cases the employee 
engagement outcome will be between the endpoints calculated from the mean.  This implies normal 
fluctuation as a result of regression to the mean or in other words, random chance, as opposed to causal 
links that can be drawn from changes in engagement for any particular period.   
Significant patterns in the survey data arise when analyzing engaged employees from the two 
large survey periods in 2011, N = 7630.  This chapter presents results that reflect a good deal of 
skepticism or lack of confidence in The Company and its leadership, especially from the most 
experienced employees, whose knowledge and insight is arguably what the company may need most 
especially during a time of business transformation.  
 
4.2 Beliefs that correlate 
In 2011 data results, there are several questions that indicate beliefs, shown as dichotomous 
variables, which significantly and positively correlate with the state of being engaged, shown as the 
dependent variable, engaged employees.  In other words, employees who are engaged also believe that 
this company has an outstanding future (Bright Future, question 16); trust the leadership of the company 
(Trust, question 13); believes that the leadership has communicated a vision of the future that motivates 
them (Future Vision, question 14); is confident that this company will be able to transform its business 
(Transform, question 17); believes this company values their contribution (Values Contribution, question 
10); believes there is open, honest two-way communication in this company (Open Comm, question 11); 
believes resources are focused on what matters most (Focus Matters, question 3); and feel they are part of 
a team (Team, question 12).  The correlations with their correlation coefficients (r) are shown in Table 5.   
The correlations with the strongest relationships are highlighted indicating that employees who believe 
this company has an outstanding future are confident it will be able to transform its business (r = 0.711);  
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Correlations 
 Engaged 
Employees 
Bright 
Future 
.16 
Trust 
.13 
Future 
Vision 
.14 
Transform 
.17 
Values 
Contribution 
.10 
Open 
Comm 
.11 
Focus 
Matters 
.3 
Team 
.12 
Engaged 
Employees 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .462** .456** .441** .446** .429** .376** .360** .374** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 
Bright 
Future 
.16 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.462** 1 .514** .539** .711** .391** .376** .408** .301** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 
Trust 
.13 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.456** .514** 1 .582** .521** .478** .448** .435** .432** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 
FutureVision
.14 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.441** .539** .582** 1 .535** .420** .403** .425** .361** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 
Transform 
.17 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.446** .711** .521** .535** 1 .376** .375** .426** .310** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 
Values 
Contribution
.10 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.429** .391** .478** .420** .376** 1 .429** .361** .497** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 
N 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 
Open 
Comm 
.11 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.376** .376** .448** .403** .375** .429** 1 .428** .377** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 
N 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 
Focus 
Matters 
.3 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.360** .408** .435** .425** .426** .361** .428** 1 .306** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 
N 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 
Team 
.12 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.374** .301** .432** .361** .310** .497** .377** .306** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 7630 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 5. Beliefs that Significantly and Positively Correlate with the State of Engagement 
employees who believe the leadership has communicated a motivating vision for the future trust the 
company leadership (r = 0.582) as well as believe this company has an outstanding future (r = 0.539); 
employees who believe it will be able to transform its business are likely to believe leadership has 
communicated a motivating vision for the future (r = 0.535); employees who trust the leadership of the 
company are confident this company will be able to transform its business (r = 0.521) as well as believe 
this company has an outstanding future (r = 0.514).  These results are consistent with Kenexa that 
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generally states that confidence in the organization’s future consistently and heavily contributes to 
engagement (Kenexa Corporation, 2008), and that more cooperative and successful work environments 
occur when employees trust their senior leaders (Kenexa Corporation, 2013).  Leaders that are 
trustworthy are likely to have followers that take risks, such as sharing new ideas that can become the 
building blocks for innovation.  Kenexa reports, “Employees who trust their senior leaders report greater 
innovation. They feel encouraged and supported, and are willing to try new things even though they might 
not succeed” (p. 2013, p. 2).  Kenexa finds that the characteristics of leaders that foster trust are 
benevolence, competence, and integrity, “Leaders who are seen as capable, kind and honest inspire trust” 
(p. 2013, p. 2).  Lastly, a factor analysis was performed and found that all of the Pulse survey responses 
utilized in this analysis loaded onto one factor, suggesting that these questions addressed slightly different 
dimensions of a single construct that are further described in the next section. 
 
4.3 Predicted outcomes 
Binary logistic regression framework is used to investigate the dependence structure of various 
outcome variables such as engaged employees and a set of six explanatory variables.  In separate 
regressions, the engaged employees variable and the eight other variables listed in Appendix 5 are used as 
dependent variables, also referred to as outcome or response variables.  Gender, Length of Employment, 
Year Born that indicates age group, Job Status, Middle Managers and October Survey period are the 
independent variables, also referred to as predictor or explanatory variables.  Results of the regressions 
are detailed below, along with the interpretations of what the variations in proportion and probability 
models imply for The Company.  
Logistic regression represents the probability of an occurrence10.  For engaged employees as the 
dependent variable shown in Table 6, employees with beliefs defined as engaged, described in section 
                                                
10 It was not observed that The Company engaged in regression analysis rather it reported the percent of employees 
that agreed with each question and noted differences in results between job status and the changes between periods.   
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3.3, are more likely to be younger females with shorter lengths of employment who do not hold middle 
management positions.  From Table 6 shown below, the estimated model is:  
Logit (engagedemployees) = 2.529 - 0.506(gender) – 0.183 (empl length) – 0.192(year born) + 
0.74(job status) – 0.195(middle manager) – 0.163(oct survey)  
 
 
 
Variables in the Equation with Engaged Employees as Dependent Variable 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a 
Gender -.506 .052 94.069 1 .000 .603 .544 .668 
Employment Length -.183 .024 56.046 1 .000 .833 .794 .874 
Year Born -.192 .033 34.699 1 .000 .825 .774 .880 
Job Status .074 .054 1.882 1 .170 1.077 .969 1.197 
Middle Manager -.195 .117 2.783 1 .095 .823 .654 1.035 
Oct Survey -.163 .051 10.246 1 .001 .849 .768 .939 
Constant 2.529 .220 132.092 1 .000 12.541   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Gender, Employment Length, Year Born, Job Status, Middle Manager, Oct Survey. 
Table 6. Predictive Model for Engaged Employees 
 
Statistically significant is gender (1=female, 2=male) with a negative parameter of B=-0.506 indicating 
that males are 60% (Exp (B)=0.603) as likely as females to be engaged while controlling for the other 
independent variables.  The confidence interval for gender Exp (B) is 0.544 to 0.668 indicating that males 
are between 0.544 to 0.668 times as likely to be engaged as females.  Likewise, employment length 
indicates that as experience with the company increases, the odds of being an engaged employee do not.  
Employees with greater tenure are 83% (B=-0.183 and Exp (B)=0.833) as likely to respond as engaged as 
compared to employees with shorter lengths of employment. The Year Born predictor variable echoes a 
similar result with greater odds for positive beliefs in younger employees.  Older employees are 83% (B=-
0.192, Exp (B)=0.825) as likely to be engaged as younger coworkers.  Overall employee engagement 
beliefs are less widely held in October as compared to February 2011 as shown by B=-0.163.  In fact, 
beliefs for all regressions worsened in October as compared to February.  The relationship between 
employee engagement and middle managers were not significant; however, the relationship between 
employee engagement and job status is.  As job status rises, so does the likelihood or odds of being an 
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engaged employee (B=0.074, Exp(B)=1.077) or in other words, employees with higher job status are 
1.077 times as likely to share the beliefs of engagement.  A meaningful exception to this probability trend 
will come from middle managers in the regressions that follow. 
Comparable patterns exist in the logistic regression models when the eight variables listed in 
Appendix 5 are analyzed as dependent variables.  A key difference from the previous regression for 
engaged employees (Table 6) is that these regressions show significance for middle managers.  Tables 7-9 
show significance in all independent variables indicating that buy-in and commitment to the company is 
problematic for older males with greater length of employment and middle manager status.  This group of 
male, veteran employees in middle manager positions responded less favorably to questions reflecting 
beliefs that the company has an outstanding future (Table 7), that they trust the its leadership (Table 8), 
and are confident it will transform its business (Table 9).  Although agreement with these beliefs rises 
with job status (B=0.206), middle managers as a group do not share these beliefs with the same 
probability as employees who are not middle managers.  In fact, when controlling for the other 
independent variables, middle managers are only 60% (Exp (B) = 0.603) as likely to agree that they 
believe the company has an outstanding future (Table 7), only 49% as likely (Exp (B) = 0.488) to agree 
that they trust the leadership of the company (Table 8), and only 60% (Exp (B) = 0.606) as likely as other 
employees to agree that they are confident this company will be able to transform its business (Table 9).   
 
Variables in the Equation with Bright Future as Dependent Variable 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a 
Gender -.414 .054 59.540 1 .000 .661 .595 .734 
Employment Length -.337 .027 150.344 1 .000 .714 .676 .753 
Year Born -.117 .034 11.713 1 .001 .890 .832 .951 
Job Status .206 .058 12.611 1 .000 1.228 1.097 1.376 
Middle Manager -.506 .124 16.561 1 .000 .603 .472 .769 
Oct Survey -.334 .053 40.386 1 .000 .716 .646 .794 
Constant 3.102 .239 168.515 1 .000 22.237   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Gender, Employment Length, Year Born, Job Status, Middle Manager, Oct Survey. 
 
Table 7. Predictive Model for employees who believe the company has an outstanding future 
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Variables in the Equation with Trust as Dependent Variable 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a 
Gender -.409 .056 53.028 1 .000 .664 .595 .742 
Employment Length -.262 .028 86.092 1 .000 .770 .728 .813 
Year Born -.111 .036 9.671 1 .002 .895 .835 .960 
Job Status .646 .077 69.861 1 .000 1.909 1.640 2.221 
Middle Manager -.717 .163 19.452 1 .000 .488 .355 .671 
Oct Survey -.236 .055 18.416 1 .000 .790 .709 .880 
Constant 2.339 .251 87.002 1 .000 10.376   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Gender, Employment Length, Year Born, Job Status, Middle Manager, Oct Survey. 
 
Table 8. Predictive Model for employees who trust the leadership of the company 
 
Variables in the Equation with Transform as Dependent Variable 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a 
Gender -.334 .054 38.381 1 .000 .716 .644 .796 
Employment Length -.241 .027 82.616 1 .000 .786 .746 .827 
Year Born -.089 .034 6.923 1 .009 .914 .855 .977 
Job Status .143 .058 6.109 1 .013 1.154 1.030 1.292 
Middle Manager -.501 .124 16.340 1 .000 .606 .475 .772 
Oct Survey -.350 .053 43.850 1 .000 .705 .635 .782 
Constant 2.614 .234 124.908 1 .000 13.654   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Gender, Employment Length, Year Born, Job Status, Middle Manager, Oct Survey. 
 
Table 9. Predictive Model for employees who are confident this company will be able to transform its business 
 
Tables 10 shown below and Tables 11-12 provided in Appendix 6-7, reflect significance across 
the same set of independent variables with the exception of year born.  The dependent variables are 
Future Vision, Values Contribution, and Team respectively as shown in Table 10-12.  When controlling 
for the other independent variables, middle managers are only 49% (B=-0.714, Exp (B) = 0.489) as likely 
to agree that leadership has communicated a future vision that motivates them (Table 10), only 69% (B=-
0.378, Exp (B) = 0.685) as likely to agree that the company values their contribution (Table 11), and only 
52% (B=-0.660, Exp (B) = 0.517) as likely as other employees to agree that they feel a part of a team 
(Table 12).  The pattern of experienced males lack of buy-in and commitment to the company continues 
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to be significant.  Also continuing is the significance of job status as a positive predictor variable in the 
regressions with the respective dependent variables of Future Vision, Values Contribution, and Team.  In 
all of these cases, job status indicates that higher status job holders or higher job grades as they are 
referred to at The Company, are more likely to have beliefs that align with positive aspects of the 
company’s present and future.  This trend makes the fall-out of middle managers more curious and a 
critical concern for two primary reasons.  First, in middle-up-down organizational structures managers 
occupy key positions that form the nuclei of self-organizing teams and second, in top-down hierarchical 
structures middle managers are primary candidate pools for future senior managers and company leaders.   
 
Variables in the Equation with Future Vision as Dependent Variable 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a 
Gender -.455 .054 71.815 1 .000 .635 .571 .705 
Employment Length -.155 .025 37.586 1 .000 .857 .815 .900 
Year Born -.040 .033 1.397 1 .237 .961 .900 1.026 
Job Status .551 .068 65.505 1 .000 1.735 1.519 1.983 
Middle Manager -.714 .144 24.750 1 .000 .489 .369 .649 
Oct Survey -.293 .052 31.190 1 .000 .746 .673 .827 
Constant 1.541 .228 45.657 1 .000 4.669   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Gender, Employment Length, Year Born, Job Status, Middle Manager, Oct Survey. 
Table 10. Predictive Model for employees who believe leadership has communicated a future vision that motivates them 
 
Tables 13 shown below and Table 14 provided in Appendix 8, reflect significance across the 
same set of independent variables with the exception of gender.  It seems that gender is not a significant 
predictor of probability that employees agree with the beliefs that there is open, honest two-way 
communication (Table 13) and resources and efforts are focused on what matters most (Table 14).  The 
results of employment length, year born, job status and middle manager are consistent with previous 
findings that point to lack of alignment with The Company and employee beliefs for those that are 
experienced with greater employee length at The Company, older, and middle manager job status. 
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Variables in the Equation with Open Communication as Dependent Variable 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a 
Gender .074 .052 2.005 1 .157 1.076 .972 1.192 
Employment Length -.221 .024 86.815 1 .000 .802 .765 .840 
Year Born -.097 .032 9.261 1 .002 .907 .852 .966 
Job Status .457 .058 62.957 1 .000 1.579 1.411 1.768 
Middle Manager -.679 .123 30.469 1 .000 .507 .399 .645 
Oct Survey -.356 .051 49.361 1 .000 .701 .634 .774 
Constant .774 .213 13.185 1 .000 2.169   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Gender, Employment Length, Year Born, Job Status, Middle Manager, Oct Survey. 
 
Table 13. Predictive Model for employees who believe there is open, honest two-way communication 
 
The lack of confidence in The Company’s future and in open communication that appears in the 
quantitative survey data is represented in the survey comments provided by some respondents but not all.  
While the comments are anonymous, gender and job level descriptions are available and noted.  Shown 
below are February 2011 survey comments that are in response to the question, “Do you have suggestions 
for improving communication within the division” which was asked of all employees in all divisions.  
The responses, provided below (and others listed in Appendix 10), reflect beliefs across genders and job 
levels that demonstrate at best mixed results in both how The Company is being lead into future and its 
ability to exhibit honest two-way communication. 
It seems like managers are trying to figure out what the future looks like, but we're often left out 
of the loop.  It would be helpful if the people doing the current work would be brought into some 
of those meetings. (Female individual contributor, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
Everyone loves [Name of senior leader D] - it would be great to see him more!  
(Female middle manager, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
Needs to be more open and honest, the positive spin is obvious.  
(Female individual contributor, Pulse Survey February 2011 ) 
 
Greater appreciation of open, honest communication - dissenting opinions are not valued in my 
area. (Male middle manager, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
Communicate, communicate, communicate. I've found people in my division don't tend to share 
much information. They believe by retaining that knowledge, it makes them smarter and more 
important than you. It's all about egos. Yuck!  
(Female individual contributor, Pulse Survey February 2011 ) 
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Comments made in response to this same question also reflect the employees’ internalization of 
WoodstoneTM principles that launched at The Company with business transformation in 2006 and are 
described in section 4.5 and Appendix 14.  This curriculum is also referred to as Stepping Stones. 
Honest, candid communication and assuming positive intent still seems to be an issue at times. 
(Female middle manager, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
Despite Steppingstones, I do not feel comfortable having open and honest communication with my 
own manager.  He only wants to hear positive thoughts and feedback. Anything negative is held 
against you.  He retaliates which is unacceptable.  (Female individual contributor, Pulse Survey 
February 2011) 
 
Just follow the Woodstone principals and this could improve the overall communication from 
general managers down. (Male front line supervisor, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
Lastly, in October 2011 there were survey comments that echoed those from February to the question 
regarding suggestions for improving communication.  There were also other comments that called out the 
need to address the growth in digital in response to, “What topics would you like to learn more about.”  
Tell us what is going on, stop the double talk and innuendo and tell us how it is and how it 
impacts us. (Female individual contributor, Pulse Survey October 2011) 
 
I wish people felt more comfortable speaking their minds and not being punished for having 
different views than the corporate agenda. I feel we are not challenging our agenda enough to 
make it as robust as it could be, but low level employees that live in the trenches are afraid to 
speak of improvements or ideas to make the agenda better. (Female middle manager, Pulse 
Survey October 2011) 
 
I have communication overload which makes it hard to focus on what is important. 
(Female individual contributor, Pulse Survey October 2011) 
 
Why we let Apple beat us to the iCards market and why our e-greetings have not evolved. 
(Male individual contributor, Pulse Survey October 2011) 
 
Digital! What are we doing, how is it going to integrate into our daily business? Why can't we 
move faster? (Female middle manager, Pulse Survey October 2011) 
 
How we are adapting with the ever-changing technology? It seems like other companies are 
beating us to new social networking and leaving us behind while we are over analyzing what to 
do. (Female individual contributor, Pulse Survey October 2011) 
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4.4 Employee interview themes and observations 
The concerns raised by employees in the 2011 survey results also appear in many of the beliefs of 
the male, middle managers interviewed in 2013.  The Pulse Follow-Up interviews suggest several serious 
and related root causes that are described in their words in the paragraphs that follow.  The open-ended 
nature of the interview questions (Appendix 3) allowed for exploration of beliefs to uncover not only 
“what” beliefs are present but “why.”  The common themes that emerge are in three distinct areas: need 
for transparency to improve communication and trust, increase competency in the digital connecting 
space, and need for effective decision-making and accountability.  Overall, these beliefs appear to be 
critical factors that form barriers between middle and senior management and create skepticism in The 
Company’s future by not fostering beliefs of engagement and equally as important, stifle knowledge 
creation at the individual and organizational levels.  What is also notable from the interviews is that while 
the comments are candid and indeed critical in many instances, the spirit and intent with which they were 
offered appeared supportive and at times, even paradoxically optimistic as opposed to defeatist in nature. 
The first theme that emerged during the interviews was the need for greater “transparency” to 
improve communication efforts and trust within the firm.  The word “transparency” was used in several 
instances to describe desired behaviors that embody honesty and authenticity.  The first few comments 
describe a culture that controls the flow of information.  
The position that I’m in requires information to be shared with me and me having access to it. I 
am not a senior manager so there are some limitations there. But if I do need information that 
only a senior manager can get, 9 times out of 10 my senior supervisor will provide it for me if I 
ask. [Information is withheld because] I’m not a senior manager. … Now why? I don’t know if 
that’s a trust factor or not, but that’s my gut. (Interview, Employee 3) 
 
I think when you’re not being candid with people in meetings I think it’s pretty obvious that 
you’re not and that your withholding information. So the more openness and the more you share 
then the more people appreciate that and they feel comfortable doing the same with you if you’re 
open to it.  There are some people that portray themselves that way whether its their personality 
or not, and there are some people that are just not quite there. (Interview, Employee 3) 
 
There are limitations to what we actually provide and share within the company. I think that how 
we share is very important and what we share…. (Interview, Employee 2) 
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Similar themes are echoed in the comments shown below and speak to how leadership behaviors and 
communication practices either build or erode levels of trust within The Company.  
I just think the more open and honest that the organization can be the more you build that trust. 
When there are rumors swirling and obviously there is something going on and management 
doesn’t seek to squelch it and says that nothing is going on then something does happen…that 
erodes trust.  You’d get farther if you’d just say we’re working on X, keep doing what you’re 
doing and we’ll share it with you when it’s ready or by this date.  Don’t say nothings going on 
and whisper about it in the corners... Leaders don’t have to share what it is but teach senior and 
middle managers here’s what you say when you’re put in this position don’t just say, no, no, 
nothing is going on and try to deny it…that erodes trust.  (Interview, Employee 4) 
 
The things that build trust - is that you’re genuine.  When you strip everything away…it comes 
back to that genuine trust. …. I think on eroding trust it’s the opposite.  When there is behavior of 
people trying to avoid difficult conversations or that you know things aren’t factual. There are 
cases of that. You are in a meeting and someone doesn’t have their facts straight and you think 
they are either making it up or they really don’t have a good grasp of what they are supposed to 
know.  Obviously, that erodes trust. (Interview, Employee 5) 
 
I would say lack of transparency erodes trust. I think we all have a pretty good understanding 
financially of where we are or we may have an understanding of what’s going on in the 
organization but when you’re not having the transparency from the leadership to tell you what is 
truly happening, you start to distrust, it starts to build bad behavior. There was a meeting 
recently of middle managers and senior managers where it was the first time the leaders had the 
extremely transparent “this-is-where-we’re-at” and it left me thinking, this is what we have 
needed for years. … You walked out of there going “I want to work really hard, I want to help 
this company.”  Everybody in the organization wants to do that but right now I think everybody is 
losing faith, they have a lack of trust because of a feeling of lack of transparency. 
(Interview, Employee 8) 
 
The interviews found comparable beliefs to those noted in the 2011 survey comments regarding 
communication, specifically the fear to challenge the status quo and to speak freely and authentically.  
The other piece of the culture is where people just don’t feel free enough that they can challenge 
the status quo with being picked out as the odd bird in the whole family. …so the richness of the 
decision making, the richness of the dialogue within the company is reduced unless you have 
areas where those leaders have specifically encouraged people to speak up and challenge them to 
get a better result.  (Interview, Employee 6) 
 
…if your senior managers are afraid to be authentic and talk about the real things, that is a big, 
big problem for the company. It slows it down culturally - it slows down its ability to teach 
people. If they are afraid to talk to other people and be authentic, how are they going to learn 
about that particular area or learn about positions potentially in other areas that they are asked 
to go to or about their process so that they can understand what do we need to do, how can I help 
you out. You don’t have the real stuff if you are always playing the kingdom game. (Interview, 
Employee 6) 
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Interview comments that speak to the need to increase transparency in communication and strengthen 
trust also offer reflections about the beliefs of The Company’s senior leaders and the corporate culture. 
There are some tremendous [senior leader] contributors that I absolutely trust – heart and soul. 
No question in my mind that their interests are in the best interest of the company and in the 
individual. That’s why I’ve been here for 30 years. I still believe that to be true and I believe it to 
be true for the majority of individuals at senior manager level and above. But there still is a 
group of individuals that tend to push down an agenda that is less than inclusive and is really 
does start breaking at the trust level.  (Interview, Employee 9) 
 
Transparency – you feel a lot better about somebody when you feel they are being completely 
honest with you.  You know that they can’t share everything that you might want to know but if 
you feel they are being transparent and sharing what they can then that certainly gives you a 
better feeling. … I think we’re trying to become a more transparent company.  We’ve introduced 
the Woodstone principles and all of that so I think we’re communicating a little more effectively 
than we have in the past. I still believe our leadership does a better job at talking about it then 
demonstrating it. Talking the talk vs. walking the walk. So I think we’re making progress in that 
area but I still would like to see corporate leaders act a little bit differently rather than just 
talking about it. … I still think people have agendas that might not be in the best interest of the 
company, occasionally. (Interview, Employee 10) 
 
I think we have a somewhat secretive culture. There have been some things that have happened 
the last year or two and I think I understand the reasons why but also it makes you feel “why are 
we doing some of these things.” …  It feels like there is almost an aura of paranoia. It erodes the 
trust in sharing anything with anyone. … I know it’s important to preserve our competitive 
advantages, however, it feels like desperation and paranoia. (Interview, Employee 11) 
 
The final comments under the first theme of transparent communication and trust are shown below.  They 
explicitly reflect the challenges inherent to a traditional hierarchical culture and the difficultly of 
corporate-wide change efforts.  The example provided includes the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
that launched The Company’s business transformation initiative in 2006 that was named Project Horizon.  
As of 2013, the ERP using SAP integration software to automate business processes was not fully 
implemented when the final installation and Project Horizon was suspended in late 2010.  The point here 
in the scope of this study is not to argue the value of integrated enterprise level technology systems rather 
it is to illustrate examples of the concurrent beneficial and detrimental impact large-scale initiatives have 
on employee beliefs and how arduous it is to change embedded cultural behaviors. 
Yes, I think that the silos that we work in are sometimes frustrating - constraining information in 
that way. Getting the [various areas] on the same page...sharing information efficiently seems to 
be a problem. …  So I think we’re making strides in that area but I think that the silos and the 
way we work are still constraining the way we share knowledge. … I guess the challenge is when 
you don’t know what you don’t know. Sometimes you’re not thinking you need to know a certain 
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piece of information someone has so you can’t even ask the question.  You don’t know you have 
that need so that’s where it gets a little more challenging. (Interview, Employee 10) 
 
Project Horizon, my favorite child to pick on, everyone and their cousin knew that go-live was 
going to be a mess and it was - then we acted surprised. None of the leadership on the business or 
the technology side paid a penalty for that. (Interview, Employee 7) 
 
So we went through Project Horizon, which is an ERP implementation of SAP, and at that point, 
we learned even more how to knock down verticals.  There was a conscious choice going in that 
it was a business-led transformation. We were going to have to revisit the ways we worked, the 
ways we talked to each other so that was yet another step to break down the verticals.  We are not 
there yet completely but I would say in the supply chain, it’s to the level like 10x from where it 
used to be. I think other parts of the company as they have to deal with some of those same 
realities are trying to do the same thing—lean out their processes and as they do that, realizing 
that maybe it is good thing that I am to talk to and understand other parts of the business. I think 
the level of knowledge overall has gone up. I think there are more leaders, certainly not all, that 
are reaching across the aisle trying to educate themselves about what is going on and 
collaborating better. (Interview, Employee 6) 
 
 
There are positive indications that cultural beliefs changed during and following the cessation of 
Project Horizon as evidenced by behaviors demonstrating a more holistic understanding of The Company 
and a greater explicitly stated desire to collaborate among internal departments and divisions.  Employees 
no longer questioned “if” there was a need for business practices to change, the question evolved to 
“how.”  The Business Process Management training efforts in 2010 of more than three hundred US 
employees across various job levels provide an example that elucidates that internalization of new beliefs 
takes time and experience.  At the opening of each formal training meeting of Foundations of Business 
Process, attendees were asked to play the game “Win as Much as You Can” (details noted in Appendix 
11).  The purpose of the game was to create interaction between attendees and reflect their acculturated 
beliefs through situations where players had to choose between supporting individual team interests 
versus behaviors that would hurt their individual team but optimize results for the group as a whole.  In 
all group games except one, once players were split into teams and learned the ambiguous rules of how to 
“win as much as you can” players exhibited behaviors of competition between teams, spirited rivalry, 
secrecy, lack of transparent communication and mistrust.  When select individuals on teams attempted to 
collaborate instead of compete with other teams, they were typically disregarded by their fellow 
teammates unless the individual was of significantly superior job status or s/he was an effective lobbyist.  
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Interestingly, the one group that was the exception to this behavior came from the supply chain area of the 
business.  The behaviors demonstrated by this group of senior and middle managers were collaborative 
from the beginning of the game and at no time did members choose to compete as individual teams in lieu 
of working together to optimize the group as a whole.  The group expressed they could not play any other 
way – they had to depend on one another for success.  Just as interesting is the fact that four years earlier 
this group was the first at The Company to implement the philosophies and practices of Lean originating 
from the Toyota Product System (TPS).  There is no evidence to prove a cause-effect relationship; 
however, the outcome in this example from 2010 was a leadership group that demonstrated greater 
transparency in their communication and consequently higher levels of trust among group members. 
 The second theme that emerged from the Pulse Follow-Up interviews in 2013 was a consistently 
acknowledged need for The Company to increase its corporate competency in the digital “connecting” 
space.  Historically, The Company had varying degrees of presence and success in digital mediums.  At 
the turn of the millennium it had a corporate website offering a variety of products that earned a ranking 
of number 8 in a prominent trade magazine’s top-10 list of e-tail, auction and travel sites as well as other 
popular publicity from industry magazines and consumer opinion poles (The Company Noon News, 
January & February 2001).  While expanding to other platforms like digital, The Company remained 
committed to reinventing their core product category and set forth a goal to triple the size of their 
company by the year 2010.  In 2001, the vision on how to achieve this was through the expansion of how 
they defined their business, a change in The Company’s structure, listening to consumers and new 
employee mindsets, new behaviors and new attitudes (The Company Noon News, February 6, 2001).  In 
July of 2001, The Company activated what they internally messaged as an important new consumer 
website with ambitious year-over-year growth goals of over 500% for the first two full years following 
the launch.  Unfortunately at that time, broadband Internet connections were not common in the home 
estimated at only 3% of the US adult population compared to August 2013 where 70% of US adults 
access the Internet at home through a broadband instead of the dial up connections common early in the 
millennium and only used by 3% of the US adult population today (Zickuhr & Smith, 2013).   
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After less than a year, The Company ended its newly launched consumer website in April 2002 
due to below-plan financial results and unanticipated industry challenges including slow consumer 
adoption rates and lack of support from industry partners to promote the new personalized, online 
products (The Company Noon News, April 8, 2002).  In that same year, the corporate website that was 
acclaimed for its e-tailing was repositioned to focus on marketing priorities in support of in-store 
specialty retail subsequently limiting products available for purchase online (The Company Noon News, 
April 10, 2002).  In this same period new start-ups like Shutterfly, founded in 1999, were searching for 
ways to grow revenue amidst a field of 1,000 other start-ups as well as established retail goliaths like 
Walmart and Walgreens (Vance, 2013).  In the years that followed, a new social-techno paradigm 
emerged that fundamentally changed the way people connect through various and increasingly personal 
digital devices.  During an employee forum with the CEO, a middle manager asked when The Company 
would re-enter and aggressively compete in digital.  He replied that it would be when a profitable 
business model is found.  In contrast, returning to the Shutterfly example, when its CEO Jeffrey 
Housenbold joined from EBay in 2005 the former high-school and college yearbook photographer was 
already spending $2000 a year on the site and believed that Shutterfly’s customers were amateur, “chief 
memory officers” (Vance, 2013).  The company grew as it put strategies in place to solve for non-holiday 
periods by using its digital presses for customer brochures for other businesses and acquired companies 
like Tiny Prints and Wedding Paper Divas to complete its portfolio and drive year-round traffic of 
primarily female shoppers that represent 80% of Shutterfly’s business (Vance, 2013).  Today in 2013, 
smartphone usage in the US continues to increase now representing 61% of mobile subscribers (Nielsen, 
2013) and over 80% of Americans use the Internet that ranks 28th out of 211 countries (ITU, 2013).   
The historical context for The Company’s digital initiatives in the decade prior to the survey and 
follow-up interviews are necessary to understand the emotion behind the beliefs shared by the male, 
middle managers given the majority were employed by The Company when the digital events of the last 
decade transpired.  In several cases, the interviewees brought up the topic of digital across various 
questions expressing regret that The Company has failed to make inroads in this new market.  
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I think that we haven’t pushed things like digital. We haven’t been as quick to manage what our 
company stands for with consumers to make it more relevant in new spaces especially digital. 
(Interview, Employee 5) 
 
…one of the major capabilities we need is a better digital infrastructure that we don’t have right 
now. If we had a full digital leg for the “stool” I think we’d have a greater competitive advantage 
– I feel like we have two out of three legs. (Interview, Employee 12) 
 
When I think of capabilities I think of actions we can take and strategies we can employ to make 
this company more successful but do we have the guts and the courage to act on those things. I 
don’t believe we do. [Why?]  I don’t know if it’s because they are very conservative individuals 
or if there is something they haven’t shared with the rest of the employees i.e. a different strategy 
they haven’t shared which could be the case, but in the last 10-11 years we’ve seen our business 
decline and how long do we wait is the question you ask. There are things that are out there that 
we - you know hindsight is 20/20 right - but should we have been the Facebook, Twitter, Google 
+ and do we even still have that opportunity?  (Interview, Employee 4) 
 
Digital is ambiguous and it’s vast and it’s risky so we are just not comfortable going into that 
space aggressively because we don’t have a line of sight showing me the money or showing me 
the revenue. … I’m in a corporation that has chosen to prioritize the digital a little lower on the 
priority scale…I know my limitations and what I can put out on the table.  Now if I had unlimited 
resources in front of me, we could do a lot more. Therefore, knowing I have the resources 
available. Would I like to do more and do I think there is bigger opportunity in digital? 
Absolutely.  And therefore to answer the question, I don’t have the resources in my own mind of 
what we could do. (Interview, Employee 8) 
 
Similar to the comments of the need to increase transparent communication and strengthen trust; 
comments on the topic of digital also offer insights into belief’s about leadership and the culture. 
I think we are really behind in the digital world. I think we need senior leaders to embrace and 
maybe somebody that has that skill set and background would really help us. We have a lot of 
ground to make up in the digital world. … I think we should develop stronger capabilities in the 
digital world - we need much stronger capabilities there. … I don’t know if we’re building 
[competitive advantages] quickly enough though…. That sense of urgency – I think we have it but 
I don’t know we have the same sense of urgency that a publically traded company would have. I’d 
like to see us go after competitive advantages a little more quickly. … I don’t think we move fast 
enough or are forward thinking enough in the digital world.  (Interview, Employee 10) 
 
[Why is The Company behind in digital?] I think we dabble in it. I think we get into it and it 
doesn’t really do much so we bail. We have to understand it could be a very expensive proposal 
and we don’t have the intestinal fortitude to stick with it until it works. (Interview, Employee 4) 
 
We’ve always done digital half-assed - kind of there, kind of not, kind of don’t want to because 
we’ll cannibalize the sales in our stores. ... Last week we announced a three-pronged approach 
about how we’re going to attack it. … So I’m really glad that we are committing to it and that we 
are recognizing our 20-year decline in [core product] that is only going to continue. Kudos to the 
[owners] because supposedly they have never said that, but that doesn’t mean you take our 
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digital strategy and break it into three pieces. With three different owners, three different 
leads…ok, that doesn’t feel like the right thing to do to attack it. (Interview, Employee 7) 
 
I’m not feeling that we have the breadth of skills to do everything we’re being asked to do.  
Digital is probably a good example. We’re not digitally savvy and probably never keep up with 
the market…just because it’s not part of our core competency.  What are we asking our leaders to 
do in that space vs. what do we need to accomplish is maybe some gap just to be frank.  
(Interview, Employee 2) 
 
The third major theme that emerged from the Pulse Follow-Up interviews in 2013 was a 
consistently acknowledged need for effective decision-making and increased accountability for decisions.  
During business transformation, The Company’s leadership had recognized the need to make decisions 
more quickly based on the information available and invested considerable time, training efforts and 
collateral materials to improve decision-making by adopting what they refer to as the Decision-Making 
Model (Appendix 12).  Corporate officers were the first to adopt the practices outlined in the model 
followed by senior managers.  As of 2010, it was consistently observed that in any formal meeting where 
a decision was to be made by senior leadership the conversation followed from the standardized decision-
making model structure of frame, debate, decide, and act.  Shown below are interview comments that 
describe beliefs that the corporate effort to improve how decisions are made has fallen short of its goal.  
…the thing that I wonder as far as a capability we have is do we have a decision making 
structure that lends itself to be nimble enough to react and to succeed in an ever so fast paced, 
moving environment. (Interview, Employee 1) 
 
…I’ve seen senior leaders and how some of them make decisions. I don’t think the due diligence 
that is needed is always there.  There is a lot of pressure to make decisions quicker than ever 
which can be good but sometimes I think that not all the I’s are dotted and T’s are crossed to 
make that final decision.  I think we act too quickly on some things. (Interview, Employee 3) 
 
…on with the amount of meetings that we have to make a decision is…not even get to a point of a 
decision…is sad.  I feel like there is a lack of understanding of who makes the decision.  Who is 
the owner of that decision? It is very unclear across the board in everything on just about 
everything I work on.  Whose decision is - this is always a key question.  We have a lot of 
meetings to discuss but at the end of that meeting, we rarely have a decision because it has to go 
to this forum or that forum where the decision, hopefully, will be made at that time. … I think we 
are still a very matrixed organization, the number of forums, the number of decision making 
forums that there are, by the time it gets to the point where I have influence, the decisions are 
already pretty much made. (Interview, Employee 8) 
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A critical failure point in the decision-making process appears to be the lack of accountability for 
decisions that are made.  Whether this condition in The Company is real or perceived, it exists because it 
is in the beliefs of employees as are the reasons for why as described below.  
Lack of accountability for results. We talk a lot about being accountable but when you look at the 
several situations where you don’t see any official accountability so its hard to trust that its truly 
what is meant.  There are no assurances that it is happening. (Interview, Employee 1) 
 
We’ve hyped it up so much now that I don’t know if we can realistically meet it’s expectations 
and so if it doesn’t take off or if certain parts of it aren’t good, the way our rumor mill works, 
“Oh my god!”… I think it’s part culture and also that people are worried that if they just came 
out and admit that they screwed up they would be held accountable.  (Interview, Employee 7) 
 
…the owners are too nice.  I don’t think they want to look at people and say, “I’m going to fire 
you.  I don’t care how awesome an employee you’ve been for 20 years, but if you don’t deliver 
the results I’m going to let you go.” I get a real sense that the owners don’t want to do that. …  
We are usually reactionary versus proactive…I am told time and again that we didn’t see that 
one coming.  No one was fired for missing that one. But again, how did we not know that was 
coming? (Interview, Employee 7) 
 
I think the company is absolutely too nice.  It is a very generous company of course which 
attracts many people to the company but its that slippery slope where if we are to remain 
competitive and to succeed against the competitive marketplace I think we have to be a lot more 
methodical in the way we approach the business.  We tend to do things that are “too nice” so that 
decisions are delayed. When you delay decisions that has other implications.  
(Interview, Employee 9) 
 
The idea of “niceness” is rooted in The Company’s heritage.  “Niceness was an inherent part of caring 
and sharing, and being nice and getting along with others were requirements of employment at [The 
Company]” (Lampe, 1998, p. 220).  Niceness also has a dark side that was embedded in the culture, “A 
culture of niceness, however, made it easy for those in power to create systems that both exploited and 
oppressed some employees and not others. … The culture of niceness did not allow people to question or 
talk about what was really going on, and implied in it was the acceptance of the way things were” 
(Lampe, 1998, p. 221).  
  While commenting on the need for improved decision-making and increased accountability, 
several responses from the middle managers reflect the desire for increased autonomy.  From their point 
of view, empowering decision-makers closer to the level where the work occurs is how decision-making 
can be improved and is a path to increase not only accountability but also speed and trust. 
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What I’ve seen that builds trust is pushing down decision-making.  This automatically says I trust 
you to make the decision. I think we don’t do ourselves a favor whenever we expect our most 
senior leaders to make all the decisions and the senior leaders don’t do anyone else a favor when 
they make those decisions rather than saying “no, you guys can make that”…. How you take trust 
away is by involving too many people…“I don’t trust you to actually form an opinion and make 
the decision, I think you need to involve 20 other people” which slows down decision making and 
then it becomes paralysis. (Interview, Employee 2) 
 
… if you want to go faster, then give me the accountability and also give me the autonomy.  That 
tool, I know it’s a soft skill, but that tool in and of itself is probably the only thing that is limiting 
right now.  (Interview, Employee 6) 
 
I think recently sharing of information is much better than it has been in the past.  I do think it 
ties back a little bit to the trust and decision-making structure.  If I don’t have decision rights or 
true accountability for whatever I may be trying to make a decision on, I think that hinders within 
our company to open up some of the dialogue back and forth and trust between one another. 
(Interview, Employee 1) 
 
The thing I have noticed the most, kind of within the last 5 years, nearly every decision is made at 
such a high-level that the middle managers don't feel empowered to do really anything because 
all we really are now are just executors of a more grand plan…. 10 years ago, we could have a 
whiff and it wasn't really that big of a deal and now every miss is a big deal.…more and more 
decisions that used to be made at lower levels are being made at higher levels. Things at the 
middle manager level that they used to know they no longer know because decisions are made at 
a higher level. I think that has “unempowered” the middle manager level.  
 (Interview, Employee 11) 
 
Finally, the last interview comments regarding the third major theme of decision-making and 
accountability is direct feedback from interviewees on how they believe the decision-making model has 
been adopted by the culture.  The semi-structured interview questions did not specifically inquire about 
decision-making practices or the decision-making model; however, when either topic surfaced in the 
responses to the open-ended questions, this researcher asked interviewees whether the model helped to 
improve the overall decision-making process of The Company.  Shown below are their responses.   
Yes, absolutely very much so especially on the healthy debate portion of it.  There’s more of that 
going on today then there has been in the past.  What still goes on today is your supposed to have 
the healthy debate, decide and act.  You come to the act portion of it…and sometimes after the act 
happens it gets pushed back to the debate…because people are in a room and something is 
revisited and they have a different point of view. Sometimes it because they have new information 
but in this case, they didn’t like the decision and changed it…  The decision making model has 
put everyone on the same page so when you come to a meeting you frame it, debate it, decide and 
let’s act.  We try to follow that format and when we don’t, we’re challenged to do that….I think 
that’s working….even though we’re still not quite where we need to be. There is still some 
hesitation in healthy debate portion of it. There are more people that participate in the healthy 
debate and some people that don’t even though they want to.  (Interview, Employee 3) 
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I think some of the misses that our senior manager have is when they are in the meeting and there 
is healthy debate with people that are not participating they don’t call them out. They should be 
called out because that person has a point of view but that person may not want to share because 
they are uncomfortable. The senior managers that get the best results are those that call people 
out in a nice way…. (Interview, Employee 3) 
 
I think it’s helpful in what it’s supposed to do which is make it quick and make it a process that is 
getting you to the root of the issue, to get to some likely decisions or options. What I don’t think it 
allows you to do is to really pull back and talk through all of the other options that might be out 
there because at the end of the day what it has done is created a structure that is to get the 
problem solved quickly and efficiently versus going in and having a discussion, getting everybody 
on the same page, having a big conversation on some of the different types of thinking that’s in 
that room.  It gets you down to “we’ve got to move on, we’ve got to move on, we’ve got to move 
on because I have to have a decision when I walk out of this room.” [Researcher:  Do you think 
there is a missed opportunity there?] Oh, most definitely, most definitely. (Interview, Employee 8) 
 
 
The comment above points to missed opportunity for knowledge creation when decisions must be made 
within specific time constraints that are most commonly during an hour meeting.  Shown below are the 
remaining responses to the question whether the model helped to improve the overall decision-making.  
Comments reiterate the point that decision-making is not empowered at the level where the work occurs. 
I don’t think so, no. Not necessarily the model, but maybe the structure. I think what we’re kind of 
hung up now is in an era of heavy cost cutting which leads to decision-making structure that has 
to funnel up to the top entirely too much.  (Interview, Employee 1) 
 
I think it has helped but what I’ve heard comments more or less about how it’s used.  It’s 
probably not used as frequently as it needs to and being used as far down in the organization as it 
should be. So, yeah, our senior leaders are doing an effective job of lets frame it, debate it and 
then we’ll decide. But once you get down below their level how often do you see just a middle 
manager saying, “hey, we’re going to use the frame and debate model because I need input from 
all those that are influencers” and it’s declared that that particular manager is making that 
decision….I don’t see much of that.   (Interview, Employee 2) 
 
Yes, I do think the decision making model has helped. Maybe I’m just not in enough meetings 
with that…I don’t see that widely as adopted yet. Maybe it’s because I’m not in the level of 
meeting where that’s employed. (Interview, Employee 10) 
 
I think when its used and its effective, however, I think only the senior people really use it on a 
regular basis and I think the middle managers use it to tee up decisions to senior managers but I 
don't think its used at the middle manager levels very effectively. (Interview, Employee 11) 
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4.5 Unintended consequences and unpredicted outcomes 
Unintended Consequences. The three major themes of beliefs from the middle manager 
interviews reveal fundamental reasons why these employees do not demonstrate attitudinal engagement.  
The reality they depict in the interviews is not in alignment with the stated corporate vision of creating a 
“more emotionally connected world by making a genuine difference in every life, every day” (The 
Company intranet).  Corporate behaviors that disconnect from the vision appear in the lack of success in 
the emerging digital space and lack of dedicated pursuit to stated corporate culture changes intended to 
strengthen authentic communication, trust, and decision-making processes.  Shortcomings in these areas 
appear to have related and other unintended consequences: lack of confidence and lack of risk taking.  
Recall the main goal of organizational knowledge creation theory is to recognize conditions that enable 
knowledge creation so that innovation and learning can improve.  Firms and the communities of practice 
within them that fail to instill the confidence and trust required for employees to take risk are not settings 
where new knowledge can easily be created and cultivated.  “While a community of practice is a living 
place where the members learn knowledge that is embedded in the community, ba is a living place where 
new knowledge is created” (Nonaka, Toyama, Konno, 2000, p. 15).  The key idea to comprehend the 
concept of ba is “interaction” – knowledge is created through interactions with others and ba is their 
shared context that evolves as they do.  For ba and the dynamic process of knowledge-creating to thrive, 
it must have the necessary conditions – trust, care, commitment, creative chaos, requisite variety, 
redundancy, and autonomy (Nonaka et al, 2000).  
The first unintended consequence to discuss is lack of confidence.  The interviews uncover a 
cultural preoccupation with building consensus, being “nice”, and a need for heroics that point to a lack of 
confidence in the organization’s knowledge system and business processes.  From a knowledge-creating 
viewpoint, employees do not have the necessary conditions to create new knowledge, most notably trust 
and autonomy.   This is problematic when, as discussed in the introduction, competition is a war of 
movement whereby success depends on anticipating market trends and the speed in meeting customer 
needs.  Shown below are consensus-building beliefs that include behaviors within and across groups 
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revealing leadership behaviors where stated expectations do not match reality.  When leaders’ behaviors 
are inconsistent with their messages, trust and autonomy cannot exist.  
We have a very consensus-building culture and while that can be good I think it can be kind of a 
hindrance.  Our standard way of business involves a lot of meetings, a lot of approvals and a lot 
of consensus and I think sometimes that makes you slow down and not move as fast. 
(Interview, Employee 12) 
 
I think the company is articulating that they want individuals to contribute and be engaged and to 
be inclusive but there is very little receptivity for that at the end of the day by the senior 
managers. … I think there is a contingent that absolutely is inviting folks to contribute and to 
make a difference and again, we see that at an individual level but if you step back and look at it 
from a much broader perspective sadly it feels…“get on board and if you’re not on board then 
there’s the door.” (Interview, Employee 9) 
 
You lost all that capacity or wasted it, lost because someone was not trusteed, not heard.  In Lean 
one of the wastes is intellectual waste.  If you break the trust of someone or they break trust with 
you and it gets passed on and typically it does in an organization, people will talk to other 
people. “You’re going to work for that person, man here’s what they did?” It just harms the 
organization all the way around. (Interview, Employee 6) 
 
 “Nice” appears again and again across the interviews and seem to describe a culture full of boundaries 
and inauthentic behavior as shown below.  People and experiences that are inauthentic and do not 
promote confidence in individuals so they are free to share their true beliefs despite The Company’s 
investment in developmental programs such as WoodstoneTM.  The seemingly successful and widely 
adopted training program addressed deep-rooted cultural beliefs at The Company and the psychology of 
human behavior so that barriers could be removed and new expectations put in place such as the “Wood 
stone principles” adopted by The Company (Appendix 14).  From the interviews, it appears the top-down 
effort to establish a new foundation for shared contexts to take root is not sustainable.  
…we are a culture of being so nice and just not being able to be direct and give your opinion. As 
a middle level manager it’s very difficult to really stand up at a senior management meeting and 
look at a senior manager and say “I don’t agree with you at all and here’s why” because I think 
that is looked at as career suicide if you do that.  I think they have tried to foster an environment 
where you should feel comfortable with that and open the door for you to do that and we want 
you to do that but the insult is we’ve seen behavior over the past few years that show that that is 
not actually true. The actions and the behaviors of those who did do that actually didn’t pay off 
for them. So, I think it makes people very nervous to challenge in forums where they are sitting 
there in disagreement not feeling good about the direction we are going but nobody says 
anything. (Interview, Employee 8) 
 
I also think that Woodstone, while it was hard for me – I didn’t enjoy the time but yet when I look 
back, the organization needed that because it really was something about our culture. We were 
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afraid to speak up. We were afraid to…and we were overly nice and we were afraid to be 
confrontational so I think that was really worthy. It was really diving down deep. I felt that 
someone was able to see that this was a problem and found something that seemed to be pretty 
effective for the organization and I know it was really effective for a time. We’re getting back into 
that conservative behavior all over again for a number of reasons probably.  
(Interview, Employee 8) 
 
 
Michael Hammer (1996) wrote that entrepreneurs are the “quintessential American folk heroes” whose 
ingenuity and creative spirit “energizes a workplace with a can-do atmosphere and an obsession with 
providing customer value” (p. 68).  The dark side of the entrepreneurial spirit is fear – fear of failure and 
being bested by competitors.  For an organization, “the presence of Heroes is a sign of defective 
processes, whereas the reliance on Stars betrays a lack of appreciation of processes and their importance 
(p. 103).  In other words, when an abundance of “Heroes” and “Stars” exist it suggests the organization 
does not have the processes and capabilities it needs to succeed without them.  If confidence is not 
threatened by their existence when they are present in the organization, it will be when they inevitably 
leave.  What is more, when strong performers are habitually over leveraged it can lead to their burnout.  
…people have generally been rewarded or promoted because of their ability to perform heroics.  
When you have to perform heroics that mean your process isn’t working very well.  Either you 
haven’t designed or built it, or it’s not flexible enough, whatever.  I think that directly influences 
the kinds of leaders you get. … We manage in crisis, the company almost encourages thriving in 
a crisis even though we say we don’t, we do.  It’s under the radar.  It is one of those things that 
are reinforced in the culture. (Interview, Employee 6) 
 
I think heroics have become an expectation of peoples’ jobs where that used to be an “exceed” of 
expectations now it is an “achieve.” (Interview, Employee 11) 
 
 
The second unintended consequence is lack of risk taking.  The aversion to risk taking that 
surfaced in the interviews appear to come from a combination of factors including fear of failure, 
cognitive biases that likely influence behavior, and a variety of acculturated behaviors that have 
developed over time such as beliefs The Company is too slow to change and an over reliance on meetings 
which appear in the comments shown below and in the others that follow.   
I think we are very hierarchical. I think we’ve probably always have been…. I think we’re over 
meeting’d, over emailed, but I think that’s also part of The Company’s way to have such grand 
dialogue on every single issue because we cannot afford to fail. (Interview, Employee 11) 
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I think it’s OK to fail…that atmosphere is there but I think some of the things that we could really 
fail on we don’t even give a try so again it’s the out there things that we really don’t even get to 
push on to see if we really could change things – those don’t happen.  Don’t happen because of 
risk averseness or they have knowledge of something else that we shouldn’t go down that path. 
(Interview, Employee 1) 
 
We have a very careful, conservative culture. (Interview, Employee 6) 
I think risk-taking is another big one - if you got people that have to funnel everything up to the 
top you don’t get people taking many chances, they may be over analyzing to make a decision 
that they could have made by themselves.  I think accountability kind of goes out the window.  If 
everything funnels up then less people feel accountable at the middle manager level since the 
decisions are ultimately being made at the top.  (Interview, Employee 1) 
 
 
Beliefs relating to leadership behaviors as shared in the interviews allude to cognitive biases that may be 
unrecognized such as anchoring and competitor neglect.  These appear in the interview quotes that follow 
and that have appeared previously in comments and observations discussed in section 4.4 in regards to 
The Company’s digital competencies.  The anchoring effect is the strongest and most prevalent biases that 
results from the human mind’s tendency to focus on the initial piece of information to make subsequent 
judgments and decisions (Kahneman, 2011).  In the case of The Company, expectations for new product 
initiatives can be referenced against or “anchored” to known performances of mature product categories.  
What is more, because initial proposals may accentuate the positive to make the case for activation, initial 
estimates will tilt subsequent forecasts toward overoptimism (Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003).  Competitor 
neglect is the focus on one’s own plans and organizational capabilities while underestimating the 
likelihood of negative events and the strengths of rivals.  Lovallo & Kahneman (2003) warn that, 
“Neglecting competitors can be particularly destructive in efforts to enter new markets. When a company 
identifies a rapidly growing market well suited to its products and capabilities, it will often rush to gain a 
beachhead in it investing heavily in production capacity and marketing” (p.60). Unfortunately, many 
other competitors also target the market and as all the firms invest, supply can outstrip demand rendering 
the new market unprofitable. 
I think our expectations going in are more stretch goals than realistic goals.  
(Interview, Employee 11) 
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I think our leadership is highly risk-averse but they don’t think of themselves as risk averse. I 
have an example of that.  There was a [specific senior management] leadership team meeting 
where I heard someone say, “You know, we’ve been told on Kenexa that we are risk averse.  
We’re not risk averse but they haven’t shown me a line of sight about how to get to a revenue 
stream on this.” And I thought you’ve just defined risk averse. Hello. Because you don’t always 
have all of the data and we are such a data rich company. Now we are entering a territory where 
we don’t have all the data and it’s paralyzing us. Because when I don’t have all of that data, I 
either can’t make a decision, I’m speaking my opinion only of what I would do and what I would 
buy or I don’t have enough data to show me this is actually going to drive revenue and profits – 
so it’s no.  If we keep doing that, we are just going to continue down every conservative path that 
we have been and I don’t see the growth potential. (Interview, Employee 8) 
 
Finally, there is an abundance of comments that denote acculturated organizational behaviors indicating 
beliefs that the organization and the people are slow to change and of an over reliance on meetings.  
Shown below are comments that highlight beliefs of the lack of change. 
I trust [leadership’s] business sense particularly at the executive level.  They either came from 
outside the company or grew up within the company and had some pretty good varying 
experiences on [specific senior management] leadership team.  So on the business side, not a 
problem.  Within that same vein though, it still gets back to this willingness to step out and lead.  
People don’t feel comfortable particularly because this is such a consensus-driven culture. … At 
the [specific senior management] leadership team level I feel good about the business. I don’t 
think they are stepping out. I think they are in a very challenging business environment. I’ve 
heard the excuse before that “It takes a long time to turn a ship around.”  An aircraft carrier can 
turn around in 3-1/2 minutes if the planes are not on the deck. I think that analogy has grown 
very old with me. Even though the company is more than 100 years old, it could turn itself around 
and get into new ventures but you have to be willing to take more risks. (Interview, Employee 6) 
 
You got a lot of people with The Company who have been here 20-30 years. They are not 
comfortable stepping out of their shell and pushing change. We are used to doing things a certain 
way, had a lot of initiative beat out is a harsher way to describe it but probably the easiest way. 
 … Attitude reflects leadership so if my leaders don’t act with a sense of urgency, if they don’t act 
like they are driven, if are not pushing their employees to change and exhibiting that behavior 
themselves then why are your employees going to do that? Some of your top performers will 
naturally do that no matter what you do. You are not going to galvanize the other 95% of the 
work force to strive for success if they are looking to their leadership…. (Interview, Employee 7) 
 
As for the over reliance and abundance of meetings, Jason Fried co-found and president of 37 Signals that 
creates collaboration software said in his 2010 TED Talk that “over collaboration” is a disease that most 
companies have and the real problems to getting work done are M&M – managers and the meetings.  
Shown below are comments that illustrate over collaboration that seems to also inhibit risk taking.  
We always have the “meeting after the meeting” conversations within the company. I think the 
investment that [The Company] has made in Woodstone and various Kenexa resources has done 
a lot to help elevate understanding amongst both employees and managers that you have to talk 
openly. I think that’s been a positive so I think there are a lot of conversations that are going.  
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But I still think there is a mindset within the company that is very hierarchical that they tend not 
to push questions up or ask those tough questions so I think there that’s…we’re seeing progress 
but not to the level that we need to have breakthrough thinking. Think that’s what we’re waiting 
on at this point to be given the ability and the leash to have those tough conversations with our 
leaders and right now there is very little receptivity to that and I think a lot of that again is being 
dictated by nature of the change and the shift within the business from a strategy standpoint. 
(Interview, Employee 9) 
 
Most of the knowledge sharing that we have is sitting through meetings…short meetings, long 
meetings, medium meetings. I believe a lot of knowledge is shared during these meetings, but 
there’s still…the challenges we’ve had with meeting over the years are still are predominate 
today which is the meeting before the meeting and the meetings after the meeting. And I don’t 
care what anybody says i.e. when people say that we will not nix you based on what you say I’ve 
seen otherwise. And so, there’s a trust factor that there depending on who’s in the room I might 
not be as open to asking certain questions or certain comments.  I think that still goes on today. I 
know I experience it personally. The meeting before the meeting is all about lobbying and the 
meeting after the meeting is “hey, here’s what I really think.” Now, I will tell you I try not to do 
that, but in some cases I find myself doing that personally which I’m not happy about but it just 
depends whose in the meeting. Sometimes, I’m not asked for my point of view because I’m not a 
senior manager and other senior managers are in the room that are asked for their point of view.   
(Interview, Employee 3) 
 
I think it is really is helpful – knowing what the purpose of the meeting is, who the decision maker 
is…I think those are all really valuable things to come to meetings equipped with but I don’t think 
people have programmed themselves to think about it that way. What that means is there are a lot 
of meetings that are not as valuable as they could be….(Interview, Employee 10) 
 
 
Unpredicted Outcomes. Trust in the senior leaders and achieving success through competitive 
advantages created by “engaged” employees cannot be predicted.  What is known is that there is not a 
high level of trust in the skills and talents of senior leaders at The Company as a result of not achieving 
success and building the competitive advantages that middle managers perceive as vital.  Despite efforts 
to inspire company leaders years earlier in a “leadership model for the future” (Appendix 13), it does not 
appear they have effectively instilled confidence in their skills and talents.  Provided below are answers to 
question #9 (Appendix 3) that asks do you trust the skills and talents of senior leaders.  
I do for the most part. I don’t know if we have the right talent in some of our senior leaders. I do 
for the most part trust senior leaders and their skills. My two cents on that is we are in a product 
category where most of our shoppers are women. So honestly this is coming from a man, I would 
like to see more middle and upper level managers be women that are using our product 
consistently and have that deeper understanding of what our customers are looking for. So that’s 
one hole for us, I think we need more women with opportunities or in positions like that. 
(Interview, Employee 10) 
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I do not. I think they are smart people. I just don’t think they are equipped to lead us through a 
time and the position that our organization is facing…and the challenges that our organization is 
facing. I think they are good leaders for leading an organization that is conservative, cash rich, 
and ok with not growing, but to go into new spaces, to grow, to go into highly ambiguous places 
and to take a lot of risk - absolutely not. (Interview, Employee 8) 
 
Goes back to the recent results of the business.  I think that raises the question of talent of our 
senior leaders. (Interview, Employee 1) 
 
I think our strategies are a little too short-term focused.  Having a longer-term strategy of where 
we need to win and identifying how is really important.... (Interview, Employee 2) 
 
As interviewees answered the question about the skills and talents of senior leaders, many middle 
managers also described the skills and talents that they want exhibited by company leaders in order for 
the organization to grow both in revenue and in human talent development. 
I strongly believe leadership is very, very different from managing.  I don’t see leaders who will 
try to do the right thing by themselves.  There are some cases their own integrity is not there to do 
it. In other cases, like I said before, they are afraid their peers and/or bosses will step on them for 
being real and speaking their truth.  I think this company, like most companies, says people are 
the most important resource and yet if we really broke down the time, how much time is really 
spent on their people development they would be shocked. … If leaders don’t do that, people 
either leave the company or stagnate in place and you also lose the ability to have a richness in 
future leaders at higher levels. …the mantra out there today tends to be “your career is in your 
hands” - I think that is a leadership copout. (Interview, Employee 6) 
 
[Good leaders] are transparent.  They are smart enough to know what they don’t know and they 
leverage their status.  They get out of people’s way.  They guide and correct versus command.  
They add their thought leadership where it is needed. (Interview, Employee 7) 
 
I think the biggest skill and talent you want is that [senior leaders] are inspiring. They are 
leading the charge and you will follow them because you want to win. I don’t see that.  
(Interview, Employee 5) 
 
I’m naively optimistic that we’re going to dig out of this I think at the end of the day the real 
challenge that we’re having is again to create an inclusive environment at the level that I operate 
to understand where I fit and quite frankly the 400+ employees that I’m managing fit. Because I 
think at the end of the day that’s our greatest resource and we don’t want to talk about that. ...  
It’s more about survival and yet, the thing we heard from senior managers that our company is 
more financially healthy than it has been in years. So there are a lot of folks scratching their head 
saying, “if that’s the case then show us a path to a future that’s not shackled.” Let us chase some 
things and make investments that are in our long-term best interest as opposed to reacting.  
We are just in a very reactionary mode today. (Interview, Employee 9) 
 
I struggle that we are growing the right kind of leaders for the company and that we are not 
aggressively pursuing some turnover in our work force that I think we should. The company has a 
very long average tenure…that really just promotes loyalty to the company. We have that lack of 
both, younger and fresh perspective such as experienced hires from the outside that is making it 
much harder for us to realize the vision that is laid out by The Company. (Interview, Employee 7) 
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Notable in the description below of the skills and talents this middle manager wants to see, is the current 
divide that exists between middle managers and the leadership of the company.  In this example, the 
interviewee describes company leadership that is detached as evidenced by their surprise of the 2013 
employee engagement results.  Given the results discussed in this study, this “surprise” was predictable.  
Sharing information and building a business case - once you include people in the conversation 
and help them understand what the end-game strategy looks like you build trust, you build 
inclusiveness, you build engagement. A telling example of the lack of engagement was the latest 
Kenexa survey that was probably one of the worst scores this company has had since we’ve 
measured it. What is even more surprising is that it surprised the senior managers and corporate 
officers within the company.  The fact they were surprised was very telling and I think they drive 
that.  The interesting thing is that when you have an ownership group come out in a meeting and 
acknowledge that and look at the audience and say they are disappointed in the audience…i.e. 
middle managers....that they are not feeling as engaged as the people that are working for them 
then that is very telling as to the amount of distance between the senior management that is 
leading the company and the employees that support them. (Interview, Employee 9) 
 
Shown below are comments that provide a snapshot-in-time of middle manager beliefs whether the 
company is or is not building competitive advantages (question #10, Appendix 3).   
I feel very optimistic that there are some very, very smart folks that are running the company, a 
lot smarter than I am, that are making choices that are putting us in a position to win. (Interview, 
Employee 9) 
 
When I look at capabilities I think in terms of basics…do we make a good product, do we make a 
product that people want, do we have distribution, all those things are yes. But when you start to 
say why don’t we grow then I think it has a lot to do with more strategic types of decisions. 
(Interview, Employee 5) 
 
I think leadership has a very strong dug-in point of view in the way our brand needs to be 
presented and I'm not certain that may be the correct course and I think it is so ingrained in our 
culture that it prevents us from seeing other opportunities to move forward and grow.  
(Interview, Employee 11) 
 
As with the comment above, in many cases middle managers described what should be done to bolster 
existing and/or create new advantages that included renewed assessment of marketplace conditions, and 
candid reassessment of corporate strategies and capabilities. 
I think the tools are all there to succeed.  I do think that there has to be recognition of where the 
[core product] market has been and we’ve known its been declining for 20 years.  So what are we 
going to do about that?  Are we going to face reality and try to deal with that directly or just say 
“well, we’re trying to work on building the category back up” - two different things.  The 
Company needs to reframe some of the challenges and some of the assumptions that it has run 
under. (Interview, Employee 6) 
97 
 
 
 
I think we need to redefine what our capabilities are. I think capabilities exist in the organization, 
but I think what we have relied on in the past in our core capabilities may not be core abilities 
anymore. (Interview, Employee 8)  
 
There is a lot of talk – the words seem positive about Omni channel and bringing someone on 
with experience.  I think that as long as that person is allowed to do what s/he needs to do in 
order to move things forward and not have an old company paradigm of “well, we can’t hurt that 
aspect of our business so you can’t go and do that” type of thing. We have to have everything 
looking forward. Let’s lead from a viewpoint of what do we want the company to look like in 20 
years then let’s drive to it. (Interview, Employee 11) 
 
 
At the conclusion of all Pulse Follow-Up interviews, the employees were asked if they could 
agree with all four of the questions used to measure engagement (Appendix 2, #18-22).  In all cases, 
employees were not able to answer yes to all questions.  There was a consistent pattern in their responses 
around concern for the future and continued pride in The Company today.  Interviewees unanimously 
agreed with the question “They are proud to work for this company.” 
I don’t know today if someone is starting his or her career I could recommend The Company as a 
place of employment.  When I started  I had a lot of opportunity for growth and over my career 
every few years I had a different opportunity to broaden my skills sets…I’m not so sure someone 
out of school would have that opportunity in the future…positions or salaries commensurate with 
the marketplace…. I will say am I proud to work for a company like [The Company]. … That’s 
what keeps me here. I think there is a tremendous opportunity to impact the lives of people 
everyday. (Interview, Employee 2) 
 
I worry about the company and very much appreciate the support I’ve had with the company. 
They have given me a great opportunity. I work as hard today as I ever have in my life. I enjoy 
what I do and the people that I work with.  I truly believe in this company and our customers…I 
still believe in the brand and I still believe in the company.  (Interview, Employee 3) 
 
The culture is still great. You don’t get a place that cares about people like this place does. We 
are so focused and grounded on that that it scares me sometimes though. (Interview, Employee 7) 
 
I am proud to work at [The Company]. I don’t know if I’d refer my own kids when they get out in 
the workforce because I need to feel a little more confident in the future of the company.  
(Interview, Employee 10) 
 
Pride does significantly correlate to beliefs of future success (Appendix 9); however, it has a weaker 
correlation than the other variables discussed.  It can also be argued that feelings of pride are rooted in the 
past and in employees who experienced years of success.  Pride will not be sustainable for either 
experienced or new employees if future years reveal under performance and loss of brand relevance.  
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I’ve always been intrigued by the engagement survey just because I can’t answer yes to these 
questions doesn’t mean that I’m not engaged. If I hadn’t been engaged with this company I 
wouldn’t have been here 26 years so engagement is a misnomer in terms of how it is being 
interpreted. I come to work…and I’m not in a vacuum in this situation many employees are 
engaged they have a lot invested in this company and want it to succeed. Just because I can’t say 
I rarely think about looking for a new job doesn’t mean I’m less engaged. You have to look out 
for yourself, too (Interview, Employee 4) 
 
At the senior manager level, I do think for whatever reason that our senior managers in general 
its almost like when you get to that level you’re more worried about irritating any of your peers 
because you got to a high level, high pay, high amount of people you have to manage or product 
whatever that is. It seems that is a greater elevation with the company, maybe not.  Maybe other 
corporations do the same thing.  So it’s those leaders, the best ones are letting the middle 
managers do what they do best which is execute, set the strategy, figure out some of the basic 
skeleton if you’re a senior manager then let them run. But instead, our senior manager corps 
often times feels that they have to be hands-on. And again, ultimately that all gets back to control.  
Ultimately you have to be vulnerable, you have to be willing to relinquish some control and trust 
other people.  That’s the only way those other people are going to have their own failures.  They 
won’t be a big failure right, they will have little failures and they’re learning. They might be the 
next North American Leadership Team in 10 years.  But if they don’t, then guess what if they get 
promoted to the higher level, they are going to be very risk averse because they have always been 
successful with the easy low-bar stuff and never had a chance to fail forward.  I think failing 
forward is the just most important thing for all of us, right?  Most of us didn’t get up on a bike 
and ride off into the sunset.  We fell down and scraped our knees and learned from that.  If we fail 
forward eventually we can all ride a bike. (Interview, Employee 6) 
 
 
4.6 Post employment interviews 
Interviews with two individuals choosing to no longer work at The Company affirm many of the 
beliefs from current employees previously discussed and offer additional depth and perspective about the 
social practices and leadership behaviors present in the corporate culture.  Specifically, there were 
obstacles these former middle managers believed inhibited performance and their ability to learn:  
inconsistent appreciation of new thought and skills sets, lack of enabling and tenacious leadership, and 
denial of competitive threats.  The first, beliefs of inconsistent appreciation for new ideas and skills sets 
are represented in comments, shown below, that describe shared contexts with inconsistent levels of trust, 
care, commitment, creative chaos, requisite variety, redundancy, and autonomy. 
The Company struggled to appreciate niche values - niche skill sets and liked to have a lot of 
generalists. That’s all good and well, but when you perform and you do great things in a 
particular space, you don’t have the value recognized.  At some point you start to wonder if your 
performance matters. In general I would say that the culture there was not one that neither 
fostered nor encouraged exceptional performance. (Interview, Former Employee #1) 
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I think I learned the most when the organization was sprinkled with outside perspectives. The 
Company does a lot of advancement from within which is great potential for people to grow 
within the organization. I think the organization is at a point of stagnation and needs some 
additional outside perspective to let it be more flexible to learn and grow. I would find myself 
getting a little stagnant in a couple of ways 1) complacency…it’s rampant in an older 
organization where everyone is complacent and happy with the way things run and 2) without an 
outside perspective one might not take on new experiences. I always did and learned the most 
when I would have someone mentor me from the outside. (Interview, Former Employee #2) 
 
When I got there, the culture had been so successful in the way it performed that people felt that 
challenging the status quo was sacrilegious. That created a very passive-aggressive culture 
where everybody knew there were challenges and problems but you certainly didn’t put them at 
the forefront.  Towards the end of my time there, I think that passive-aggressive behavior gave 
way to a more candid environment but that candor was sporadically accepted.  In some places it 
was appreciated and in others a person could be fired for it. So I just think that manifested 
socially. Everybody was very friendly, certainly interested in you personally, but I’m not sure 
there were healthy business practices that allowed you to grow. (Interview, Former Employee #1) 
 
I think that The Company has an ego – as a corporate culture. There is an unwillingness to seek 
outside perspectives on a consistent basis. There is a willingness to work with a consultant when 
The Company thinks it’s important but there is a lot of outside perspective that comes proactively 
that is not accepted. (Interview, Former Employee #2) 
 
Second, the lack of enabling leadership appears to be an obstacle that former middle managers believed 
inhibited performance and their ability to learn.  Specifically, shown below are comments that indicate the 
need for leaders that are capable of leading through times of intense change, leaders who welcome ideas 
that are contrary to their own, and those who can empower new and sustainable capabilities.  
It needs different kinds of leaders. What happens, you have leaders who don’t understand 
leadership amid change then they reject it. They consider it counter to The Company’s culture.  
Personally, it was something where I could never be successful. I never felt I was rewarded for 
taking challenges or risks. I never felt I was rewarded for true leadership moments.  I never felt 
those things were valued – I felt like what was valued was the networking, the conversations—
which were all good but it just isn’t how you change a company. That may be how you tweak and 
hone a company but you don’t change a company with that kind of leadership. (Interview, Former 
Employee #1) 
 
One of the interesting things about The Company coming from a military background, I knew 
about hierarchy, I knew about the respect that is given to each level but The Company was 
extreme in it. In the Army even though there were levels, it practiced a servant leadership model 
that was the idea that the leader was there to make sure their troops had what they needed to be 
successful, not just there to direct and look good. I’m not saying that in general about The 
Company, but there were lots of leaders who embodied that. … I had senior managers who 
would almost view an opinion counter to theirs as insubordinate. It always confused me because 
as a leader, I always want people smarter than I am on my team. They keep me from doing 
something really stupid. The smarter they are the less management they need. That was viewed in 
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The Company as almost insubordinate. I never understood culturally how that came to be. I even 
read The Company’s history to know just what the different leadership models were and I never 
could understand it. That comes from somewhere.  It comes from a really good idea that gets 
deluded and eroded over time into something that it’s not. (Interview, Former Employee #1) 
 
The people who are in the leadership roles are the people who are successful in an environment 
where everything is good, so you need a different kind of leader in an environment that requires 
change and challenge.  You don’t have the same leaders who were rewarded for status quo, 
passive-aggressive behaviors. (Interview, Former Employee #1) 
 
I think we have a lot of incredibly intelligent leaders. There’s not a single one that I would say is 
not savvy. I think unfortunately they are bred within the walls of the organization so some of the 
behaviors are based on some of the things I just talked about – the “comfortable” behaviors. The 
vast majority of leaders came in out of college and I don’t think a lot of people know how to push 
the right direction, how to force urgency, how to force complex decision-making, inspire clever 
problem solving. I think there is a lot of comfort there. (Interview, Former Employee #2) 
 
The problem with The Company is it doesn’t stick, if it doesn’t have the leadership support. 
Something that is really good for a year, we can’t sustain it beyond that but true change takes 
four years to implement and see value. (Interview, Former Employee #1) 
 
In the organization I’m in now there’s something called an empowerment charter. It focuses on 
pushing the decision-making down to make sure people feel like they can move the business in the 
direction it needs to go and having senior leadership inspire and guide. So inspire and guide at 
the top level but the bottom is accountable for the decisions. Even though The Company says they 
want to push decisions down, everyone really leans on the senior leaders to make the calls.  
 
Following the response above, this researcher asked this former middle manager if he believed there is 
accountability for the decisions at The Company.  His answer is provided below, along with his beliefs 
about why leaders are not held accountable. 
No, otherwise there would be a lot less of the senior leaders there. If success equated to 
advancement at The Company it would be a totally different story. There are people that are 
consistently making decisions that are wrong – totally wrong and are not held accountable for 
making those decisions. They continue to advance and they continue in senior leadership roles.  
 
I think senior leaders there become family. It’s very hard to let people go that are friends.  
(Interview, Former Employee #2) 
The third and final obstacle that former middle managers believed inhibited performance and their ability 
to learn is the pervasive denial of competitive threats.  Shown below are the descriptions that support the 
earlier supposition of cognitive biases – specifically competitor neglect that contributes to over optimism. 
I think in general what’s rewarded consistently are people who have nice, well thought of 
demeanors. At the end of the day you don’t beat people in a “cage fight” by being nice, you got to 
fight. You have to bring the fighters to that fight. It doesn’t mean the culture dies it just means 
that it evolves. (Interview, Former Employee #1) 
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I think they try to make it a learning culture. People try to stay open but I think there is a lot of 
passive…passive aggressive is the wrong word…but a lot of things said in meetings where once 
you left a meeting things fell apart because it was a culture of choice and options. We were never 
pushed aggressively until we were forced. So a lot of the advancements in the organization 
happen happened out of a forced nature…. We’re amazing when we are forced into action but 
our social practices - the way we interact is very polite, very calm, we talk about driving change 
and being proactive but when everyone leaves the room they go along their merry way and it’s 
optional because they are not measured on that aggressiveness. … I don’t think people feel the 
dramatic nature of the business. I don’t know how they feel it because no one is impacted until 
recently when people are let go. Now they felt it. I think we never made things real for our 
employees. (Interview, Former Employee #2) 
 
One of the best things I’ve learned here at my present company is how strongly we compete with 
our competitors, how closely we follow what they do, how we know who they hired, how we know 
what their programs look like, we know their relationships to their customers. It’s more than just 
saying they are competitors, it is saying we are against them in this fight. The Company struggled 
even acknowledging it had competitors and struggled to acknowledge the need to worry about 
them. The last 20 years has been different than the first 80. (Interview, Former Employee #1) 
 
4.7 Summary of results 
The attitudinal engagement measure of employee engagement defined by The Company does not 
measure behavioral engagement, rather it’s goal is to measure psychological affiliation with The 
Company so employees know and more importantly feel that what they are doing every day is more than 
“just a job.”  While this goal is admirable, and indeed aspirational, it appears to come with a negative 
backlash when employees do not perceive that the social practices and leadership behaviors they 
experience within the organization enable their success or The Company’s.  This is true for middle 
managers with many years of experience at the firm and in many cases is especially true for male middle 
managers.  According to 2011 Pulse Survey data, tenured male middle managers are less likely to agree 
with all four questions used to measure engagement despite a greater likelihood of this occurring as job 
status increases from individual contributor up to senior manager.  Middle managers are less likely than 
other employees to agree that they believe the company has an outstanding future, that they trust the 
leadership of the company, and that they are confident this company will be able to transform its business.  
For these same questions, male middle managers were less likely than females to agree.   Similar patters 
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were found across other questions indicating a pattern where middle managers, especially males with 
years of experience, appear from the data to lack buy-in and commitment to the company and its future.  
Interviews with male middle managers reveal that while they are frustrated with the lack of 
positive business results and take issue with some of the social practices and leadership behaviors within 
the company, they remain proud to work for The Company and care about making contributions to its 
success.  The interviews revealed patterns of experiences that form their beliefs that are not available 
from the quantitative survey data.  Common themes were uncovered in three distinct areas.  First, the 
need these employees have for transparency from senior leaders to improve communication and trust. 
Second, the inability to innovate in the digital space that emerged over the last decade is a source of deep 
disappointment and regret that contributes to the concerns many of these employees have for the 
capabilities of The Company and its leaders.  Third, the interviews reveal beliefs that decision-making 
and accountability must be improved across the organization.  These beliefs appear to be critical factors 
that create barriers between middle and senior management and create skepticism in The Company’s 
future.  More importantly, these beliefs appear to stifle knowledge creation at the individual and 
organizational levels.  What is also notable from the interviews is that while the comments are candid and 
indeed critical in many instances, the spirit and intent with which they were offered appeared supportive 
and at times, even paradoxically optimistic as opposed to defeatist in nature. 
The post employment interviews confirm many of the beliefs from current employees and 
elaborate on the social practices and leadership behaviors in the culture that act as obstacles.  They 
believed inconsistent appreciation for new thought and skills sets, lack of enabling and tenacious 
leadership, and denial of competitive threats inhibited performance and their ability to learn. 
The common themes of transparency, digital innovation, and decision-making and accountability 
seem to be symptoms of a top-down management model and hierarchical structure that no longer is 
healthy nor productive for The Company.  Present at the firm are leaders perceived as “commanders” that 
create a culture where employees are highly dependent on top management.  The backlash the 
organization is experiencing appears to be an outcome of this firm’s top-down management style that has 
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only intensified due to the challenging business climate and several years of unsatisfactory business 
results.  Created is a belief divide that separates senior leaders from the middle managers they are to lead.  
This has severe and unintended consequences that can fuel lack of both confidence and risk taking.  
Business firms and the communities of practice within them that fail to instill the confidence and trust 
required for employees to take risk are not settings where new knowledge can easily be created and 
cultivated thereby limiting knowledge creation that powers learning, innovation and competitive 
advantage. 
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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
The purpose of this final chapter is to provide a brief overview of the study that begins with the 
research summary and discuss the main findings that specifically answer the central questions that were 
posed in the introduction.  The first question was to explore corporate learning using the theory of 
organizational knowledge creation and one US based corporation to determine the theory’s relevance to 
American firms.  The second was to understand how social practices and leadership behaviors affect 
employee knowledge, or “true beliefs,” and thus the implications to the firm’s knowledge creation and 
ultimately, its competitive advantage.  The chapter concludes with the implications of the study, its 
limitations and suggestions for further research. 
 
5.1 Research summary 
The mixed methods case study was undertaken to explore the theory of organizational knowledge 
creation in one relatively homogenous US based corporation to determine its relevance in America.  The 
research also attempted to understand how social practices and leadership behaviors affect employee 
knowledge, or “true beliefs,” and thus the implications to the firm’s knowledge creation and competitive 
advantage.  Nonaka’s theory of organizational knowledge creation, developed over the last twenty years 
with his associates in non-US firms, was used as the framework to examine the extent to which internal 
factors such as social practices and leadership behaviors affect knowledge creation.  In addition, 
consequences from external events were included to assess the roles of luck and randomness as well as 
their affects on employee beliefs within the 100-year old firm given the pseudonym of The Company.  
Given that knowledge is only useful in its context, the introduction described the origins of The 
Company that this researcher argues is a positive Black Swan event - an improbable positive event that 
has massive consequences.  In this case, the unlikely founding of a firm by a poor teenage boy that 
birthed a new industry and changed how Americans express their feelings and connect with others.  Also 
described in the introduction is a birth of another industry, this one by the Internet.  The new socio-
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technical paradigm joined with a new economy to create unpredictable and highly scalable global 
networks.  This improbable event is the second Black Swan confronted by the firm.  Unfortunately this 
time, what was deemed improbable just a decade ago is now the source of significant negative 
consequences that put the firm’s competitive position in jeopardy.  In retrospect, it may seem ironic that 
the firm that established how many Americans emotionally connect would not lead the next generation of 
social connecting in the emerging digital mediums.  However, this is the nature of Black Swans that begin 
outside the realm of the expected, have an extreme impact on the world around them and are predictable 
only in retrospect as people create explanations for their occurrence only after the fact.  This is indeed a 
problem of knowledge.  When firms focus only on what they know and what has already happened, then 
they are blind to the reality of events that may happen but have not happened yet.   
Five sections comprise the literature review.  The first section begins by setting the historical 
context for organizational culture in traditional US companies that is followed by topics of learning, 
definitions of knowledge, and learning organizations in the second section.  The third summarizes 
organizational knowledge creation theory and its evolution over the course of almost twenty years of 
research outside the US.  Social practices and leadership behaviors require the exploration of truth, trust, 
blame, shame, and power in the four sections that provides important background for the fifth and final 
section that reviews the literature on the paradoxes within organizations, the decision-making practice and 
the role that luck and randomness play in success.  
This case study used a variety of quantitative and qualitative data that included survey data 
collected by The Company in 2011 and qualitative data collected in fourteen formal semi-structured 
interviews with middle managers.  Twelve of the interviews were conducted with male middle managers 
that are presently employed at The Company to specifically investigate reasons behind the survey data 
results. Two interviews were conducted with former middle manager employees, one male and one 
female, that no longer work at The Company to understand their beliefs after voluntarily resigning less 
than 12 months earlier.  Finally, other qualitative data was comprised of primary data from direct 
observation of formal group discussions and relevant internal documents along with secondary data 
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sources including an ethnographic dissertation that provided historical context through a biographical and 
cultural analysis of the organization.  The variety of data sources aided the attempt to answer the broad 
research questions raised in the study: is the theory of knowledge creation relevant at The Company and 
how do social practices and leadership behaviors impact the knowledge creation process as evidenced by 
employee beliefs.  The following sections discuss the main findings as derived from the research and 
contribute to Nonaka’s organizational knowledge creation by elucidating the two voids in theory: is 
organizational knowledge creation theory relevant in a US based firm, and how do social practices and 
leadership behaviors affect knowledge and ultimately, the firm’s competitive advantage.   
 
5.2 Organizational Knowledge Creation Theory in the US 
The interviews and direct observations at The Company reveal the theory of organizational 
knowledge creation does not have relevance in this US corporation primarily due to the narrow way in 
which knowledge in general is perceived as well as valued, and the lack of broadly adopted leadership 
behaviors that enable and empower the thoughtful actions and respected authority of subordinates.  These 
limiting factors stem from structural and societal influences that produce acculturated behavior in the 
organization that is not easily, if ever fully, overcome.  First, the Western views of knowledge that value 
the possession of explicit knowledge, and measurement and management to near-term results are not in 
alignment with knowledge creation theory.  The examples, shown below, illustrate the lack of value 
placed on tactic knowledge, or “instincts,” that were also observed in the use of the decision-making 
model where “fact-based” decisions are not just encouraged but required.  Observations indicate use of 
the structured decision-making model at The Company may actually inhibit learning, especially in 
instances where decisions are elevated to senior leaders instead of made at the level where the work 
occurs.  
At the end of the day, you can find people who are super smart and you can find people who are 
really hard working but the people are the best of all are the people who have tremendous 
intuition and instinct about what needs to be done next. At the end of the day if you look at really 
large companies like Yahoo or Apple and you wonder why they are successful and it always 
comes back to some leader who had a vision and they had an instinct that something needed to be 
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sellable and it was on a big scale. So I always look for people who in the corners, when there is a 
stressful situation, have really good instincts about what they may need to do. Over time if you 
trust them, they may take you in a direction you hadn’t thought but the outcome is a lot better.  I 
thought I had good instincts and when leaders would finally listen and trust me, I thought we 
always got good things done. But I spent a ton of my career explaining, explaining and explaining 
and at some point you can’t explain your instincts. (Interview, Former Employee #1) 
 
I would say we have become very clear on using the decision making model which I am a big 
proponent of because you don’t want to sit there and spin in meetings.  But we have a culture of 
coming in, this is the topic, framing and debate means I have two or three choices on what we are 
going to do so let’s frame and debate those and we’ve got to do this in one hour. The reality of it 
is we are going to have convergers and divergers in that room and there are some people who 
would like to get out, maybe annoyingly to some, and there are clearly people in there who would 
like to have more discussion and more understanding before they can get to a decision.  So you 
have half the room that’s thinking, “okay we have enough information, let’s go,” but then you 
have the other half of the room who doesn’t have the information they need to feel comfortable to 
make the decisions. So you leave that room a little bit divided still and you are at the point where 
you don’t have the decision. It’s just more of “this I what we’re leaning to and we have to shoot it 
up the ladder” to make sure we get the right decision or to get the decision made. But I think you 
have half the room who are still not clear on why it went in that direction because they don’t have 
enough information. (Interview, Employee 8) 
 
Lastly as observed at The Company, the views of objective measurement and management in the business 
setting prevail over the emotional and more abstract concepts of nurturing and love.  This fundamentally 
set limits to the first phase of knowledge creation, Socialization, because the love, trust, and commitment 
created through Originating Ba is not consistently established to encourage individuals to remove the 
barriers to authentically share emotions, experiences, and mental models.   
Second, the hierarchical management model at The Company is not conducive to the power 
distribution or ancillary practices that enable organizational knowledge creation as described in Nonaka’s 
theory.  In the traditional hierarchical model as practiced by The Company, the flow of information is 
controlled and is often restricted based on job level.  The Company selectively shares information with 
employees as noted in the comments regarding the need for “transparency” and what is shared is 
generally done so explicitly.  Practices such as redundancy are not in place to routinely create common 
cognitive ground nor are middle managers in empowered, decision-making positions to form the nuclei of 
self-organizing teams as they are in the Middle-Up-Down management model.  In knowledge creation 
theory, middle managers play the crucial role of “knowledge producers” because they are at the 
intersections of vertical and horizontal flows of information in the firm and “actively interact with others 
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to create knowledge by participating in and leading ba” (Nonaka et al, 2000, p. 22).  This is the 
foundation of “distributed leadership” that is not cultivated at The Company.  Consequently, knowledge 
creation theory is not relevant or applicable at The Company.  For this reason, the remainder of the 
discussion will use the more generic term of “corporate learning” to acknowledge that while organization 
knowledge creation as it is defined in theory does not exist at The Company, learning still occurs.  It is 
likewise important to note that this researcher does not believe that the indiscriminate adoption of select 
organizational knowledge creation practices will produce value and may even be detrimental to 
performance as shown in piece meal adoption of Lean manufacturing practices derived from TPS 
(Jayaram, 2010, Bergenwall et al, 2012).  
 
5.3 How do social practices and leadership behaviors affect knowledge creation 
Organizational knowledge creation is the process by which the knowledge created by individuals 
is made available, amplified, and connected to the organization’s knowledge system (Nonaka & von 
Krogh, 2009).  As discussed, this process of knowledge creation as described by theory does not occur at 
The Company due to the narrow way in which knowledge is perceived and the lack of broadly adopted 
leadership behaviors that empower subordinates in the hierarchical management model, most notably 
middle managers given their critical roles in theory as knowledge producers and energizers of ba. 
However, the cultural beliefs that preclude knowledge creation can also thwart corporate learning.  
Several social practices and leadership behaviors detrimental to corporate learning were observed and are 
summarized in the paragraphs that follow.  Important to recognize is that these practices and behaviors 
are not mutually exclusive meaning they overlap, intersect and are altered based on the individual, group, 
business environment and set of circumstances in which they occur.   
First, the overarching social practices that appear to affect corporate learning are the lack of 
transparent communication and subsequent trust, lack of effective decision-making and accountability at 
the level the work occurs, and inconsistent appreciation of new thought and skills sets.  Leadership 
behaviors directly influence the social practices within The Company given the cultural norm that the 
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more senior the manager, the greater power they have to make decisions and in many instances, the more 
knowledge they have or are perceived to have.  Senior leaders set the tone and modes of operation at The 
Company, which is similar to the creation of shared context or ba in knowledge creation theory, albeit not 
exclusively limited to the realm of senior leaders or organizational structures, as is the case with the 
hierarchical model.  When network of interactions lack trust, have little empowerment or fail to 
appreciate new thought and talent, the ability for new knowledge to be created is limited.  The result at 
The Company is existing knowledge that is severely restricted and does not commonly extend across 
multi-layers within the organization or across functional boundaries.  Instead, what are created are 
pockets of knowledge, or “tribes,” that possess and occasionally hoard their knowledge. 
We are a tribal knowledge company.  We have people who have been doing something, the exact 
same job for 20 years who have never changed, never been asked to change, and in fact we don’t 
want them to change because they know what they are doing, they are good at it.  So we don’t 
always rotate people, as we should. (Interview, Employee 7) 
 
 
Second, the leadership behaviors that appear to affect corporate learning are the same ones that 
originate from many of the social practices discussed: how communication and trust is established, 
whether decision-making is effective and exemplifies accountability, and how new thought and skills sets 
are appreciated.  Leadership behaviors were also seen to affect corporate learning by how competitive 
threats were addressed.  The denial and lack of effective response to the threats rising in the digital space 
is a current source of frustration and lack of confidence not only in the specific skills and talents of 
leadership but also in the future of The Company in general.  From the qualitative data collected, it 
appears that innovations in digital connecting failed to succeed not because there was lack of alignment 
with the corporate vision and not because there were no attempts made.  Limited success to date seems to 
stem from a lack of tacit knowledge, experience or “instincts” to discover new value propositions in this 
rapidly evolving space.  Failed attempts in digital are likely to also come from cognitive biases present 
when critical decisions were made, as was some really bad luck in timing.  Each of these three factors will 
now be discussed in greater detail.  
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Leaders did not have the necessary experiences or motivating personal interest to digitally 
connect; therefore, they did not have a deep tacit knowledge required for creativity and innovation in the 
space.  They appeared not to understand it, to fear it, therefore, dismiss it in favor of their current, proven 
and profitable business models.  Intrinsic motivation is needed for activities that require creativity 
(Osterloh & Frey, 2000) and in this case, it seems also necessary to inspire action that is in direct 
alignment with The Company’s corporate vision.  What was missing was the path to a new business 
model - the money - the extrinsic reward.  Those who are extrinsically motivated tend to repeat what has 
already been successful (Amabile 1996, 1998; Schwartz, 1990 by Osterloh & Frey, 2000), and are 
pressured to achieve the rewards that lead to superficial performance and reduced levels of learning.  
Secondly, this researcher suspects that a combination of cognitive biases and organizational pressures 
played a role in the decisions that failed to produce desired outcomes for digital business models.  
Anchoring, competitor neglect and confirmation bias may be factors that plagued critical decisions.  
Organizational pressures, such as an overarching cultural need to be the “very best,” and the extrinsic 
motivation of teams accountable for achieving a revenue goal may have contributed to the inability to 
create the new knowledge necessary to iterate and learn their way to success over time.  Lastly, what bad 
luck on timing; to enter and exit digital innovation when only a small portion of the US population had 
broadband access and the use of personal technical devices such as smart phones had not yet emerged. 
 
5.4 Implications  
This case study demonstrates that what is not learned can be a source of loss – loss of trust, 
intellectual waste, lost potential in new markets, and weakened belief in a firm’s vision for the future.  
When knowledge is treated as property that must be protected and defended, as Taleb (2010) argues, then 
an organization can obscure knowledge or knowing from itself.  In a competitive marketplace, protecting 
intellectual property is certainly necessary; however, it must be balanced with the organization’s need to 
successfully utilize and create knowledge.  Otherwise, behaviors intended to protect the knowledge 
“property” can impede innovation within the firm that “owns” them.  The social practices and leadership 
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behaviors described seem to be exacerbated by the tenuous situation The Company finds itself in – they 
must rapidly find ways to participate in digital mediums and the new marketplace that has established 
itself in an environment of flat to declining revenues and increasing costs.  This creates circumstances 
where resources are more constrained, risk taking is less tolerated pushing decisions upward to be 
scrutinized resulting in middle managers who experience a loss of decision-making authority and 
increased concerns about the future, especially when strategic choices have not resulted in renewal and 
recovery.  Strategic failures and abrupt cessation of strategic initiatives appear to have increased middle 
manager feelings of mistrust and that leadership is “grasping for salvation.”  The cycle of grasping for 
salvation ultimately leads to running out of hope, options, and cash (Collins, 2009) rather than the 
disciplined behaviors that promote sound business practices and knowledge creation that are critical for 
recovery and sustainable growth.  There is perpetual optimism present even in employees that are no 
longer at The Company “so a lot of the advancements in the organization happened out of a forced 
nature…. We’re amazing when we are forced into action.” (Interview, Former Employee #2).   
The collective social practices and leadership behaviors discussed have unintended consequences 
that manifest in lack of confidence and lack of risk taking in employees that put limits on individual and 
corporate learning.  These consequences threaten The Company’s ability to innovate.  Brené Brown 
(2012) asked Kevin Surace, then CEO of Serious Materials and Inc. magazine’s 2009 Entrepreneur of the 
Year, what the most significant barrier to creativity and innovation was and he replied:  
I don’t know if it has a name, but honestly, it’s the fear of introducing an idea and being 
ridiculed, laughed at, and belittled.  If you’re willing to subject yourself to that experience and if 
you survive it, then it becomes the fear of failure and the fear of being wrong.  People believe 
they’re only as good as their ideas and that their ideas can’t seem too ‘out there’ and they can’t 
‘not know’ everything.  The problem is that innovative ideas often sound crazy and failure and 
learning are part of revolution.  Evolution and incremental change is important and we need it, 
but we’re desperate for real revolution and that requires a different type of courage and 
creativity.  (Kevin Surace from Brown, 2012, p. 186) 
 
Blame is a cultural pattern that still exists at The Company; therefore, shame needs to be consistently 
addressed rather than “covered-up.”  Shame breeds fear, destroying the tolerance for individuals to be 
vulnerable.  People need to be vulnerable in order to trust and need to feel trust to be vulnerable (Brown, 
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2012).  Trust must be nurtured at The Company and is “a slow-building, layered process that happens 
over time” (Brown, 2012, p. 47).  Empathy is a valued asset and love is a connection to be cultivated 
fulfilling the primal human need for belonging even in a Western corporate environment.  Empathy is 
required for self-transcendence and is essential to sharing individual tacit knowledge.  As individuals 
trust, they allow themselves to be vulnerable and authentic dialogue is possible.   
I’ve found very few people I would consider great leaders. … In order to gain control you have to 
be able to give it up. You have to be vulnerable and let your ego drop to the point where you 
realize these are very bright adults, the same as you.  However, they were treated in the past and 
whatever knowledge they were exposed to, your job is to make them as effective as possible.  
Generally they are the experts and you have to trust them.  Ultimately that is a control thing. In 
order to trust someone, you have to share pretty deeply either on a personal level or at a 
corporation level otherwise you don’t trust. (Interview, Employee 6) 
 
The need for trust and vulnerability must also be balanced with the need for accountability and power.  
Likeability is overrated and power is an intrinsic part of leadership (Pfeffer, 2010).  Pfeffer’s lessons on 
the obstacles to the path to power are also important ones for corporate learning and building competitive 
advantages.  First, do not believe the world is a fair so learn from all people and situations, especially 
from those you do not agree with.  Second, avoid the leadership literature that focuses on success stories 
often dismissing discussions of the power plays as well as the large role that luck can play (Kahneman, 
2011). And third, get over yourself by not being overly concerned with your self-image or experiencing 
setbacks. Powerful leaders need to be attentive to maintaining the desired practices and values within their 
organizations as they learn to adapt to predictable and unpredictable challenges that inevitably emerge.  
Leaders must direct learning in new, strategic areas because failures can come from focusing on what is 
known rather than focusing on what is not.  
In addition to the social practices and leadership behaviors discussed, other patterns of 
detrimental behavior within the organization must be recognized and avoided.  The behavioral patterns 
are grounded in a false belief that organizational structure can improve how knowledge is created, that 
new project “hype” will increase adoption, and that attitudinal engagement surveys always reflect 
behaviors.  First, it does not appear that cycles of organizational restructures at The Company have 
113 
 
 
dramatically changed corporate learning or the ability to create new knowledge that results in 
significantly improved business outcomes and increased competitive advantage.  Second, there is 
evidence to suggest that the tendency of the leadership to hype or “oversell” new projects can be the 
source of dysfunctional behaviors when they do not deliver on forecasts.  New and often complex projects 
may include scenario planning that dramatically understates the probability of failure that results in a loss 
of trust.  Finally, the “employee engagement index” as it is measured does not reflect the important 
reasons behind employee beliefs illustrated in this case study and is positively skewed by the question of 
pride.  Beliefs of pride measure memories of past success not expectations for the future.  Interviews 
showed employees take exceptional pride in The Company’s past performance and the power of the 
brand; however, this pride and brand equity is not sustainable if future years do not demonstrate the social 
practices and leadership behaviors that enable corporate learning, new knowledge, innovation, and 
growth.  
Finally, my hope is that The Company finds ways to confront the Black Swan and worries less 
about risking embarrassment and more about missing an opportunity (Taleb, 2010, p. 296).  Chances for 
success can be random and the ability to seize situations that can produce “good” luck as well as develop 
human capital is reflected in the firm’s performance.  Luck is an elusive theoretical concept and, like it or 
not, is determinant of performance (Ma, 2002).  Social connections between human beings reside in the 
world where Black Swans are common - knowledge in this context grows slowly, erratically, in a manner 
that cannot be controlled.  To be strong and successful in the new socio-technical paradigm The Company 
must release the traditional, hierarchical ways of working – they must build trust to be trusted, place the 
firm’s assets where they can benefit from serendipitous happenings and be able at critical times to be 
vulnerable and…let go. 
 
5.5 Limitations of the study and future research 
This study focuses on corporate learning within and external events impacting The Company.  
Consistent with case study research, the limitations of research include specific findings and 
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interpretations that may not be applicable to other situations and organizations.  The opinions of The 
Company’s current and former employees can only be explicitly described through words and images; 
therefore, the complete transfer of their knowledge may be limited.  Some of the viewpoints discussed 
may involve a limited number of employees, and may not be potentially representative of the broader 
population.  However, these research findings can be used to compare with the extant organizational 
knowledge creation theory literature and can be further tested with other organizations in the US.  
If the traditional hierarchical company featured in this study is indicative of others in the US, 
there are indeed few companies in the US that embody the true nature of the knowledge-creating 
company and have little understanding of what knowledge is and what must be done to exploit it.  
Suggestions for future research include case studies on US firms that effectively practice organizational 
knowledge creation and firms that are transitioning away from hierarchical management model to other 
models that may be more conducive to organizational learning, knowledge creation, and innovation.  
Research in corporate learning, knowledge creation, and the various other terms used to describe 
organizational development is valuable and is built upon the premise that the conversion of information 
into knowledge and holistic learning can be a source of competitive advantage and critical asset to the 
firm.  Corporate learning and knowledge creation has never been more relevant in the US and the global 
marketplace where Black Swans are prevalent.  Paradoxically, what should be acknowledged in the 
research are the roles of luck and randomness to appreciate the likelihood of surprises and not 
overestimate how much we think we know. 
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APPENDICES
 
Appendix 1. Pulse Survey Periods and Responses 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. Pulse Survey Questions 
Employees at all US locations were “encouraged to complete the Pulse survey to provide timely feedback 
on topics that are particularly important to their business.”  Survey participants were asked to “check the 
box in each row that best describes how they feel about the following statements for the company at 
large” using a typical five-level Likert scale of strongly disagree, disagree, neutral (neither agree or 
disagree), agree or strongly agree.  Responses were coded categorically as strongly disagree=1; 
disagree=2; neutral (neither agree or disagree)=3; agree-4; strongly agree=5. 
 
1. Within this company, decisions are made in a timely, efficient manner. 
2. This company regularly adapts its work processes to the changing needs of its business. 
3. At this company, resources and efforts are focused on what matters most.** (Culture Behaviors) 
4. Leaders are making decisions in the best interests of the entire company instead of their own 
division's needs. 
5. At this company, employees willingly provide candid and direct feedback to others. 
6. Leaders reward and recognize employees who experiment and learn. 
7. Individual work goals and priorities are clearly communicated to me. 
8. I use “The Company” products to connect with others for ANY DAY occasions. 
9. I advocate the use of “The Company's” NEW products. 
10. This company values my contribution.** (Contribution) 
11. In this company, there is open, honest two-way communication.** (Communication) 
12. I feel that I am part of a team.** (Involvement and Belonging) 
13. I trust the leadership of this company.** (Trust) 
14. The leadership of this company has communicated a vision of the future that motivates me.**  
(Future/Vision) 
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15. At this company, people are held accountable for achieving appropriate objectives. 
16. I believe this company has an outstanding future** (Future/Vision). 
17. I am confident this company will be able to transform its business.** (Future/Vision) 
18. I would gladly refer good friends or family members to this company for employment.* (Advocacy) 
19. I rarely think about looking for a new job with another company.* (Commitment) 
20. I am proud to work for “The Company.”* (Pride) 
21. Overall, I am extremely satisfied with this company as a place to work.* (Satisfaction) 
 
Survey participants were asked to provide the following information. Response options with their 
categorical coding are listed under each question.  
22. What gender are you?  
“Female” = 1; “Male” = 2 
23. What is your job level?  
“Individual contributor”=1; “Front line supervisor”=2; “Middle manager (grades 11-14)”=3; 
“Senior manager (grade 15+)”=4; “Don’t know”=5*** 
24. How long have you worked for “The Company”? 
“Less than a year”=1; “1-3years” =2; “More than 3 years but less than 5”=3; “5-10 years”=4; 
“More than 10 years but less than 20”=5; “20 years or more”=6 
25. What year were you born? 
“Before 1945”=1; “1945-1960” =2; “1961-1967”=3; “1968-1981”=4; “1982 or later”=5 
 
*Results from these four questions are used to measure the employee engagement in the case study analysis as the 
percent of employees who agree with all four questions.  The employee engagement index (EEI) score utilized by 
The Company uses the same questions to measure the average percent of employees who agree with the four 
questions. EEI scores will not be utilized in the case study. 
 
**Questions are significantly correlated to the four questions used to measure employee engagement.  
 
***For question #23, responses of “Don’t Know”=5 were removed from the data analysis. 
 
 
 
Appendix 3. Pulse Follow-Up Interview Questions 
1. What is your job level?  
• Individual contributor 
• Front line supervisor 
• Middle manager (grades 11-14) 
• Senior manager (grade 15+) 
2. How long have you worked for “The Company”? 
• 1-3years 
• More than 3 years but less than 5 
• 5-10 years 
• More than 10 years but less than 20 
• 20 years or more 
3. What year were you born? 
• Before 1945 
• 1945-1960 
• 1961-1967 
• 1968-1981  
• 1982 or later 
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4. Do you believe the company has the capabilities it needs to succeed? Why or why not? 
5. Do you have access to the resources you need to succeed? Why or why not? 
6. Do you think the company’s social practices affect knowledge/knowing within the company?  If so, 
how?  What are examples? 
7. Do you think the company’s leadership behaviors affect knowledge/knowing within the company? If 
so, how?  What are examples? 
8. If not already mentioned, what behaviors do you experience that build or erode trust? 
9. Do you trust the skills and talents of senior leaders?  Why or why not? 
10. Do you think the company is building competitive advantages?  Why, why not and how? 
11. Do you agree with all four statements that measure engagement? (shown as #18-21 in Appendix 2) 
 
 
 
Appendix 4. Post Employment Interview Questions 
Reflecting on your experience at The Company: 
1. Were there factors that inhibited your performance and/or ability to learn?  If so, how? 
2. Do you think the company’s social practices affect knowledge/knowing within the company?  If 
so, how?   
3. Do you think the company’s leadership behaviors affect knowledge/knowing within the 
company? If so, how?   
4. Is there a cultural belief that job level equates to knowledge?  Any implications?   
5. Based on your responses, are there implications to building competitive advantages?  If so, what? 
 
 
 
Appendix 5. New Labels for Dichotomous Variables 
Variable Label Survey Question 
Bright Future 16. I believe this company has an outstanding future. 
Trust 13. I trust the leadership of this company. 
Future Vision 14. The leadership of this company has communicated a vision of the future that 
motivates me. 
Transform 17. I am confident this company will be able to transform its business. 
Value Contribution 10. This company values my contribution. 
Open Comm 11. In this company, there is open, honest two-way communication. 
Focus Matters  3. At this company, resources and efforts are focused on what matters most. 
Team 12. I feel that I am part of a team. 
 
 
  
130 
 
 
Appendix 6: Logistic Regression Table 11 
Variables in the Equation with Values Contribution as Dependent Variable 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a 
Gender -.121 .057 4.433 1 .035 .886 .792 .992 
Employment Length -.166 .027 36.570 1 .000 .847 .803 .894 
Year Born -.009 .036 .062 1 .804 .991 .924 1.063 
Job Status .539 .075 51.195 1 .000 1.715 1.479 1.988 
Middle Manager -.378 .161 5.507 1 .019 .685 .500 .940 
Oct Survey -.565 .056 101.979 1 .000 .568 .509 .634 
Constant 1.488 .246 36.427 1 .000 4.427   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Gender, Employment Length, Year Born, Job Status, Middle Manager, Oct Survey. 
Table 11. Predictive Model for employees who believe this company values their contribution 
 
 
Appendix 7: Logistic Regression Table 12  
 
Variables in the Equation with Team as Dependent Variable 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a 
Gender -.346 .061 31.990 1 .000 .708 .628 .798 
Employment 
Length 
-.207 .031 45.379 1 .000 .813 .765 .863 
Year Born -.033 .039 .706 1 .401 .968 .897 1.045 
Job Status .682 .090 56.987 1 .000 1.978 1.657 2.360 
Middle Manager -.660 .191 12.006 1 .001 .517 .356 .751 
Oct Survey -.231 .060 14.779 1 .000 .794 .705 .893 
Constant 2.086 .275 57.734 1 .000 8.056   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Gender, Employment Length, Year Born, Job Status, Middle Manager, Oct Survey. 
 
Table 12. Predictive Model for employees who feel that they are part of a team 
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Appendix 8: Logistic Regression Table 14  
 
Variables in the Equation with Focus Matters as Dependent Variable 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a 
Gender -.031 .052 .361 1 .548 .970 .876 1.073 
Employment Length -.163 .023 49.472 1 .000 .849 .811 .889 
Year Born -.097 .032 9.348 1 .002 .908 .853 .966 
Job Status .247 .054 21.346 1 .000 1.281 1.153 1.422 
Middle Manager -.462 .116 15.824 1 .000 .630 .502 .791 
Oct Survey -.126 .050 6.298 1 .012 .882 .799 .973 
Constant .795 .209 14.418 1 .000 2.214   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Gender, EmploymentLength, YearBorn, JobStatus, MiddleManager, Oct_Survey. 
 
Table 14. Predictive Model for employees who believe resources and efforts are focused on what matters most 
 
Appendix 9: Correlation of Pride for The Company and Belief in Future Success   
Correlations 
 Have 
Pride 
Bright 
Future.16 
Trust.13 FutureVision.14 Transform.17 
Have Pride 
Pearson Correlation 1 .358** .399** .374** .336** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 7593 7593 7593 7593 7593 
Bright Future.16 
Pearson Correlation .358** 1 .514** .539** .711** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 .000 
N 7593 7630 7630 7630 7630 
Trust.13 
Pearson Correlation .399** .514** 1 .582** .521** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 .000 
N 7593 7630 7630 7630 7630 
FutureVision.14 
Pearson Correlation .374** .539** .582** 1 .535** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  .000 
N 7593 7630 7630 7630 7630 
Transform.17 
Pearson Correlation .336** .711** .521** .535** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 7593 7630 7630 7630 7630 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
  
132 
 
 
Appendix 10: February 2011 survey comments suggesting communication improvements 
We have to end the ultra secretive nature that departments have about what they are doing. No 
one in this company should ever have to sign a non-disclosure agreement about a product [The 
Company] is making. We are all one team. We are all in this together. It just always feels like it's 
us against them when dealing with internal divisions around here.  
(Male individual contributor, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
[Name of senior leader D] does an outstanding job of being spontaneous, open, available and 
communicative in person (Male middle manager, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
I think we're on the right path, now more people need to step up and use communication tools to 
actually communicate! (Male individual contributor, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
Need better management and directors who share information within the merchandising group. 
(Female individual contributor, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
This past year was very beneficial when the management team came to 2420 for meetings. It 
presented a more relaxed atmosphere to ask questions. I hope it continues.  
(Female individual contributor, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
Need more opportunities for two-way communication  
(Female front line supervisor, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
Management should be more open to constructive criticism. Not taking it personally. 
(Female front line supervisor, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
Need more information about progress on corporate direction as it relates to the entire company 
(Male individual contributor, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
Need more timely information-proactive rather than reactive.  
(Female front line supervisor, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
Foster an atmosphere where ideas and suggestions are welcomed by managers/team leaders 
(Male front line supervisor, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
Immediate management needs to communicate more with staff  
(Female front line supervisor, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
Don't tell us what we already know.  Tell us the bigger picture.  
(Female individual contributor, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
More "in the moment" language, less "crafted” 
(Female senior manager, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
 
Honest discussion, no more spin, no more stories and enough with the blogs on dealing with 
change. We're not 12, we're professionals in a highly skilled and specialized field  
(Male individual contributor, Pulse Survey February 2011) 
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Appendix 11: “Win as Much as You Can” Group Facilitation Exercise  
Formal Meeting “Foundations of Business Process” in 2010: Purpose was to build awareness of business 
process and collaborative thinking through a series of functional and cross-functional team meetings 
conducted throughout the 2010. Total attendees included 300+ US employees across various job levels.   
  
The purpose of the exercise was to “break the ice” by playing a game at the meeting open and examine 
aspects of acculturated social behavior in situations where players had to choose between supporting 
individual team interests versus group benefit.  The only 
game rules given to participants were to 1) get in four 
teams, 2) name your team, and 3) optimize results to 
“win as much as you can” in four rounds of play where 
each round, teams were asked to submits a ballot with 
the word “red” or “green” noted with their team name.  
Participants asked for more rules, none were given 
instead they were instructed to devise their own strategy 
and they could discuss it with whomever they wish.   
 
At the conclusion of four rounds, teams totals were 
tabulated along with the total payout across all teams.  
Team(s) that submitted “red” ballots realized they sub-optimized results because if all teams submitted 
“green” ballots for all four rounds the total group payout is maximized at $1600.  Any “red” plays place 
team interests over the group and sub-optimize overall results by reducing the total payout amount.  
Of the games played in the US in 2010, only one session did the group with every team play “all green” 
which equates to roughly 5% of total participants.  Notably, this group was the functional leadership team 
from Operations that expressed they could not play any other way – they had to depend on one another.  
 
 
Appendix 12. The Company’s Decision-Making Model Explained  
As part of business transformation The Company recognized that changing the culture required deliberate 
efforts to define the desired cultural attributes and establish new employee behaviors to achieve the 
desired results of sustainable profitable growth, increased consumer engagement and expanded brand 
relevance.  The Decision-Making Model consists of four parts to be used to increase clarity, 
accountability and timely action on decisions: frame, debate, decide, and act.  First, “frame” the scope of 
the decision that needs to be made, determine the decision-maker, whose input is needed and the timeline 
for the decision to be made.  The expectation for employees in this step is “do your homework.”  
“Debate” the options after stating an initial recommendation and ask for all points of view.  The 
expectation for employees is to vigorously debate the options.  Third, “decide” with courage by making 
the decision “based on weighing pros/cons of all inputs” and “communicate and document the decision 
and the rationale.”  The expectation for employees is to “support uniformly, no going back! (rare 
exceptions).”  Lastly, “act” to get results by developing a communication plan to activate the decision, 
delegate responsibilities and accept accountability.  The employee expectation is to be accountable for the 
success of the decision and give clear and honest feedback with a focus on moving forward and learning.   
5 
Lets Play 
Win As Much As You Can 
The Payoffs  
 
4 REDS     All Lose $100 
 
3 REDS     Win   $100 
1 GREEN     Lose  $100 
 
2 REDS     Win   $200 
2 GREENS    Lose  $200 
 
1 RED     Win   $300 
3 GREENS    Lose  $100 
 
4 GREENS     All Win $100 
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Appendix 13. The Company "Leadership Model for the Future" 2009 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 14. The Company Behavior Principles from WoodstoneTM Consulting (2007): 
The training program that began with a core group of senior managers was cascaded to all senior and 
middle managers in a three-day course that was generally referred to as WoodstoneTM.  The business 
objectives of the course were to drive the success of business transformation by outlining clear 
expectations of leadership behaviors, instill respectful truth-telling, and create self-awareness that 
together fosters overall culture change at The Company.  A condensed version of the curriculum was 
launched across the company and titled “Stepping Stones – The Pathway to Leadership Excellence.”  
 
Both WoodstoneTM and the condensed version, Stepping Stones, are comprised of topics that range from 
The Company’s state of the business, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), topics on emotional 
intelligence, authentic communication and The WoodstoneTM high performance model.  As part of the 
model, employees were asked to “assume positive intent” in their conversations with others and accept 
accountability as described below.  
 
• You are accountable for your own performance 
• You are accountable for the success of your stakeholders 
• You must be willing and able to subordinate your personal agenda for the good of the company goal 
 
Behavior has consequences: if you are unwilling or incapable of you cannot be on this team. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Hallmark Leadership 
 
 2 10.23.13     |         CREATIVE CONTENT, BRAND & ESSENCING     |     Emotion, Meaning, & 
Storytelling 
 
 
WHAT IS LEADERSHIP? 
 
Leadership is the ability to envision where you want to go and make clear choices on how to get there. True 
leadership requires a passion for the purpose of the organization, the courage to follow a previously uncharted 
path, and the ability to attract the help of others. 
 
Resource management and tactical execution of day-to-day checklists are necessary for the company to function. 
True is also about the passionate pursuit of something glittering on the horizon while inspiring and emboldening 
others to move forward to achieve a shared vision of the future.   
 
 
A Leadership Style that’s “on top of” 
others, only looking down at 
resources and day-to-day tasks 
without a future focus.  
A Leadership Style that’s “in front of” 
others focused forward and inspiring people 
to follow and create the future. 
For Organizations That Plan 
To Stay In One Place 
For Organizations That Intend 
to Move Forward 
VS. 
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Appendix 15. Informed Consent Statement for The Company’s Survey Data 
 
INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT 
A Case Study on Organizational Knowledge Creation 
 
The purpose of the qualitative case study is to test the theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation in a 
US based firm to determine its relevance to American organizations and contribute to theory by exploring 
how social practices and leadership behaviors affect employee knowledge. 
   
RISKS AND BENEFITS    
The Department of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies at the University of Kansas supports the 
practice of protection for human subjects participating in research.  No risks, burden, inconvenience, or 
discomfort are anticipated with your participation in the study.  There are no direct benefits anticipated to 
you as a result of this study.  No payments are provided to any participants. 
 
PARTICIPANT CONFIDENTIALITY 
The corporation name or employee names will not be associated in any publication or presentation with 
the information collected or with the research findings from this study.  Instead, the researcher will use 
pseudonyms rather than names.  
 
Permission granted on this date to use and disclose your information remains in effect indefinitely.  By 
signing this form you give permission for the use and disclosure of employee pulse surveys from 2011 
for purposes of this study at any time in the future. 
 
QUESTIONS ABOUT PARTICIPATION 
Questions should be directed to the researcher(s) listed at the end of this consent form. 
 
PARTICIPANT CERTIFICATION: 
I have read this Consent and Authorization form. I have had the opportunity to ask, and I have received 
answers to, any questions I had regarding the study.  I understand that if I have any additional questions 
about my rights as a research participant, I may call (785) 864-7429 or (785) 864-7385, write the Human 
Subjects Committee Lawrence Campus (HSCL), University of Kansas, 2385 Irving Hill Road, Lawrence, 
Kansas 66045-7568, or email mdenning@ku.edu.  
 
 
 
_______________________________         _____________________ 
           Type/Print Participant's Name   Date 
 
 _________________________________________    
                               Participant's Signature 
 
Researcher Contact Information: 
Tammy Broaddus                                  John Rury Ph.D. 
Principal Investigator                          Faculty Supervisor - University of Kansas 
Educational Leadership & Policy Studies   Educational Leadership & Policy Studies 
(address & phone number provided)                    (address & phone number provided)                    
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Appendix 16. Informed Consent Statement for Interviews 
 
INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT 
Organizational Knowledge Creation and Social Practices 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies at the University of Kansas supports the 
practice of protection for human subjects participating in research.  The following information is provided 
for you to decide whether you wish to participate in the present study.  You may refuse to sign this form 
and not participate in this study.  You should be aware that even if you agree to participate, you are free to 
withdraw at any time.  If you do withdraw from this study, it will not affect your relationship with this 
unit, the services it may provide to you, or the University of Kansas. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
To determine how organizational knowledge creation is affected by social practices in large organizations 
as they initiate new strategies and build new capabilities to become more competitive in the marketplace.  
This case study of a single, large US company with a relatively homogenous population will test 
Nonaka’s and associates theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation and examine to what extent 
external forces and internal factors such as social practices affect the organizational knowledge creation 
process.   
 
PROCEDURES 
Thank you for providing your name at the end of the questionnaire to participate in this follow-up 
interview to learn more about your beliefs and opinions.  Your responses will be audio taped for research 
purposes only and will be destroyed at the conclusion of this research.  Quotes and/or references from this 
interview will be anonymous. 
 
RISKS    
No risks, burden, inconvenience, or discomfort are anticipated with your participation in the study.  You 
may choose to not answer any question if you are uncomfortable and end this interview at any time. 
 
BENEFITS 
There are no direct benefits anticipated to you as a result of this study. 
 
PAYMENT TO PARTICIPANTS  
No payment is provided but this interview is conducted during business hours at company X. 
 
PARTICIPANT CONFIDENTIALITY 
Your name will not be associated in any publication or presentation with the information collected about 
you or with the research findings from this study.  Instead, the researcher will use a study number or a 
pseudonym rather than your name. Your identifiable information will not be shared unless required by 
law or you give written permission. 
 
Permission granted on this date to use and disclose your information remains in effect indefinitely.  By 
signing this form you give permission for the use and disclosure of your information for purposes of this 
study at any time in the future. 
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REFUSAL TO SIGN CONSENT AND AUTHORIZATION 
You are not required to sign this Consent and Authorization form and you may refuse to do so without 
affecting your right to any services you are receiving or may receive from the University of Kansas or to 
participate in any programs or events of the University of Kansas.  However, if you refuse to sign, you 
cannot participate in this study. 
 
CANCELLING THIS CONSENT AND AUTHORIZATION 
You may withdraw your consent to participate in this study at any time.  You also have the right to cancel 
your permission to use and disclose further information collected about you, in writing, at any time, by 
sending your written request to Tammy Broaddus. 
 
If you cancel permission to use your information, the researchers will stop collecting additional 
information about you.  However, the research team may use and disclose information that was gathered 
before they received your cancellation, as described above.  
 
QUESTIONS ABOUT PARTICIPATION 
Questions about procedures should be directed to the researcher(s) listed at the end of this consent form. 
 
PARTICIPANT CERTIFICATION: 
I have read this Consent and Authorization form. I have had the opportunity to ask, and I have received 
answers to, any questions I had regarding the study.  I understand that if I have any additional questions 
about my rights as a research participant, I may call (785) 864-7429 or (785) 864-7385, write the Human 
Subjects Committee Lawrence Campus (HSCL), University of Kansas, 2385 Irving Hill Road, Lawrence, 
Kansas 66045-7568, or email mdenning@ku.edu.  
 
I agree to take part in this study as a research participant.  By my signature I affirm that I have received a 
copy of this Consent and Authorization form. 
 
_______________________________         _____________________ 
           Type/Print Participant's Name   Date 
 
 _________________________________________    
                               Participant's Signature 
 
 
Researcher Contact Information: 
Tammy Broaddus                                  John Rury Ph.D. 
Principal Investigator                          Faculty Supervisor - University of Kansas 
Educational Leadership & Policy Studies   Educational Leadership & Policy Studies 
(address & phone number provided)                    (address & phone number provided)                   
 
 
 
